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ABSTRACT
Despite its supposed secularization, in the last decades Europe has witnessed the 
flourishing of neo-populist movements - commonly regarded as ‘extreme right wing 
movements’ - which are characterized by charismatic leaders who proclaim their world- 
rejecting Salvationist creed to a devoted following. Previous explanations of these 
movements have been primarily materialistic. While valuable, such explanations do not 
address the internal beliefs, practices and world-views that motivate these groups. This 
thesis uses extensive archival material, interviews, publications, speeches, and other 
empirical data from within two of the most successful such groups, the National Front of 
Jean-Marie Le Pen and the Northern League of Umberto Bossi, to develop a more 
productive and inclusive model of charismatic political movements in the contemporary 
West. The thesis pays special attention to the non-material dimensions of these 
movements, focusing on the cultural frames that sustain the groups, sacral ize them and 
provide them with a world-view and place in history. These findings are systematized and 
integrated into an ideal type, designated as “Missionary Politics.” This missionary form 
of politics should be understood, following the methodological path of Emilio Gentile 
and Roger Griffin, as a cluster concept, defined as a political religion, and characterized 
by a dynamic interaction between charismatic leadership, a narrative of salvation, 
outsiderhood and ritualization, and the creation of a moral community invested with a 
collective mission of battling conspiratorial enemies and of redeeming the nation from its 
current crisis. The thesis argues that the notion of Missionary Politics sheds light on non­
material dynamics in contemporary radical populist movements that have previously been 
unnoticed or ignored by contemporary social analysis. Furthermore, current trends toward 
increased globalization, European integration, and Islamic immigration have the potential 
to increase the allure and potency of charismatic European faith-based movements 
proclaiming a politics of salvation.




1. The Secularization Paradigm ................................................  5
2. Mission in Max Weber’s Sociology......................................  9
3. Mission and Secular Religions.......................................... 12
4. The Problem ............................................................................  25
5. Missionary Paradigm: Approach and Methodology ... 28
6. Case Studies.............................................................................  34
7. Plan of the T hesis...................................................................  36
LE PEN AND THE NATIONAL FRONT
1. The C risis...............................................................................  37
2. The Group as The Elected.................................................  40
. Historical Continuity......................   40
. The Definition of the G roup...............................................  45
. The Group Under S iege....................................................... 48
. The National Front’s Exceptionality.................................  59
3. Le Pen as The Savior 63
23.1. The Le Pen Industry....................................................  63
.The Inner Circle...............................................................  63
.The Leader’s Discourse..................................................  73
.The Personalized Party..................................................  81
3.2 Religious Symbolism........................................................ 85
. Rhetoric..............................................................................  85
. Rituals.................................................................................  90
. Moral Community.............................................................  98
. Charisma.............................................................................  104
3.3 The Succession of the Charismatic L eader...................  105
4. Politics as Salvation.............................................................  106
UMBERTO BOSSI AND THE NORTHERN LEAGUE
1. The C risis..............................................................................  I l l
2. The Group as the Vanguard............................................. 112
. Historical Continuity........................................................... 112
. The Definition of the G roup..................................................  116
. The Group Under S iege......................................................... 119
. The League’s Exceptionality................................................  137
3. Bossi as The Savior...............................................................  140
3.1 The Bossi Industry............................................................  140
. The Inner C ircle.............................................................  140
. The Leader’s D iscourse................................................  147
. The Personalized P arty ..................................................  153
33.2 Religious Symbolism........................................................  158
. Rhetoric.......................................................................  159
. Rituals.............................................................................  159
. Moral Community......................................................  165
. Charisma......................................................................... 173
3.3 The Succession of the Charismatic Leader......................174
4. Politics as Salvation...................................................................  177
THE MISSIONARY MODEL
Elements of Sacredness....................................................... 181
1. A Sacred Nation................................................................  182
2. A Sacred History...............................................................  186
3. Chosen Peoples ...............................................................  189
4. Apocalypticism and Dynamics of Salvation.................  191
5. The Messianic Leader...................................................... 202
The Sacred Collective......................................................  211
1. Narrative and Outsiderhood....................................... 212
2. Ritualism and Outsiderhood.....................................  214
3. The Collective and Liminality..................................  216
4. Communitas and Militancy........................................ 218
. Group Dynamics, Commitment and Conversion .... 219
Leadership and the Missionary M odel.......................... 222
The Future of Missionary Politics.................................  224
4AN OVERVIEW ...........................................................................227
A ppendix......................................................................................  230
References 263
5Missionary Politics-Introduction
1. The Secularization Paradigm
Sociologists and historians have dedicated a body of literature, particularly since the 
1950s and 1960s, to the decline of religion both at a societal and an individual level. 
Although it is not a homogeneous group of writings and explanations, this literature has 
been clustered into the general term of “secularization theory.” The central argument is 
that, since the beginning of reformation in the sixteenth century through the 
enlightenment, the western world has suffered a process of multifaceted modernization 
that has led to the undermining of religion in the social system and in the minds and 
behavior of individuals.
Max Weber’s philosophy of history can be considered the prime reference in all 
social analysis of the dynamics and effects of secularization. In a speech given in 1918, 
the German sociologist argued that the increased trend of rationalization and 
intellectualization led to a “disenchanted world.” That is, “it means that principally there 
are no mysterious incalculable forces that come into play, but rather that one can, in 
principle, master all things by calculation.”1 In Weber’s view, a crucial development for 
the construction of an increasingly disenchanted world was the protestant reformation 
and the rise of a new work ethic that encouraged individualism and led to the emergence 
of modem capitalism.
In The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit o f Capitalism, Weber made a distinction 
between “outer-worldly ascetism” that promoted distance between the spiritual and the 
rest of society and the new “inner-worldly ascetism” that saw hard work, activism, and
1 Max Weber, “Science as a vocation”, speech given at Munich University, 1918, in H.H. Gerth and C.W. 
Mills From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, Oxford University Press, New York, 1958 (paperback 
edition), p. 139.
6diligence as a way of gaining God’s favor.2 This boost to individualism would, in the 
long term, undermine deep-rooted ideas about hierarchy and even the social relevance of 
religion for the organization and life of communities. A major feature of modernity’s 
march towards a “rational” construction of society was the prominence of an organized 
group of experts, a bureaucracy in charge of human affairs. Weber described the 
emergence of an era where authority was based on rational grounds. “The bureaucratic 
structure”, Weber wrote in Economy and Society, “is everywhere a late product of 
development. The further back we trace our steps, the more typical is the absence of 
bureaucracy and officialdom in the structure of domination. Bureaucracy has a ‘rational’ 
character: rules, means, ends, and matter-of-factness dominate its bearing.”3
On the whole, the theoretical spine of Weber’s analysis has remained central to 
the current secularization paradigm. Modernization is viewed as the greatest enemy of 
religion. One of the main contemporary defenders of the secularization paradigm, 
sociologist Steve Bruce, describes secularization as a “social condition manifest in (a) the 
declining importance of religion for the operation of non-religious roles and institutions 
such as those of the state and the economy; (b) a decline in the social standing of 
religious roles and institutions; and (c) a decline in the extent to which people engage in 
religious practices, display beliefs of a religious kind, and conduct other aspects of their 
lives in a manner informed by such beliefs.”4 This is, in sum, the view of the 
disenchanted world described by Weber. In Bruce’s words,
the clash of ideas between science and religion is less significant than the more subtle impact of 
naturalistic ways o f thinking about the world. Science and technology have not made us atheists. 
Rather, the fundamental assumptions that underlie them, which we can summarily describe as 
“rationality” ... make us less likely than our forebears to entertain the notion of the divine.5
This secularizing trend, however, as generally admitted by proponents of the 
secularization paradigm, tends to be geographically delimited to the western world. 
Sociologist Peter L. Berger, one of the fathers of the paradigm turned critic, observes the 
emergence of powerful movements of counter-secularization in the contemporary world.
2 Max Weber, Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, Scribner, Ny, 1958 (Originally published in 
1904-05).
3 Weber, Max “Economy and Society”, in H.H Gerth and C.W. Mills, op.cit, p.244.
4 Bruce, Steve “God is Dead: Secularization in the West”, Blackwell Publishing, Malden, Mass, 2002, p. 3.
He particularly emphasizes Islamism and evangelicalism as “the two most dynamic 
religious upsurges in the world today.”6 These movements are orthodox in the sense that 
they are characterized by an intense religious fervor and a return to traditional sources of 
religious authority. Similarly, Philip Jenkins argues in The Next Christendom that the 
center of gravity of the Christian world has shifted from Europe and the United States to 
the Southern Hemisphere. “Christians”, Jenkins writes, “are facing a shrinking population 
in the liberal west and a growing majority of the traditional Rest. During the past half- 
century the critical centers of the Christian world have moved decisively to Africa, to 
Latin America, and to Asia. The balance will never shift back.”7
A school of thought particularly critical of the secularization paradigm that has 
gained prevalence in the last decades has been the application of “rational-choice theory” 
applied to religious studies. It is essentially a supply-side theory of religion and has as a 
major contributor, among others, sociologist Rodney Stark. While accepting a macro-, 
version of secularization, in terms of institutional differentiation between the church and 
the state, the supply-side school rejects the notion that there has been a micro-version of 
secularization in the last centuries, that is, a general decline in religious commitment, in 
individual piety and belief. The demand for religion has always remained constant since 
people always want the salvation and relief from fear that religion has too offer. 
Therefore the fact that the levels of subjective religiousness remain high even in the 
nations most often cited as examples of secularization undermine the secularization 
doctrine.8
From this perspective, religion is seen as a product in the marketplace and, from 
the various options available, people choose according to their hopes, fears and needs. 
The implication is that people act rationally in choosing their religion. Therefore, an 
environment of religious freedom (pluralism), with open competition between religions, 
enhances religious vitality and the level of consumption (in terms of a more active not.
5 Ibid. p. 28-29.
6 Berger, Peter L. (Ed), The Desecularization of the World: Resurgent Religion and World Politics, 
Eedermans, William B., Publishing Company, 1999. pp. 6-7.
7 Philip Jenkins, “The Next Christianity”, in The Atlantic Monthly, October 2002, p.; see also, The Next 
Christendom: The Coming o f Global Christianity, Oxford University Press, 2003 (paperback).
8 On this issue see, Rodney Stark, “Secularization R.I.P,” in Rodney Stark and Roger Finke, Acts o f Faith: 
Explaining the Human Side o f Religion, Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 2000, 
pp.57-79.
8lazy laity). Religion is consequently subject to the laws of supply and demand. This 
factor explains the religious disparities within the western world. That is why the United 
States is a more religious country that European countries (where religious monopoly has 
a stronger tradition that undermines the “religious market).9
Even if it has been challenged, the secularization theory is still a dominant one 
and shared by many scholars. In a recent work Inglehart and Norris have established a 
direct link between the process of societal modernization and the declining importance of 
religious values in postindustrial notions. One of their conclusions is worth quoting in its 
entirety:
We conclude that due to rising levels o f human security, the publics o f  virtually all advanced 
societies have been m oving tow ards m ore secular orientations. We demonstrate that 
“modernization” (the process of industrialization, urbanization, and rising levels of education and 
wealth) greatly weakens the influence o f religious institutions in affluent societies, bringing 
lower rates o f attendance at religious services, and making religion subjectively less important in 
people’s lives.10
“In Europe”, observes sociologist of religion Philip Jenkins, “Christianity is 
largely a dead issue.”11 In fact, at both a popular and a scholarly level, the current 
assumption is that religion is on the decline in Europe, particularly Western Europe. The 
secularization paradigm seems to hold in European territory. In fact, if attention is paid to 
the religious upsurge in other parts of the world, in matters of faith Europe increasingly 
looks like an exceptional case.12 This can be seen at two levels: at an institutional level 
church attendance is at an all-time low, the majority of churchgoers are overwhelmingly 
elderly and the church, either Protestant and Catholic, has increasing difficulty in­
recruiting members for the clergy; at an individual level, very few people follow church-
9 Ibid, pp. 220-233
10 Inglehart, Ronald and Pippa Norris, Sacred and Secular: Religion and Politics Worldwide, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 2004, p. 18.
11 Philip Jenkins, “Christianity’s New Center”, in The Atlantic Monthly, Interviews, September 2002, p.
12 Inglehart and Norris stress the fact that the notion of “secular exception” of Europe should be extended to 
all of the postindustrial societies. To her, “secularization is not taking place only in Western Europe, as 
some critics have claimed (though it was first observed there). It is occurring in most advanced industrial 
societies including Australia, New Zealand, Japan and Canada ... But even in America there has been a 
lesser but perceptible trend toward secularization; the trend has been partly masked by massive 
immigration of people with relatively traditional worldviews.” In Inglehart, Ronald and Pippa Norris, 
op.cit, p. 18
9dictated codes of behavior and an increasing number plays down the importance of 
religion in their personal lives.13
In this environment it come as no surprise that the member states of the European 
Union decided to exclude any reference to God in the newly-approved European 
Constitution. There is no reference to the Christian roots of Europe either. Instead there is 
a somewhat vague reference in the preamble of the document to “the cultural, religious 
and humanist inheritance of Europe.”14 It is a symbolic but very significant episode of a 
continuous narrative of secularization.
2. Mission in Max Weber’s Sociology
In his analysis, Weber describes how the Western World was indeed marching towards 
an inexorable rationalization. However, Weber leaves open the possibility of 
discontinuities in this process. Weber’s introduction of the concept of charisma in social 
science should be seen as way of counterbalancing this rationalist trend with the 
occasional irruption of the irrational and enchanted in the modem world. In politics, this 
means the possibility of heroic leadership. The emphasis on heroic leadership was not 
new in itself, after all, thinkers such as Thomas Carlyle before him had put forward 
“great man” theories of leadership and historical change. “For, as I take it, Universal 
History, the history of what man has accomplished in this world,” declared Carlyle in 
1840, “is at bottom the History of the Great Men who have worked here.” 15
Weber’s innovation is his emphasis both placed on the concept of charisma and 
charismatic domination. This is a major contribution to subsequent leadership literature. 
Charismatic authority is the opposite of the legal or bureaucratic authority. Indeed, it rests
13 “The European Values Study: A Third Wave”, Tilburg University, 1999/2000.
14 “Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe -  Preamble”, in http://european-convention.eu. The EU 
leaders reached agreement on the new Constitutional Treaty for Europe at the European Council in Brussels 
on June 17 and 18 2004. The Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe will be signed on October 29,
2004 in Rome. It then has to be ratified by all Member States either by parliamentary approval and/or 
referendum.
15 Carlyle, Thomas, “On Heroes and Hero Worship,” Everyman’s Library, Dutton, New York, 1962, p.239. 
(first published in 1841 and based on a series of lectures he delivered in 1840.)
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“on devotion to the exceptional sanctity, heroism or exemplary character of an individual 
person, and of the normative patterns or order revealed or ordained by him.”16 The* 
concept of charisma is a religious term meaning “the gift of grace.” In the New 
Testament the apostle Paul describes a char ism as a divine bestowal of power incapable 
of being induced by human effort and manifestating itself in spiritual gifts (charismata) 
such as prophecy, healing, and glossolalia.17 Using the work of religious scholar Rudolph 
Sohm as a basis, Weber took the concept from its original Christian context and tried to 
make it operational in the historical and social domain. Therefore, there should be no 
surprise at the persistence of religious undertones in Weber’s work on charisma. 
Charismatic leaders resemble the biblical prophets. “The term ‘charisma,’” he wrote in 
his landmark study Economy and Society,
will be applied to a certain quality of an individual personality by virtue o f which he is 
considered extraordinary and treated as endowed with supernatural, superhuman, or at least 
specifically exceptional powers or qualities. These are such as are not accessible to the ordinary 
person, but are regarded as o f divine origin or as exemplary, and on the basis o f them the. 
individual concerned is treated as a “leader.” 8
In the beginning, there is a “revelation” that proves to people that the leader should be 
followed. “It is recognition on the part of those subject to authority which is decisive for 
the validity of charisma. This recognition is freely given and guaranteed by what is held 
to be a proof, originally always a miracle, and consists in devotion to the corresponding 
revelation, hero worship, or absolute trust in the leader.”19
A central tenet of Weber’s theory on charismatic authority is the concept of 
“mission.” It is another term that Weber took from Christian vocabulary. In Trinitarian 
theology it means the sending into the world of the Son or Spirit by the Father, or of the 
Spirit by the Son, especially for the purpose of salvation.20 Understandably, the apostles 
of the New Testament used terminology that intimately linked with a sense of mission or 
vocation in life. “Pure charisma,” Weber writes, “is specifically foreign to economic 
considerations. Wherever it appears, it constitutes a ‘call’ in the most emphatic sense of





the word, a ‘mission’ or a ‘spiritual duty’.”21 Weber makes it clear that the charismatic 
leader is driven by a sense of mission, of “calling” or “vocation.” In Politics as a 
Vocation, he declares,
Here we are interested above all in the second of these types: domination by virtue o f the 
devotion of those who obey the purely personal “charisma” of the “leader.” For this is the root of 
the idea of a calling  in its highest expression. Devotion to the charisma of the prophet, or the 
leader in war, or to the great demagogue in the ecclesia or in parliament, means that the leader is 
personally recognized as the innerly “called” leader of men. Men do not obey him by virtue of 
tradition or statute, but because they believe in him. If he is more than a narrow and vain upstart 
of the moment, the leader lives for his cause and strives for his work.22
In Weber’s work, the role in history of these leaders with a sense of mission is 
crucial. Although he describes the coming of a world run by bureaucrats, Weber longs for 
a world run by true charismatic leaders driven by a cause. This is particularly important 
for democracies, in which “there is only the choice between leadership democracy with a 
‘machine’ and leaderless democracy, namely, the rule of professional politicians without 
a calling, without the inner charismatic qualities that make a leader.” In a paragraph very 
revealing of his mindset Weber observes,
all historical experience confirms the truth -  that man would not have attained the possible unless 
time and again he had reached out for the impossible. But to do that a man must be a leader, and 
not only a leader but a hero as w e ll ... Only he has the calling for politics who is sure that he shall 
not crumble when the world from his point o f view is too stupid or too base for what he wants to 
offer. Only he who in the face of all this can say ‘in spite of all’ has the calling for politics.23
Recognition of the charismatic leader and complete personal devotion to the 
possessor of the charismatic quality arise out of either “enthusiasm” or of “despair and 
hope.”24 The charismatic leader sense of mission comes into being during a period of 
crisis. The effect of a crisis is dual: crisis disrupts the social and psychological 
equilibrium and increases the need for a strong leader; crisis also leads to the
20 quote
21 Ibid, p.244
22 Weber, Max, “Politics as a vocation”, in H.H. Gerth and C.W. Mills, op.cit, p.79.
23 Ibid. p. 128.
24 Weber, Max “Economy and Society”, op.cit, p.242.
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development of the sense of mission by the future leader. It reinforces his inner drive to 
act and lead. It strengthens his own devotion and faith in his mission. In Weber’s words,
The mere fact o f recognizing the personal mission of a charismatic master establishes his power. 
Whether it is more active or passive, this recognition derives from the surrender o f the faithful to 
the extraordinary and unheard-of, to what is alien to all regulation and tradition and therefore is 
viewed as divine -  surrender which arises from distress or enthusiasm.25
3. Mission in Secular Religions
That the life and mission of religious leaders are at the center of Weber’s analysis of 
charismatic leadership is understandable. After all, the type of devotion and inner calling 
described by Weber can easily be found, for example, in the examples taken from the 
Bible or medieval history, in times where the religious sphere was admittedly more 
central to the life of individuals, groups, and communities. However, Weber was 
particularly pessimistic about the march of rationalization and bureaucracy and its 
implications for men. The potential danger was spiritual emptiness and a government of 
bureaucrats and technocrats removed from the people.
Thus Weber stressed the importance of the political sphere in the modem world 
as a last resort of freedom and creativity in history. As in the past a charismatic religious* 
leader could affect the evolution of history, so in modernity a charismatic political leader 
could do the same. Charisma is in Weber’s view a “specifically revolutionary force,” a 
locus of creativity and freedom. In his words, “[charisma] may then result in a radical 
alteration of the central attitudes and directions of action with a completely new 
orientation of all attitudes toward the different problems of the ‘world’” It is not 
surprising that Weber rejected what he saw as a “leaderless democracy,” typically
25 Max Weber, Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretative Sociology, op.cit, vol.2 p.l 115
26 Ibid, p.245.
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parliamentary democracy, and opted instead for a “plebiscitarian democracy,” a case of 
“democracy with a leader.”27
The sense of mission of the charismatic political leader described by Weber, 
unlike that of the charismatic religious leader, is not divine: It is not based on a divine 
revelation and the leader does not pledge to do any God’s work, or say any God’s words. 
There is, however, a vagueness in Weber’s description of charismatic political 
movements. There was no actual detailed description of the political leader’s mission. In 
Weber’s somewhat vague analysis, the religious undertones of the political charismatic 
leader remain powerful. The Leader is somehow perceived as superhuman. There is an 
intense emotional attachment between the leader and the followers. The followers blindly 
follow their leader and his mission. The charismatic relationship has more to do with 
emotion than with reason.
It is clear that here is a quasi-religious dimension to the relationship between 
leader and follower even if the final goal is not religious in the narrow sense of bringing 
people closer to God or an afterlife. A movement may be religious in a broader sense, 
even though Weber never specifically developed his analysis of what has come to be 
known in the domain of social sciences as “secular religions.” Such secular religions are 
intimately linked with the exaltation and deification of the concept of nation typical of 
modernity, particularly since the American and French revolutions of the eighteenth 
century. The connection between the sacred and the nation can be seen in the “Social 
Contract,” written in 1762, by French philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau. In a section 
titled “On Civil Religion,” Rousseau defended the necessity for any new nation-state of 
creating its own civic religion in order to strengthen the links of the citizens to the 
national community. The “dogmas of civil religion” were a necessary and positive thing. 
In the words of Rousseau,
The dogmas of the civil religion ought to be simple, few in number, precisely worded, without 
explanations or commentaries. The existence of a powerful, intelligent, beneficent divinity that 
foresees and provides; the life to come; the happiness o f the just; the punishment o f the wicked; 
the sanctity o f the social contract and of the laws. These are the positive dogmas. As for the 
negative dogmas, I limit them to just one, namely intolerance.28
27 Max Weber, “Politics as a Vocation,” in H.H. Gerth and C.W.Mills, op.cit, and p. 113.
28 Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, On the Social Contract, Hackett Publishing Company, Indianapolis, 1987,
p. 102.
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French traveler and historian Alexis de Tocqueville also made some insightful 
observations about the links between religious faith and political action in his 1856 book 
The Old Regime and the French Revolution. Commenting on the French Revolution, he 
noted that it followed the lines of a religious revolution. To Tocqueville,
No previous political upheaval, however violent, had aroused such passionate enthusiasm, for the 
ideal the French Revolution set before it was not merely a change in the French social system but 
nothing short o f a regeneration of the whole human race. It created an atmosphere of missionary 
fervor and, indeed, assumed all the aspects o f a religious revival -  much to the consternation of 
contemporary observers.29
Weber also touched upon the subject of secular religions in a manuscript that, however, 
he never finished. In it he wrote: “In its first and most energetic manifestations the idea of 
nation has involved, in a way or another, even if in a concealed way, the legend of a 
‘providential’ mission, which accomplishment would be taken upon by those to whom it 
was directed the pathos of being its representatives.”
However, it would be up to a contemporary of Weber’s, French sociologist Emile 
Durkheim, to develop further the process of the transfer of the worship of the deity to the 
worship of the nation. At the very basis of Durkheim's sociology is his functional and 
experiential definition of religion. To him,
We arrive thus at the following definition: A religion is a unified system of beliefs and practices 
relative to sacred things, things set apart and forbidden -  beliefs and practices, which unite into 
one single moral community called a Church, all those who adhere to them.31
Durkheim sees all religious systems as being based on the distinction between the 
profane, or the ordinary world, and the sacred, the religious world. What separates these 
two realms is a collective system of beliefs, myths, rites, and symbols. In Durkheim’s 
explanation,
29 Tocqueville, Alexis De., The Old Regime and the French Revolution, Doubleday Anchor Books, New 
York, 1955, pp.12-13. (first published in 1856)
30 Weber, Max in Cavalli, Luciano, II Capo Carismatico: Per una Sociologia Weberiana della leadership, 
II Mulino, Bologna, 1981, p.265.
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The division o f the world into two domains, one containing all that is sacred and the other all that 
is profane -  such is the distinctive trait o f religious thought. Beliefs, myths, dogmas and legends 
are either representations or systems of representations that express the nature of sacred things, 
the virtues and powers attributed to them, their history, and their relationships with one another as 
well as with profane things.32
Although Durkheim never mentions the words “secular religion,” he does consider the 
nation to be the contemporary form of the religious, with its sacred objects, emblems, and 
rituals establishing the moral community of the sacralized state. The flag, he said, is the 
totem of today.
After the American and French revolutions, a major boost to the concept of 
secular religions came from the rise of ideologies such as Fascism, Nazism, and 
Communism which had a strong component of faith, a communal dimension, and an 
ultimate goal of salvation not outside the world but within the world. Eric Voegelin was 
the first theorist specifically to name these movements “political Religions.” In a tract 
published in 1938 and confiscated by the Nazis the German philosopher denounced their 
anti-Christian nature, saying that “temporal religiosity, be it mankind, the volk, the class, 
the race, or the state, which is expressed as the Realissimum, is a falling away from God.” 
He added,
belief in man as the source o f good and of betterment o f the world, such as that which dominated 
the Enlightenment, and the belief in the collective as a mysterious, divine entity, as has been 
propagated since the 19th century, is anti-Christian, to use the language o f the Mystic o f  
Frankfurt; it is turning away.33
In a seminal study, Italian historian Emilio Gentile has outlined the development 
of “sacralization of politics” since the outbreak of modem nationalisms in America and 
Europe. For Gentile, this phenomenon emerged “when the political dimension, after 
gaining institutional autonomy from traditional religion, acquired its own religious 
dimension, in the sense that takes on a sacred character, [and] claims for itself the 
mission of defining the meaning and ultimate goal of human existence... for the
31 Durkheim, Emile, The Elementary forms of Religious Life, The Free Press, New York, 1995, p.44 
(Originally published in 1912).
32 Ibid, p.34.
33 Voegelin, Eric, Political Religions, New York, The Edwin Mellen Press, 1986, p.79 (Originally 
published in 1938)
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individual and collectivity.”34 Gentile distinguishes between two categories: Civil 
religion relates to the sacralization of a common civic creed and the development of a 
system of beliefs, symbols and rituals aimed at celebrating the collectivity. Robert Bellah, 
for example, has studied the quasi-religious dimension of American nationalist sentiment. 
Bellah, in his famous essay “Civil Religion in America” has described how the American 
civil religion “has its own prophets and its own martyrs, its own sacred events and sacred 
places, its own solemn rituals and symbols.”35 Adopting a clear Durkheimian approach 
Bellah showed how this religious dimension of American democracy spawns solidarity, 
and encourages the citizens to make sacrifices for the goals of the national community. 
Gentile contends that civil religions are typical of democratic regimes in order to create 
attachment and consensus. Political religion, on the other hand, is identified with the 
sacralization of politics by antidemocratic ideologies and regimes. For Gentile,
Political religion is the sacralization of a political system founded on the irrevocable monopoly of 
power, on ideological monism, and on compulsory and unconditional subordination o f the 
individual and collectivity to its [political religion] codes o f commandments: as a consequence 
the political religion is intolerant, imposing, integral and wants to permeate every aspect o f  
individual and collective life.36
Therefore, while civil religion is a form of sacralization of politics that serves to increase 
the legitimacy and allegiance to a given political system, political religion is a form of 
sacralized politics that is inherently “total” in the sense that drives the political 
movement, provides a worldview and gives meaning and sense to reality. It is on this 
form of sacralization of the political -  political religion -  that my thesis is focused.
One scholar who has elucidated the concept of political religions has been French 
sociologist Jean-Pierre Sironneau, who has studied what he sees as the “undeniable” 
transfer of sacredness from the religious sphere to the political sphere in some political 
ideologies and movements in the last two centuries. To Sironneau,
34 Gentile, Emilio, Le Religioni della Politico: Fra democrazie e totalitarismi, Editori Laterza, Roma-Bari,
2001, pp. x i, xn.
35 Bellah, Robert, “Civil Religion in America,” Daedalus, Journal of the American Academy of Arts and 
Sciences, Winter 1967, Vol.96, No.l.
36 Gentile, Emilio, op.cit, pp.XIII, XTV.
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“Political religions” are thus, among the metamorphoses o f the sacred in a secular world, those 
where the traditional manifestations o f religion (myth, rite, communion, faith) are easier to detect; 
they are the ones that best take over the legitimating o f social order religion used to perform. That 
is the reason why we have deemed it necessary after their explosion in the first part o f the 
twentieth centuiy, to study both their nature and their function.37
Nazism and Communism serve Sironneau as two major examples of political religions. 
Both ideologies share what Sironneau sees as the “four usual dimensions of religious 
phenomena”: a mythical core, ritual, communion, and faith. However, even though these 
secular religions play the functional role of religion, Sironneau is careful to point out that 
they are not religions in the phenomenological sense, in terms of “essence,” that is, of a 
belief in superhuman beings and solving the problem of life after death. To him, “the 
transcendence aimed at by the ‘political religions’ is a pseudo-transcendence because the 
hereafter, in the future, remains prisoner of the temporality of history.”
On the whole, when social science has focused on the concept of political 
religions it has done so either by taking as case studies movements such as Fascism, 
Nazism, and communism or by applying the concept to post-colonial states. Regarding 
the latter, the literature on post-colonial modernization, particularly in the 1960s, 
emphasized the role played by political religions in cementing the solidarity and 
collective commitment to the newborn nation states. David E. Apter, a proponent of this 
theory, described the process in these terms:
After independence the situation changes radically. Not individualism but mass participation 
through community action becomes the condition o f national success. The ends o f the state 
become elevated to virtually a sacred level ... the reasons for the rise o f political religions among 
the new nations are not hard to find. Faith is a source o f authority. The new nations face the 
problem involved in the creation of overarching loyalties that transcend the more primordial ones
39of ethnic membership, religious affiliation, linguistic identification.
Regarding totalitarian regimes, particularly from the inter war period, German historian 
Karl Dietrich Bracher has described the “new philosophies” that took hold on the turn of 
the twentieth century as political religions, or “pseudo-religious ideologies with the dual
37 Sironneau, Jean-Pierre, Secularisation et religionspolitiques, Paris, Mouton Editeur, 1982, p.577.
38 Ibid, p.558.
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claim to scientific validity and, simultaneously, to religious absoluteness.” Bracher writes 
that these movements,
promised to reunite what modem science and secularization had divided: harmony once more 
between culture and technology, between politics and culture. They attempted to promise 
everything to everybody, to be an all-embracing movement and an all-embracing faith ... The 
reverse o f the medal was the emphatically one-sided militant and activist character o f the 
totalitarian movements employing these substitute religions. Fascism and national-socialism, just 
as Leninism-Stalinism and later Maoism, were both things at the same time: promise o f an 
eventual community -  the 1000-year Reich or universal communism -  but meanwhile, and above 
all, mobilization ideologies for battle with the total enemy.40
Similarly, historians Gentile and, more recently, Roger Griffin, have emphasized the 
heuristic value of the concept of political religion to understand Fascism. According to 
Griffin,
[Fascism] manifests itself, at least in inter-war Europe and in some other Europeanized societies, 
as a po litica l religion, driven by the utopia  of regenerated national community saturated with 
mythic and palingenetic thinking, reminiscent of early modem forms of European millenarianism  
without being a direct perpetuation o f them, but bent instead on purging society o f alleged 
sources of socio-cultural and/or racial decadence within historical time.41
Historian Michael Burleigh, in his book The Third Reich: A New History, also 
approached Nazism as a form of political religion, that is, as part of political movements 
“as pseudo- or substitute religions, with eclectic liturgies, ersatz theologies, vices and 
virtues.” “The Great war and its disturbed aftermath,” noted Burleigh, “led to an 
intensified revival of this pseudo-religious strain in politics, which exerted its maximum 
appeal in times of extreme crisis, just as medieval millenarianism ... had thrived in times 
of sudden change and social dislocation.”42
39 Apter, David E., “Political religions in the new nations,” in Cliford Geertz, Old Societies and New States, 
The Free Press of Glencoe, New York, 1963, pp. 66-80
40 Bracher, Karl Dietrich, The Age ofIdeologies: A History of Political Thought in the Twentieth Century, 
New York, St. Martin’s Press, 1984, pp.32, 33. (First published 1982)
41 Griffin, Roger “Cloister or Cluster? The implications of Emilio Gentile’s Ecumenical Theory of Political 
Religion for the Study of Extremism,” Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions, Vol.6, No.l, Spring 
2004, p. 14.
42 Burleigh, Michael, The Third Reich: a New History, Hill and Wang, New York, 2000, pp.6, 7.
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• The Decline of Political Religions?
The concept of “Political Religion” has therefore been closely linked with totalitarianism, 
and has been associated with the establishment of political regimes -  for example 
Fascism, Nazism, and communism - that have indeed developed some form of political 
religion. As political scientist Juan Linz has written “Political religions are powerful and 
have shaped the life of people in the 20th century in unique ways,” he notes “but only 
because they could rely on the power resources of a totalitarian state including its 
coercive resources.” He adds “they do not seem to have generated sufficient strength of 
belief to survive the loss of power.”43 As I will show, the persistent scholarly’ focus on 
the totalitarian and coercive nature of these political religions has obscured less extreme 
manifestations of sacred politics in the contemporary context. However, even the 
application of the political religion rubric to extreme totalitarian movements has meet 
resistance from a considerable number of scholars. They say the notion of political 
religion confuses the differences between the “essences” of these movements and 
traditional religions, and overstates the role of emotion to the detriment of more 
rationalist appeals. Historian Ian Kershaw has dismissed the political religion approach as 
“a currently voguish revamping of an age-old notion, though no less convincing for being 
repeated so persistently.”44
Even among those who see the political religion approach in a more favorable 
manner, there seems to be a tacit consensus that political religions are, on the whole, on 
the wane in the contemporary world. It is as if the process of secularization of society had 
also led progressively to a total de-sacralization of the political realm. For example, 
Weberian sociologist Luciano Cavalli writes that Weber’s forecasts about Western 
rationalization and secularization have proven wrong for inter-war Europe due to the 
advancement of secular religions. Cavalli notes that “In recent years secularization has
43 Linz, Juan, “The religious use of politics and/or the political use of religion: Ersatz ideology versus ersatz 
religion,” Conference paper, Munich, September 1994, p.5.
44 Kershaw, Ian, “Hitler and the Uniqueness of Nazism,” Journal o f Contemporary History, Vol.39 
(2),2004, p.250.
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attacked secular religions too. Today Weber’s forecasts [about secularization] make more 
sense then they did for decades after his death.”45 He adds, “Secularization considerably 
weakens traditional religions at first, and then the secular ones such as Marxism- 
Leninism.”46
Although recognizing the role of religion as a “constitutive aspect of human 
experience,” Sociologist Daniel Bell stresses in a similar manner the undermining of the 
sacred set off by rationalization “[0]n the double level of social structure and culture, the 
world has been secularized and profaned.” Bell states that “religion is no longer the 
‘collective conscience’ of society ... because society is radically disjointed, its different 
realms of the techno-economic sphere, with its principle of functional rationality, the 
polity and its surge for equality, and the culture with its demands for self-fulfillment 
creating increasingly intolerable strains.”47 According to him, “the ‘ground impulses’ 
behind aestheticism and political religions are exhausted.”48
The same position is taken by historian Philippe Burrin. In his evaluation of the 
relevance of the concept of political religion, he expresses doubts about the possibility to 
“re-enchant a society in the clutches of modernity.” Instead, political religions will likely 
be swept away by the march of rationalization. Discussing the inherent frailty of political 
religions he writes,
The type of political, moral and spiritual unity that they aim to create can only be thwarted by the 
massive movement toward rationalization of society, by the institutional segmentation and the 
technical specialization that continuously engender the splitting o f social life into autonomous 
spheres. Even on their own privileged level o f beliefs, symbols and rituals, the limits o f political 
religions are soon evident.49
Sironneau, a critic of the secularization paradigm who sees political religions as one of 
the resurgences of the sacred, feels compelled to note “the state of implosion and
45 Cavalli, Luciano “Charisma and Twentieth-Century Politics,” in M.S Whimster and S.Lash, Max Weber, 
rationality and modernity, Allen&Unwin, London, 1987, p.324.
46 Ibid, p.332.
47 Bell, Daniel, “The Return of the Sacred? The Argument on the Future of Religion,” The British Journal 
of Sociology, Vol.28, No.4 (Dec. 1977), p.442.
48 Ibid, p.439.
49 Burrin, Philippe, “Political Religion: The Relevance of a Concept,” History and Memory, Vol.9, No.2, 
1997, p.342.
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desegregation of the modem metamorphosis of the sacred.” Referring to what he sees as 
the echec (failure) of political religions he writes,
Political religions, moreover, if they have affinities with numerous aspects o f traditional religions, 
they are not however, properly speaking, religions, and because o f that they de-mythicize rapidly: 
the myths of progress and historicism, in which they generally supported themselves are today 
devaluated.50
Gentile also sees political religions in decline at the beginning of the twenty-first century. 
Although he acknowledges the fact that sacralization of politics can eventually be “a 
dormant vulcan,” Gentile writes that,
One might consider the sacralization of politics an imposing but extraordinary and contingent 
phenomenon, closely connected to the tumultuous cultural, political, economic and social changes 
that have dominated the process o f modernity in the last two centuries: a phenomenon, hence, 
either already exhausted or on its way to exhaustion, with the end of the epoch with generated it.51
Even Stanley G. Paine, who recognizes the “vitality of the sacred in ever-multiplying 
metamorphoses,” does not specifically identify it in any contemporary European political 
movement apart from a passing mention of Basque and Catalan nationalism and the 
ideology of “Political Correctness.” For him, “diverse forms [of political religion] may be 
found in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries in African and Asian 
countries.”52
It seems therefore that, according to major scholars, at least regarding European 
liberal democracies, political religions seem to be losing ground so rapidly that they are 
doomed eventually to disappear altogether. It is as if movements led by a charismatic 
leader invested with a mission of salvation and characterized by myth, ritual, 
communion, and faith, represent mere traces of a past doomed to be overtaken by the 
natural course of history. In fact, the internal dynamics of liberal democracies seem, on 
appearance, to be a natural corollary of a world more and more “disenchanted.” They do 
seem to fit perfectly the secularization paradigm that opened this introduction. As argued
50 Sironneau, Jean-Pierre, op.cit, p.562.
51 Gentile, Emilio, op.cit, p.202.
52 Payne, Stanley G. “Emilio Gentile’s Historical Analysis and Taxonomy of Political Religions,” in 
Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions, Vol.3, No.l (Summer 2002), p. 125.
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by Steve Bruce, “what most marks the political cultures of the modem industrial societies 
of the West from those of other countries is that the former are largely secular.” “Liberal 
democracies”, he continues, “are distinguished by having formally secular polities, their 
religious institutions are largely impotent except to the extent that they accept secular 
rules of engagement, and the majority of the population either have no religion or adhere 
to religions that have mutated a long way from their orthodox bases.”53 This is the taken- 
for-granted consensus that I intend to context in the following pages. But before doing so, 
let me return to the concept of charisma, as recent theorists have understood it.
• The Decline of Charismatic Leadership?
As Ronald E. Riggio stated in an article in the recent Encyclopedia o f  Leadership, 
“currently, there is no generally accepted agreed-on definition of charisma.”54 However, 
if social scientists have found difficult to define charisma, major post-Weberian works on 
charismatic leadership have had a more defined focus on examples of charismatic 
leaders. The rule in choosing 20th century case studies has been to take them either from 
the more extreme examples of the interwar period or from underdeveloped societies, 
particularly in relation to colonial struggles or post-colonial contexts.55 The literature of 
charisma studies has not paid the same attention to more stable, more modern and, 
therefore, allegedly less “enchanted” environments, such as those of contemporary 
Western liberal democracies. As in the case of research on political religions, this general 
scenario assumes the ebb of the sacralization of the political; therefore it is not surprising 
that major scholars have demonstrated, for some time, uneasiness regarding the 
phenomenon of charismatic leadership in their analysis of contemporary Western
53 Bruce, Steve Politics and Religion, Cambridge, Polity Press, 2003, pp. 245-246
54 Riggio, Ronald E, “Charisma” in Goethals, George R., G.J.Sorenson and James MacGregor Bums, 
(eds), Encyclopedia of Leadership, Vol.l, Sage Publications, Inc, Thousand Oaks, California, 2004, p. 158.
55 A good example of this tendency in post-Weberian charismatic leadership studies can be found in 
Willner, Ann Ruth, The Spellbinders: Charismatic Political Leadership, New Have, Yale University Press, 
1984. On this topic see also, Cavalli, Luciano, “Carisma” in Enciclopedia delle scienze sociali, Istituto 
della Enciclopedia Italiana, Roma, 1996, particularly pages 679-683.
23
political dynamics and situations. The following words of Jasper B. Shannon, written in 
1949, testify of the mindset, not to say the hope, shared by many scholars. To him,
Perhaps a more realistic, not to say more scientific, age will look upon our belief in leaders who 
can solve our social ills by political magic as absurd as we regard the divine power attributed to 
monarchs in the healing o f bodily ills... Confused and baffled, we follow the human practice of 
the ages, we make men into gods and worship or curse them as fortune, fate, or the weather make 
us alternately comfortable or unhappy. In any case the size and complexity o f human problems 
have become so great that only the inordinately ambitious or the well nigh saintly unselfish will 
assume the task o f political leadership. Institutions need to be constructed for the industrial age 
which will reduce mass dependence upon charismatic leadership.56
It is not surprising that a number of social scientists have argued that the academia 
should get rid of the term charisma in analysis of contemporary political dynamics and 
situations. Writing in 1960, American historian Arthur Schlesinger_Jr. wrote, “the 
grounds of the democratic leader’s authority rest characteristically on his capacity to gain 
conditional support from enough interests and people to put together a temporary 
majority; his method is characteristically a pragmatic balancing of forces, appeals, and 
policies: none of this finds room in Weber’s system.” Schlesinger accused Weber’s 
analysis of having a “hypnotic effect” on leadership literature and noticed “the 
uselessness of charisma as a concept with which to analyze leadership in more 
complicated cases than those of medicine men, warrior chieftains, and religious 
prophets.”57
A similar skepticism regarding the use of the term charisma to describe modem 
politics can be found in the work of sociologist Karl Loewenstein. Arguing against the 
validity of the category of charismatic authority in times of technological mass 
democracy, Loewenstein observed, “In the last analysis, as a basis of rule, it [charisma] 
possesses a historical reality. Or, to put it differently: charismatic authority in politics is a
56 Shannon, Jasper B. “The Study of political leadership,” in Jasper B. Shannon (ed), The Study of 
Comparative Government: An Appraisal of Contemporary Trends, Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc, New 
York, 1949, pp.327-8.
57 Schlesinger Jr., Arthur, “On Heroic Leadership: and the Dilemma of strong Men and Weak Peoples”, in 
Encounter, Vol.XV, No. 6., December 1960, pp.6-7
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phenomenon of the pre-Cartesian world.”58 Therefore, charisma belongs to the enchanted 
world that, at least in the Western setting, humanity had left behind.
Luciano Cavalli has also written about the flimsy chances of the survival of 
charisma in contemporary democracies. In his words,
Because in the secularized democracies of our times, the metaphorical pointer that establishes the 
disposition of the masses towards a leader points obviously more towards “trust” than “faith.” 
Moreover, in a democracy charisma reveals the weakness that Weber had referred to. Not 
supported by the monopoly o f the media and collective symbols, exposed in reality to the timidity 
or aggressiveness o f multiple points o f view, to criticism and disdain, attacked in its last 
foundation, [the] ideal, by the triumphant hedonist materialism, the charisma of the savior, o f the 
public benefactor, will maintain itself with difficulty.59
James MacGregor Bums, a major scholar of leadership studies, considers 
charisma to be a nuisance concept: “leaders who fill bellies” Bum writes, “can be tested 
on the basis of how many bellies filled.” Charisma as a sociological concept addresses 
merely “an array of murky psychological needs,” and, therefore, cannot be studied in a 
serious and rational manner; thus, any form of leadership that satisfies ‘hungers’ of the 
‘mind and spirif’^ should be approached primarily as “an exotic or lopsided form,” of 
Bums own concept of “transforming leadership”, that is, leadership that “accomplishes 
rational, planned transformational change -  real, comprehensive, durable change, 
changes that advance the great public values.”61 His is a telling example of contemporary 
scholarly discomfort -  often the mark of a dismissive attitude towards the subject -  in 
dealing with the “non-rational,” charismatic dimensions of politics.
58 Loewenstein, Karl, Max Weber’s Political Ideas in the Perspective of Our Time, (translated by Richard 
and Clara Winston), The University of Massachusetts Press, 1966, p.86.
59 Cavalli, Luciano Carisma: La calidad extraordinaria del llder, Editorial Losada, Buenos Aires, 1998, 
pp. 106, 107. (First published in 1995)
60 Bums, James MacGregor, Transforming leadership: A New Pursuit of Happiness, New York, Atlantic 
Monthly Press, 2003, p.27.
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4. The Problem
Until lately, like the concept of political religion, charisma had been largely banned from 
the academic analysis of contemporary political life. But recent developments have 
challenged the dominant rationalist model in social analysis. In the last decades the world 
has seen the rise in liberal-democratic countries of leaders so driven by a sense of mission 
and so deft at creating a devoted following that they are invariably defined as 
“charismatic.” Powerful examples of these “new charismatics” come from a pool of new 
populist movements that are usually described as fitting into the “extreme right” of the 
political spectrum. Major works have confirmed this new charismatic strain in such 
movements operating within liberal-democracies. Herbert Kitschelt calls it the “New 
Radical Right” and observes that it shares in common with the Fascist parties of the past 
“the prevalence of charismatic leadership.” In the same vein, Hans-Georg Betz argues, 
“the most successful radical right-wing populist parties are led by charismatic figures 
capable of setting the political and programmatic direction.”63 Meny and Surel observe 
that this increasing trend of populism “advocates the power of the people, yet relies on 
seduction by a charismatic leader.”64 Gianpietro Mazzoleni observes that “neo-populist 
movements characteristically organize themselves around charismatic and strongly 
personalized leaderships and are immediately and exclusively identified with highly 
visible and controversial leaders.”65 Among the characteristics displayed by the 
successful parties of the extreme right, notes Piero Ignazi, there is “an appealing, 
charismatic, and uncontested leadership which could prevent and control internal 
factionalism and attract the attention of the media.”66 Eatwell brings a similar point home 
in writing that some voters “are strongly attracted by extreme right and populist policies
61 Ibid, pp.22,27
62 Kitschelt, Herbert The Radical Right in Western Europe: a Comparative Analysis, Ann Arbor, The 
University of Michigan Press, 1995, p.32
63 Betz, Hans-Georg, and Stefan Immerfall, The New Politics o f the Right: Neo-Populist Parties and 
Movements in Established Democracies, New York, St. Martin’s Press, 1998, p.9
64 Meny, Yves and Y. Surel (Eds), Democracies and the Populist Challenge, Palgrave, London, 2002, p. 17
65 Mazzoleni, Gianpietro., J. Stewart and B. Horsfield (Eds) The Media and Neo-Populism: A 
Contemporary Comparative Analysis, Praeger Publishers, Westport, 2003, pp.4, 5.
66 Ignazi, Piero Extreme Righ Parties in Western Europe, Oxford University Press, 2003, p.203
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on issues such as immigration and law and order, and by ‘charismatic’ personalities such 
as Le Pen.”67 Eatwell sees the personification of issues and policies in the uncontested 
figure of the leader as a major “rational” tool particularly in election times. However, he 
does recognize the persistence of an emotional and affective relationship with the leader 
within these movements.68
Meanwhile, resurgent literature on charismatic leadership has followed Weber, 
and emphasized the intimate link between the development of a sense of mission and a 
situation of crisis. In Weber’s analysis, as mentioned above, recognition of the 
charismatic leader arises out of “enthusiasm, or of despair and hope.”69 Norberto Bobbio 
has expressed his conviction that
Any discussion o f the phenomena of charismatic leadership, as in the past with [the phenomenon 
of] Caesarism, makes evident the fact that either one of them arise in times o f historical crisis, in 
the passage o f a power system to another, in the moment in which the violent break of a system 
opens the road to the foundation, also violent, of a new system, [accomplished] either by a civil 
war or a revolution.70
Robert C. Tucker notes both that “charismatic leadership is specifically Salvationist or 
messianic in nature” and that “the followers respond to the charismatic leader with 
passionate loyalty because the salvation, or promise of it, that he appears to embody 
represents the fulfillment of urgently felt needs.”71 In the words of Pierre Bourdieu, 
“prophetic discourse is thus more likely to gain success in periods in which economic or 
morphological transformations determine the collapse, decline, or obsolescence of 
traditions or value-systems that provided the principles of a world-view and a mode of 
life.”72 Charles Lindholm, observes that a charismatic relation “is a creative and 
regenerating force likely to be favored particularly in times of social malaise and
67 Eatwell, Roger and Cas Mudde, Western Democracies and the New Extreme Right Challenge, London 
and New York, Routledge, 2004, p.l
68 On this point see, Eatwell, Roger, “The Rebirth of Right-Wing Charisma? The Cases of Jean-Marie Le 
Pen and Vladimir Zhirinovsky”, Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions, Vol.3, No.3 (Winter 
2002) pp. 17-21.
69 Weber, Max Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretative Sociology, op.cit, p.242
70 Bobbio, Norberto “Attenti al carisma, la violenza viene dal ‘capo’,” in Reset, No.48, May 1998, p.5.
71 Tucker, Robert C. “The Theory of Charismatic Leadership,” In Rustow, D. (ed), Philosophers and 
Kings: Studies in Leadership, George Braziller, New York, 1970, p. 81.
72 Bourdieu, Pierre “Legitimation and structured interests in Weber’s sociology of religion”, in S. Whimster 
and S. Lash (Eds), Max Weber, Rationality and modernity, Allen&Unwin Publishers, 1987, p. 130.
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suffering, when fragmented social formations are especially in need of reinvigoration 
through charismatic participation.”73 Even authors such as Ann Ruth Wilner, who does 
not see a situation of crisis as a requirement for the rise of charismatic political 
leadership, admit that “preconditions of exogenous social crisis and psychic distress are 
conducive to the emergence of charismatic political leadership.”74
This points to two major problems in the social science analysis of contemporary 
trends in democratic societies. If the western world, particularly Europe, is more and 
more secular and rational, then why does charisma (in its missionary form), which 
ultimately has to do with fervor and emotion, remain an instrument in European politics? 
Shouldn’t this “less enchanted” environment prevent the revival of charismatic 
leadership, as observed by several commentators? Complicating analysis is the fact that 
European western democracies do not seem, on the surface, to be living through any of 
the dramatic crises -such as wars or disasters - that are traditionally seen as catalysts of 
the emergence of a discourse of charismatic mission. How then can one explain this 
persistence of a charismatic strain in Western European politics?
A distinction must be made from the outset. The last decades have witnessed a 
popularization of the term charisma. It has become commonplace: Everyone who is 
popular, appealing, or gifted in sports, arts, or politics becomes in the eyes of public 
opinion, a charismatic figure. The consolidation of a celebrity-oriented culture -fuelled by 
both the media and the public’s insatiable appetite for stardom - is at the very basis of the 
explosion of charisma in popular vocabulary.75 Writing about the overuse of the term 
fascism, Griffin notes that “in the case of words this means that they are used to embrace 
more and more phenomena and so progressively lose their discriminating power: the 
“blanket term” or “conceptual hold-all” is bom”.76 Indeed, the word charisma has been 
subjected to a similar process of “inflation” and, subsequently, “devaluation.”
In order to avoid this risk of hollowing out the descriptive power of the term, I 
introduce a distinction between two forms of charisma in contemporary societies. The
73 Lindholm, Charles Charisma, Basil Blackwell, Cambridge, Mass, 1990, p.35.
74 Wilner, Ann Ruth, The Spellbinders: Charismatic Political Leadership, New Haven and London, Yale 
University Press, 1984, p.52
75 On the development of celebrity culture in contemporary western societies, see Gabler, Neal, Life: The 
Movie, How Entertainment Conquered Reality, Vintage Books, New York, 1998.
76 Griffin, Roger, The Nature of Fascism, Routledge, London, 1991, p. 1
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first one I call the popular form of charisma. It is intimately linked with the celebrity- 
oriented culture and the predominance of the visual and imagery in the contemporary 
Western world. It is in essence superficial. (I use the word superficial to indicate not 
something trivial or insignificant but rather something that is near the surface.) It deals 
essentially with projection of looks and attitudes, of physical and personal qualities 
deemed appealing and amplified by the media, particularly the visual media. The second 
form of charisma, which I define as missionary is the form that operates within my 
conceptual framework of missionary politics and on which I focus my thesis.
5. The Missionary Paradigm -  Approach and Methodology
As we have seen at the beginning of this chapter, the march of rationalization has pushed 
to the forefront a continuous narrative of secularization that has itself ultimately led to the 
undermining of traditional religions and, in a later period, to the failure of political 
religions in Europe. In this way, according to the dominant rationalist paradigm, the 
sacralization of the political fell victim to a supposedly more “rational,” secular liberal- 
democratic environment. In this paradigm, the tendency has been to study the 
sacralization of politics either as a manifestation of the past or, primarily, as the work of 
exploitive and manipulative propaganda by demagogic leaders and organizations. In my 
work I approach the phenomenon of sacralized politics not through the lens of the 
conventional rationalist model but by emphasizing a different dimension of politics in the 
West, “missionary politics,” which will guide my investigation of the reality of 
contemporary political movements.
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• An Ideal Type
My methodological approach is heuristic and it follows the path of Weber’s 
comparative-historical sociology particularly at the level of construction of ideal types as 
guiding tools to understand and systematize reality. Weber’s causal sociology is anchored 
in ideal types that provide a framework and a “mental picture” to analyze the world of 
experience. These heuristic devices function as “yardsticks” that, according to Weberian 
sociologist Stephen Kalberg, document “patterned action” and assist the researcher in 
comprehending an “amorphous and ceaselessly flowing reality.”77 Deeply rooted in 
empirical reality, these ideal types “seek to isolate, on a rigorous basis, significant causal 
patterns of action.” Because they follow primarily systematic and internally consistent 
lines they constitute a “conscious exaggeration of essential features of the significant 
action-orientations for the research task at hand.”78 Aiming at assisting empirical inquiry, 
ideal types “accentuate those aspects of the empirical case of particular interest to the 
researcher.”79 Missionary politics should therefore be understood as a construction, an 
ideal type that gives a synthesis of the features of the sacralization of the political in a 
contemporary age.
Two other scholars have attempted to capture the missionary field in 
contemporary liberal-democratic politics through the use of a methodology that refers 
back to Weber and the use of ideal-types as heuristic tools. British philosopher Michael 
Oakeshott put forward two ideal types that, according to him, have been predominant in 
the modem politics of Western Europe. These two historic styles of politics have been 
“the politics of skepticism” and “the politics of faith.” While the politics of skepticism 
offers a piecemeal approach to politics, the politics of faith is geared towards a holistic 
vision of politics within which “[T]he activity of governing is understood to be in the 
service of the perfection of mankind.” Oakeshott adds, “Perfection, or salvation, is





something to be achieved in this world: man is redeemable in history.”80 In the politics of 
skepticism, “governing is understood as a specific activity, and in particular it is 
understood to be detached from the pursuit of human perfection.”81 For the skeptic the 
activity of governing is a judicial activity, “not a matter of establishing the ‘truth,’” in 
which “discussion and ‘opposition’ will not be regarded as means for ‘the discovery of 
truth,’ but as a means for calling attention to something that might otherwise have been 
forgotten and for keeping government within its proper bounds.”82 The opposite is the 
case for the politics of faith, which aims at a totalizing vision that will transform the 
world and rid it of pollution. Oakeshott describes these two political styles as 
abstractions, extremes between which politics have been fluctuating since early-modern 
European history up to the present. In this way Oakeshott detaches the “missionary 
model” of analysis from a specific moment or movement in history and introduced the 
possibility of its application in contemporary liberal-democratic societies.
Drawing from Oakeshott’s analysis, Margaret Canovan argues that there is 
another face of democracy that is less rational and more emotional, with a strong 
component of “faith.” It deals with “redemption” rather than “pragmatism.” “Inherent 
in modem democracy, in tension with its pragmatic face,” she writes, “is faith in secular 
redemption: the promise of a better world through action by the sovereign people.” 
Through the use of concepts that systematize a diffuse empirical reality, Oakeshott and 
Canovan have stressed that the sacred has entered into the political realm, albeit in a 
“secularized” disguise. Neither, however, has attempted to apply these ideal types to 
specific case studies, which is the purpose of positing them in the first place.
80 Michael Oakeshott, The Politics of Faith and the politics of Skepticism, New Haven and London, Yale 
University Press, 1996, p.23
81 Ibid, p.31
82 Ibid, p.37
83 Margaret Canovan, “Trust the people! Populism and the two faces of democracy,” Political Studies, 
Volume XLVII, No.l, March 1999.
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• A Cluster Concept
Building on these contributions, I base my approach to the study of contemporary neo­
populist movements through the development of an empirically derived cluster concept 
of Missionary Politics. Historians Gentile and Griffin, among others, have blazed this 
methodological trail of clustering. By establishing the parameters of an ideal type, the 
cluster concept captures reality in a holistic or “organic” manner by emphasizing both 
patterns of action and dynamic, interconnected constellations of different but related 
phenomena. Therefore, a cluster should be understood as a central concept or “star” 
which lies in the middle of a constellation of adjacent and overlapping concepts and 
associated dimensions. According to this method, as stated by Griffin, conceptual terms 
“are to be approached ‘synergically’ as complimentary components forming an open- 
ended nexus of heuristic devices with which to arrive at a deeper understanding of
Of
particular aspects of reality.”
Taken as a whole, my research focus on a network of interacting concepts 
clustering around the central concept of “Missionary Politics” aims at giving a multi­
perspective approach to a multi-faceted phenomenon. Grounded in empirical reality and 
deduced from the material collected within the movements -  not imposed from above 
according to a pre-existing model, which precludes formulating an abstract comparative 
analysis -  my research on Missionary Politics has indicated the following constellation: 
Missionary Politics should be understood as a form of political religion carried out by a 
chosen people who, in a time of self-perceived deep-rooted crisis, sees itself as a moral 
community led by a missionary charismatic leader undertaking a collective mission of 
salvation. Driven by apocalyptic and millenarian dynamics, the community manifests its 
solidarity and belief in the mission by constant ritualization. In the process, the members 
of the community celebrate themselves as a sacred collective, as representatives of a
M Ibid, p.9
85 Griffin, Roger “Cloister or Cluster? The implications of Emilio Gentile’s Ecumenical Theory of Political 
Religion for the Study of Extremism,” Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions, Vol.6, No.l, Spring 
2005 (forthcoming), p.6.
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sacred nation and heirs to a sacred history involved in an apocalyptic showdown with the 
evil and conspiratorial forces of a new world order.
• Cultural Analysis
My adoption of clustering as a methodological procedure to investigate the dynamics of 
Missionary Politics makes my thesis decidedly multi-disciplinary, and I hope to give a 
rounded analysis of the phenomenon, open to contributions and insights drawn from an 
array of different disciplines such as political science, history, cultural anthropology, and 
sociology of religion. From the major competing theoretical schools in comparative 
politics - divided between rational choice theorists, structuralists and culturalists - my 
approach falls within the culturalist research school in the sense that I want to give a 
cultural contribution to political analysis and show how the experiential, rhetorical, and 
ethnographic dimensions of religion shape contemporary political groups. Culture from 
this perspective, and following the path of Max Weber and anthropologist Clifford 
Geertz,86 should be understood, not merely as the possession of specific values or beliefs 
but, in the words of Marc Howard Ross, as a “worldview”, a “system of meaning and 
identity” that “accounts for why and how people in any particular setting act as they 
do.”87
Due to predominant rationalist assumptions, these groups have until now been 
primarily explained in terms of their relationship with “issues and “grievances.” The 
implication is that these groups have been chiefly anchored in materialist frames. But in 
my study, I attempt to discern how such a group is sustained by non-material dimensions: 
the cultural frames that sustain these groups, that is, the internal production of a narrative 
and codes that establish a symbolic world and a framework of salvation. Cultural theorist
86 It is useful to remember here Geertz’s classical definition of culture as “an historically transmitted pattern 
of meaning embodied in symbols, a system of inherited conceptions expressed in symbolic forms by means 
of which men communicate, perpetuate, and develop their knowledge about and attitudes towards life” in 
Geertz, C, The Interpretation o f Cultures: Selected Essays, Basic Books, New York, 1973, p.89.
87 Marc Howard Ross, “Culture and Identity in Comparative Political Analysis,” in Lichbach, Mark Irving 
and A.S.Zuckerman, Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture and Structure, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 1997.
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Philip Smith has argued for the need to stress cultural structures such as “binary cultural 
codes” that oppose good and evil, and “narratives” that mythologize reality by aligning it 
within a salvation framework, in order to have a broader picture of contemporary 
charismatic leaders.881 follow Smith’s line of interpretation: hence my primary focus on 
the discursive frames created by those who are within the movement and involved in a 
quest for salvation, focusing on what they actually say and do, and how they experience 
and symbolize the collective, with a special relevance given to the status and role of the 
leader.
My argument that these cultural frames play a predominant role in the 
maintenance and development of these groups does not imply a dismissal of more 
instrumentalist approaches. The appeal of contemporary neo-populist movements 
certainly is spurred by different dimensions of which “the religious” is only one (albeit, 
in my view, an important and often neglected one). There are important materialist 
explanations for the phenomenon - economic insecurity, views on immigration, issues of 
crime and order, political corruption - that facilitate the identification of some sectors of
O Q
the population with movements that specifically exploit those insecurities. But these 
will not be the focus of my thesis. I agree with Gentile’s contention that “to study a 
political movement as a secular religion does not mean to find only in this aspect the 
explanation for [the movement’s] nature and historical meaning.”90 However, 
instrumentalist models that emphasize primarily grievances and concepts such as 
“political opportunity” often fail to capture the positive identity and extraordinary 
member commitment engendered by many of these movements, the persistence of 
culturally specific grand narratives in them, and the role that non-material forces play in 
the development of these movements’ respective identities.
88 Smith, Philip, “Culture and Charisma: Outline of a Theory,” Acta Sociologica, Vol. 43, No.2,2000, 
p. 103-4.
9 For a rounded view of a more instrumentalist approach of these movements see, for example, Meny, 
Yves and Y. Surel (Eds), Democracies and the Populist Challenge, Palgrave, London,2002.
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6. Case Studies
As I have written above, sacralization of politics is a generally absent theme in research 
on major contemporary movements led by leaders who are repeatedly characterized as 
“charismatic” by both social commentators and scholars. It is this lack that I propose to 
remedy in my thesis. Although my research includes other political movements and 
leaders (whom I intend to investigate further at a later date) for reasons of space, I focus 
here on two of the most successful: the French Front National led by Jean-Marie Le Pen 
and the Italian Lega Nord led by Umberto Bossi. Only a handful of studies have followed 
a similar approach to mine and have specifically focused on the role of religious 
frameworks for the implementation and sustenance of these movements -  when done, it 
has often been in a fragmentary manner.91
From my research I concluded that these two cases are sufficient to discern a 
pattern or cluster of attributes that can then be extended to provide the skeleton of an 
ideal type. Looking at both the empirical reality of these movements and the sacred 
dimension of their respective politics, I will document patterned actions and both 
integrate and systematize my findings into an ideal type of Missionary Politics. My hope 
is that I may provide a guideline against which different neo-populist movements can be 
“measured and compared.” Therefore, adding ethnographic, rhetorical, and symbolic 
cultural material to the empirical research of neo-populist movements can shed light on 
dynamics that would otherwise be left unnoticed or unexplained. Further, because my 
intention is to construct a comparative model and mode of analysis based on the
90 Gentile, Emilio., op.cit. p.216.
91 In the case of Le Pen and his movement a notable exception to the dominant rationalist and structuralist 
trends can be found in a recent book by Lecoeur, Erwan, Un neo-populisme a la franqaise, Editions La 
Decouverte, Paris, 2003 (especially chapters 9 and 10). See also, Souchard, Maryse, S. Wahnich, I.
Cuminal and V. Wathier, Le Pen Les M ots: analyse d'un discours d ‘extreme droite, Editions Le Monde, 
Paris, 1998 (especially pp.132-140 and 216-222) and Lafont, Valerie “Les Jeunes Militants du Front 
National: Trois Modeles d’Engagement et de Cheminement,” Revue Franqaise de Science Politique,
Vol.51, No. 1-2, February-April 2001 (especially pp. 193-97); Regarding the movement of Umberto Bossi 
some fragmentary references can be found in the works of Biorcio, Roberto, La Padania Promessa: La 
storia, le idee la logica d ’azione della Lega Nord, II Saggiatore, Milano, 1997 (especially chapter 9);
Donega, Claudio, “Strategic del Presente. I volti della Lega,” in Giovanni de Luna (ed) Figli di un 
benessere minore: La Lega 1979-1993, La Nuova Italia, Firenze, 1994; Berzano, Luigi, Religiosita del
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relationship between religion and politics, I work to deduce general principles from my 
case studies more than is usual in political science. The necessary loss of the nuances and 
elaboration of differences between each of the movements under study will be 
compensated for by the extensive ethnographic narratives and the patterns discerned in 
them. I hope that my primary focus on the religious dimensions of both movements, 
derived from internal material, can be extrapolated in order to supply patterns of thought 
and action that can then be applied to the study of other contemporary political 
movements.
My analysis focuses primarily on the immediate following of the leader and not 
on the “general voter.” Thus I look closely at those who surround the leader, from cabinet 
members and party officials to the militants themselves. I take a closer look at the 
dynamics of what Eatwell has called, in opposition to mass charisma, the “charisma of 
the coterie,” that is, “a hardcore of supporters both in their inner courts and more locally 
who held that a special mission drove the leader, and who accorded this leader great
O'?loyalty and were willing to make special efforts on behalf of the cause.” In his study on 
Nazism Kershaw introduced the distinction between the “charismatic community” 
comprised of those “who formed the initial agency of transmission of the personality cult 
surrounding him” and “the mass of ‘Hitler believers’ in the population at large.” 
Another study by Emrich et al, drawing from the vast organizational literature on 
charismatic leadership, has explained this distinction in terms of “public charisma” as 
perceived by a broad audience of followers, and “private charisma” as perceived by a 
“narrower band of followers, all of whom have both direct contact and relationships with 
the leader.”94 It is this more personal, private, coterie form of charisma that I call 
“missionary” that serves as the center of my thesis.
The data I use to make my argument reflects my primary concern with the self­
perception of the group. My aim is to establish the phenomenological reality of the 
collective movement through the use of first-person accounts: Therefore, speeches, party
nuovo areopago: credenze e forme religiose nell'formapostsecolare, FrancoAngeli, Milano, 1994 
(especially chapter 9).
92 Eatwell, Roger, “The Rebirth of Right-Wing Charisma? The cases of Jean-Marie Le Pen and Vladimir 
Zhirinovsky,” Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions, Vol.3, No.3, Winter 2002, p. 19.
93 Kershaw, Ian, Hitler, Pearson Education Limited, Harlow, England, 2001, pp. 15-17.
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literature, election programs, party newspapers, friendly newspapers, biographies, 
memoirs, books by the leaders and officials, and interviews with officials and militants 
constitute my primary sources of evidence. In this way, my approach is similar to that of 
Lindholm who, in his pursuit of identifying the dynamics of charismatic movements, 
defended the necessity to enter the world of the participants “by listening attentively to 
their own accounts” and not just to the abstractions of theory.951 hypothesize that these 
are indeed charismatic political movements whose dynamics and features are those of a 
political religion. If the hypothesis of the development of missionary politics is validated 
by the study of these case studies, then this will help to explain the persistence of 
charisma in contemporary democratic politics and provide a model of the form in which 
these movements are likely to take in the future.
7. Plan of the Thesis
In the next two chapters I attempt to identify the features of the sacralization of politics in 
these movements, paying attention to the actual inner workings, rhetorical tropes, ritual 
performances, and social organization of what I consider to be two paradigmatic 
examples of modern missionary political movements. In synch with my clustered 
approach to Missionary Politics, I look at how the group presents itself as a “chosen 
people” following its “charismatic missionary leader” and engaged in a battle for 
“salvation.” In the creation of this missionary narrative, the leader plays a fundamental 
role; therefore my study is primarily a leader-oriented approach. However, because the 
development of a missionary discourse implies the formation of a close-knit community, 
my analysis will also inevitably focus on some of the internal dynamics of the 
followership. In the final chapter my last chapter I draw from my empirical findings and 
lay out the different features of sacralization of politics of both movements in a 
comparative manner, attempting to integrate all the findings in order to construct -  using
94 Emrich, C.G., H.H. Brower, J.M. Feldman and H. Garland, “Images in words: Presidential rhetoric, 
charisma and greatness,” Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 46, No.3, September 2001, p.534.
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scholarly work from different disciplines -  an ideal type of missionary politics that can 
serve as a baseline for further comparative research into the religious dimension of 
contemporary political movements. I hope this to be my major contribution for the field 
of social sciences.
95 Lindholm, Charles, Charisma, op.cit, p.89.
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Le Pen and the National Front
In this chapter dedicated to the movement of Le Pen and in the next that follows 
dedicated to the movement of Umberto Bossi I identify the features of the sacralization of 
politics in each, focusing on the actual inner workings, rhetorical tropes, ritual 
performances, and social organization of what I consider to be two paradigmatic 
examples of modem missionary political movements.
1. Rejection of the Present: the Crisis
At the very basis of Le Pen’s discourse is a rejection of the present. Le Pen 
constructs a narrative intended to imprint deeply in the public mind an image of himself 
as a hero ready to save a country riddled by corruption and decline, and unable to survive 
without help. France’s “liberation” from the “crisis” of the present is an omnipresent 
theme in Le Pen’s discourse. To understand the crisis at the center of Le Pen’s discourse, 
one needs a closer look at his concept of “The Nation.” The party platform of the Front 
National (National Front) has a section headlined La Memoire (The Memory) which 
states that “It is [by] respecting their founding principles that human societies can 
perpetuate themselves. Society is not the result of a contract but the outcome of an Order. 
Nothing can be done without submission to this law ... Under abusive and intoxicating 
universal changes, is hidden a big and profound law of immobility ... In reality there is, 
in the continuity of civilizations and peoples, a pre-established harmony, reflection of the 
Creation, called Cosmos by the Greeks, that means Order.”96
According to the National Front’s philosophy, the nation is not modem. Rather, 
the nation is primordial: It is a natural body, permanent and based on a spiritual and
96 “Le Front National: Les Documents-Le Programme”, in www.frontnational.com
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physical continuity between the past and the present. It is not an abstraction or a creation 
of the intellect. The nation is a concrete reality. The program of the National Front uses 
as its main historical resource the defense of tradition and historical continuity 
propounded by French historians Ernest Renan and Hippolite Taine. Above all, this 
concept of nation represents a rejection both of the enlightenment and of the 
“abstraction” and “universalism” brought by the French revolution of 1789.
In the philosophy of the French National Front, the nation is not a community of 
citizens, a group of people detached from their ethnic or religious origins around a social 
contract or a political project. On the contrary, the nation is a community bonded by a  
continuity of generations, all of which share the same language and belong to the same 
historical France. “What we have more in common between us and with our compatriots 
that are abroad,” said Le Pen to his sympathizers “is the notion of heritage, [France’s] 
material heritage accumulated by centuries of work and sacrifices, by all the generations
07that have preceded us, [France’s] immense moral and cultural heritage.” “It took more 
than a thousand years,” he said at another time, “to establish the French nation, in its
Q O
historical homogeneity, in its culture and language.”
Although Le Pen has always rejected the label, the National Front is commonly 
put on the “extreme right” party family. Le Pen rejects the term as being more “polemical 
than scientific” and has always defined his party as “a movement of the national right, 
the national opposition.”99 In his analysis of the ideology of the extreme-right, Cas 
Mudde writes that the underlying elements of an extreme right wing discourse base 
themselves upon nationalism: “All parties are first and foremost nationalist parties,” he. 
notes, “aspiring for the congruence of state (the political unit) and nation (the cultural 
unit). The state should implement a policy of internal homogenization to create a mono- 
cultural society.”100 Thus, the problems that (according to Le Pen) affect France — 
excessive immigration, insecurity, unemployment -- are only symptoms of a deeply
97 “Le banquet des 10 000”, Paris, May 10 1987, La Documentation franfaise, in Soucheter, Maryse, S. 
Wahnich, I. Cuminal and V.Wathier, Le Pen Les mots : Analyse d ’un discours d'extreme droite, Editions 
Le Monde, 1998. p.96.
98Le Pen, Jean-Marie, “Le Discours de La Trinite : Demarxiser la France”, in Present, August 30- 
September 2 1991, p.8.
99 Le Pen, Jean-Marie, Les Frangais d ’Abord, Carrere-Michel Lafon, Paris, 1984. p. 180.
100 Mudde, Cas The Ideology o f the Extreme Right, Manchester University Press, 2002 (paperback edition), 
p. 177.
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rooted malaise of national identity extending as far back in history as the Enlightenment. 
In Le Pen’s narrative the Enlightenment initiated a process of undermining of national 
identity and values that will inexorably lead to the end of the nation itself. This scenario 
of national crisis serves as the background in which Le Pen develops a narrative that 
portrays the National Front as the last defenders of “The Nation” and Le Pen as its savior,, 
united in the mission of saving France from the onslaught of the forces of corruption and 
decadence. To understand this, I will first show how Le Pen creates and reinforces the 
identity of the group as the “true France.”
2. The Group as the “Elected”
• Historical continuity
In his discourse, Le Pen constantly aims at replacing the dominant historical 
paradigm with an alternative vision of French history. The prevalent, mainstream version 
promotes the values of the French Revolution of 1789 through the French resistance to 
the Nazi occupation as the solid basis of the Republic. Le Pen sees this version of history 
as an artificial creation of modernity that is ultimately dismissive of the true pre-modem 
and Christian roots of the French nation. The France heralded by Le Pen is the France 
that is heir to the Galois, Celts and Franks. In the words of Le Pen, “the first martyr of the 
national independence”101 was the Gallic leader Vercingetorix who defied the mle of the 
Roman emperor. A main reference in the historical repertoire of Le Pen is Clovis I, the 
king of Franks who, in the 6th century, unified the French territory with Paris as its 
capital. He also converted to Christianity. The National Front connects his reign to the 
foundation of a unified and Christian France. “In this way [the baptism of Clovis],” 
declared Le Pen in a speech, “ achieved the sacred union of Christianity, the Roman 
civilization, and the youthful vigor of the Frank people that would become, through 
fifteen centuries, the French people.” He added, “We are the heirs of this prestigious
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destiny.”102 In 1996 the National Front celebrated the 1500 anniversary of the baptism of 
Clovis in the cathedral of Reims, with several festivities and meetings all over France. In 
the preface of a book published by the party to celebrate the anniversary Le Pen stressed 
his party’s celebration as authentic because “a true celebration of the foundational 
moments of the French Nation can only come from those who have a filial relationship 
[with the nation].” Celebrations derived “from the cold analysts of a disembodied
1 A 1history” or from “subsidized official commemorations” lacked true legitimacy.
The most celebrated historical figure in the imaginary of the National Front is the 
15th century French martyr Joan of Arc who organized the resistance against English 
invaders and was tortured and burned at the stake. Le Pen’s tributes to Joan of Arc are 
always passionate, and he constantly establishes a parallel between her fight and the 
National Front. Asked in an interview which role model he would suggest to European 
youth Le Pen gave the name of this “first and most complete symbol of France.” In his 
view, “in this national heroine, patriot saint, and champion of Christianity, we find the 
youth, the people, the faith and the sacrifice, all the things than compose civilization. He. 
continued, “half a millennium ago, she was the precursor of a national France.”104 In a 
speech Le Pen declared,
What was the plot 600 years ago? It was to deliver France to the king o f England, with the 
complicity o f the University o f Paris, the church of France and feudal intrigues. What is the plot 
today? It is to put an end to the independence and inalienable sovereignty o f France and to 
amalgamate her in a so-called European unity that knows no geographical and political limits -  
with the complicity of those who have the sacred mission of defending France.105
The principles that inspired Joan of Arc’s mission in the past are the principles that 
inspire Le Pen’s mission in the present: “Faith in the eternal France, love for the 
homeland, defense of the people, authority, independence, identity, security, courage,
101 Le Pen, Jean-Marie, “Le Discours du Serment de Reims”, Present, 14-15 Septembre 1992, p.6.
102 Le Pen, Jean-Marie, “Le Discours de Jean-Marie Le Pen aux BBR”, Present, 5 Octobre 1995, p.6.
103 Le Pen, Jean-Marie, “Preface” in Brissaud, Jean-Marc, Clovis Roy des Francs -  celebration nationale 
du 1500 anniversaire, Paris, Editions Nationales, 1996, p.5.
104 Le Pen, Jean-Marie, L ' Espoir, Editions Albatros, Paris, 1989, p. 154.
105 “Jean-Marie Le Pen -  Fete de Jeanne d’Arc du ler Mai 1998,” May 1 1998, in www.frontnational.com
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gathering, faith, honor and sacrifice. Those were her values. Today they are our 
values.”106
At the same time, the French history promoted by Le Pen is nostalgic for the old 
French empire. Refusing to accept what he calls the unjust official version of colonization 
as a shameful period, Le Pen asserts that “its advantages were far greater than we want to
i r y j
admit.” To him, “history has been unfair toward the men of the Third Republic, the 
founders of the second French colonial empire ... those men that led the colonization - 
what today is referred to in a pejorative and unjust way as ‘colonialism’- had above all
10ftthe purpose of propagating the European civilization to the men of the whole world.”
In the eyes of Le Pen, two events symbolize above all the loss of the past imperial 
grandiosity of France. The first is the military defeat of Dien-Bien-Phu that marked the 
end of the French rule in Indochina; the second is the loss of the French colony of 
Algeria. They are seen above all as humiliating events that symbolize the lack of political 
will and outright treason by the French political establishment. “The defeat of Dien Bien 
Phu,” he said to one of his biographers, “is a little like the twilight of Gods for France, a 
warning from history that will not be understood.”109 In a phrase that reveals his mindset 
Le Pen once wrote, “I was aware that the only countries that could play a role in the 
world would be those who had a geopolitical but also economic and strategic space. If not 
[France] would be reduced to a little hexagon in the Asiatic peninsula that is Europe.”110 
Another subject of friction between the French History heralded by Le Pen and 
the dominant History of the French political-cultural establishment has to do with the 
Second World War and the role played by two major figures, General Charles de Gaulle 
and Marshal Petain. Le Pen considers that the “leftist-oriented” version of the events 
promote a slanderous image of the man who was the head of the collaborationist regime, 
of Vichy (1941-1944). For him Petain was a “true patriot” who thought above all in the 
best interests of France. The leader of the National front is clear about the moral 
equivalence he sees between those who joined the resistance and those who collaborated. 
“They had a common attachment to the fatherland”, he noted,
106 “Jean-Marie Le Pen -  Fete de Jeanne d’Arc du 1“ Mai 1999,”, May 1, 1999, in www.frontnational.com
107 Le Pen, Jean-Marie, L ’Espoir, op.cit, p.46.
108 Ibid, p.38.
109 Marcilly, Jean, Le Pen Sans Bandeau, Jacques Grancher, Paris, 1984, p.109.
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True, they worked on different sides [for the fatherland], but from the moment they are sincere 
and courageous they are part, without knowing it ... of the same side, that of the men who are 
capable o f giving their lives and shedding their blood for a superior cause ... Since my 
adolescence I have never accepted the Manichaeism between the Resistance and the 
Collaboration. My life experience made me conscious o f the relativity o f events and 
engagements, and I understood perfectly well that we could want to serve our country in the 
resistance to the German occupation as well as in the service o f the strategy o f the Marshall 
Petain or fighting bolshevism.111
However, Le Pen also takes issue with the “official version” of the resistance to 
the Nazis, for “it was the national right who led the combat against the occupant and the 
legend of a collaborationist right and a resistant left was forged by the communists after 
the war.”112 To put himself in a better light, the Leader of the National Front provides an 
alternative historical version of the traumatic events of World War II.
Le Pen puts much emphasis on this battle for the memory of France. To him there
is a good memory hearkening back to Gallia and the Christian origins of France and
accentuating the natural order at the basis of the nation. At the same time there is a bad
memory, inaugurated by the Enlightenment, that tries to promote a false and artificial
order. If there is a historical figure in the discourse of Le Pen who epitomizes the
subversion of natural order, it is French philosopher Jean Jacques Rousseau. To Le Pen
Rousseau is guilty of creating a utopian strain in Western thought that led to attempts to
create a forced uniformity of values and ways of living. “The Rousseau-istic dream -  that
inspired socialism, communism and liberalism -  feeds off of bluettes, humanitarian
11feelings, of love and utopias but leads to civil war, anarchy and tyranny.” To him a 
good example of this danger is the reign of terror that followed the French revolution of 
1789. “You tell me,” he said “that Europe is going to celebrate the French Revolution but 
unfortunately the revolution originated the first great bloodbath of Modem Europe ... it
110 Le Pen, Jean-Marie, Les Frangais d ’Abord, op.cit, p.49.
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opened the way to mass massacres.”114 In this light, Robespierre and Saint-Just, for 
example, play the role of veritable betes noirs in the narrative of Le Pen. The Declaration 
of the Rights of Man originated from the French Revolution is above all another step into, 
forcing peoples and cultures to lose their specific traits and amalgamate into a bland, 
uncharacteristic and artificial “universalistic” order. In 1979, for example, Le Pen 
accused then president of the Republic Giscard D’Estaing of forgetting his right-wing 
credentials because of his “Rousseau-istic, humanitarian utopian and globalist 
philosophy.” To him that was a “philosophy of the left, not of the right.”115 
Unsurprisingly, in Le Pen’s historical imagination the events of 1968 were “a decisive 
stage towards decadence,” representing, “the self-awareness of a country that realizes it is 
not a great country anymore and that abandons itself... 1968 it is the nausea. It is an act 
of despair, of disenchantment.”116 1968 represents, therefore, a powerful moment of the 
undermining of tradition and authority that was corrupting the natural fabric of France 
since the beginning of Modem times.
For Le Pen, the French political-cultural establishment was guilty of dishonesty 
and treason by actively pursuing the redefinition of France’s history. The history they, 
promoted was not the true and natural history of France: “What they want, those 
sclerotics [political class], is to tear off, piece by piece, entire sections of our history, our 
collective imaginary, our memory. It is her [the memory] that they want to darken, as we 
can see in their successful efforts, helas, in our schools to sabotage the history of 
France.”117 To counterbalance this, Le Pen and the National Front offer a truly distinct 
history. Le Pen puts at the very center of his speeches, interviews, and symbolic gestures 
this alternative history of his country. The choice of figures from the past reveals the 
intention to underscore what is constant, permanent, and stable in the history of France. 
Underneath the convulsion of past and current events lies a historical line of continuity 
where the pillars of the nation are rooted. It is above all a spiritual heritage. As written in
114 Le Pen, Jean-Marie, L ’Espoir, op.cit, p. 152.
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the program of the National Front, “France possesses a system of values that embraces 
time and space.”118
What is most important to note is that there is a relentless effort by Le Pen to 
connect the National Front and its supporters to an historical continuity that harkens back 
to the beginning of France. “The National Front is the Union of the indigenous of this 
country,”119 wrote Le Pen. As he declared in a speech,
Our effort [is to] rejuvenate in permanence the eternal message of which we are the guardians and
bearers ... We are the sons and daughters o f the party o f the homeland. We are the sons and
daughters o f those who have not measured their efforts working, who have not measured their
efforts in sacrifice in wars, in order to transmit to their children the sun, the language, the liberty,
the beauty and wealth, fruits of the millenarian effort of our people. We can only be proud of the
mission accomplished and [have] immense gratitude regarding those who have trusted in us the 
• • 120 mission.
• The Definition of the Group
Le Pen defines the National Front, his group, his militants and supporters, as the true 
representatives of France. In fact, in the alternative version of history provided by Le 
Pen, they are France. Le Pen wrote,
From Clovis to Jean de Brem [Supporter o f the Algerie Franqaise who died in confronts with the 
police] .... From Joan of Arc to Barr&s, Bainville and Maurras .... there is the same flame that 
goes through our history. We, militants and supporters o f the National Front, write a new page of 
our saga. We are a link in the immense chain o f generations. We do not have the pretension to 
reinvent the world, but more modestly and humanely to preserve the heritage, to defend a certain 
idea of a strong, generous and fraternal France. In that sense, notwithstanding it displeases our 
adversaries, we are on the first sense o f the term, the last heirs o f classical humanism that is an 
integral part o f our patrimony. Our political roots are noble, good, and beautiful. To defend them 
is not only defend our memory, our way of life and way of seeing the world, but also preserve our 
future from the clouds of Barbary that crowd the skies of the third millennium.121
118 “Le Front national, les Documents: Le programme”, in www.fi-ontnational.com
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What is particularly relevant to note is that in that Le Pen describes those who join the 
National Front as a true vanguard of men and women who constitute the best of the 
French population. They are the Elect who have the sacred mission of defending France. 
“Our responsibility is immense,” claimed Le Pen in a speech, “and let me tell you what 
Churchill used to say to the English pilots of June 1940: ‘never was so much owed by so 
many to so few.’ Well, I am sure that tomorrow France will be grateful to the most 
courageous, the most lucid and the most devoted of her daughters and sons who have
199constituted the walking wing of the recovery and national renaissance.” In the 
discourse of Le Pen the supporters of the National Front are indeed the remnant few, 
upon whose shoulders rests the responsibility of saving France. This empowerment of the 
followers is a chief element of the discourse of Le Pen. In a speech in he declared,
Since we have engaged in political combat, you know very well, my dear comrades, we do not 
seek power for the sake o f power, but to apply the ideas that we think are just when the France 
that suffers, of who we are the voice, will call us for help. We are the guetteurs au creneau, those 
who awaken our people, the voices in the night. It is true, we fight in a hurry against decadence. 
But as long as there are men to love France and to devote themselves to her, as long there is a 
French people, conscious of itself, there will be a serious hope o f victory.”123
The overall French population is guilty of letting the evils that afflict society to 
take hold putting the nation in a path of decline and decadence. The rest of the French 
trusted and gave its support to the forces of corruption and, therefore, is indirectly 
responsible for the crisis of the nation. In this context, the National Front sees itself as a 
besieged community that undergoes terrible persecutions, sufferings, and sacrifice in 
order to keep alive the spirit of the “true France” and, in the end, to redeem the mistakes 
and errors of the entire community. In his discourse Le Pen alludes to two Frances; one is 
passive and weak, the other is militant and strong, spiritually pure. This “militant France” 
is, in his words, “a conscious France that has adhered to the analysis of the National 
Front, that has understood the reasons of our decadence and that fights.” “This militant 
France,” Le Pen adds, “is suffering also. But it is suffering with hope, because action in
122 “Discours de Saint Franc -  25 Mai 1991,” op.cit. p. 145
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the good direction can pull her out from despair.”124 In fact, the “other” France is 
constituted by the part of the French population who has for a long time been 
brainwashed and stripped of its character, identity, and true nature. The role of the 
National Front is therefore and literally to show the light to those who are in darkness. “A 
lot of our compatriots have lost sight of everything that they risk losing,” declared Le 
Pen, “We need to enlighten and unite them.”125 Le Pen has many times denounced the 
“civic apathy” of the population: To him “the public spirit looks as if is in a state of
10Aadvanced coma.” On a separate occasion, he declared that “in the state of paralysis, 
coma-like in which the country finds itself it is necessary to prepare a daring and firm 
therapy in order to restore its strength and youth.”127
This lethargy is the sole thing that keeps the rest of the French population from 
joining the forces of French renaissance. Although they are not aware, the French people 
are enslaved to corrupt forces hell-bent on cutting away their roots. “We are the true 
liberators of the people of France,”128 is a permanent motto in the discourse of the leader 
of the National Front. In describing the National Front’s opposition to globalization Le 
Pen sheds light on this dialectic between the passive France, seduced by the devil of 
globalization, and the militant France, standing for truth and goodness.
This project [globalization], cynically conceived, is so monstrous that the majority o f the people 
do not believe it, do not even see that the project has already started, aggravated by the denatalite 
[declining birthrate] o f our continent and the aging o f our populations. Until now, we have been 
the only ones to see clear and to try to open the eyes and the ears o f the future slaves. Millions 
have understood us and trust us but the System [sic] has created fear. That is why we are 
persecuted ... [We have] an irresistible appetite for freedom and independence. That is why it 
would be mad and criminal to lose hope of saving France and liberate the French. When, with our 
help, with the National Front, they become conscious o f the danger, their cholera will be 
terrible.129
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• The Group is under Siege
After defining the group as the ultimate guardian of “eternal France” Le Pen 
reinforces its identity by portraying the National Front as a community under siege. The 
discourse of Le Pen evolves around the idea of menace, threat. It is rhetoric of perpetual 
fear. The hierarchy of the enemies might change slightly over time but the targeting of 
enemies is always present. The enemies loom everywhere. They are either internal or 
external to the community. Internally, close attention is paid to the political-media 
establishment. “You can, my dear compatriots,” stated Le Pen,
Today, be proud of yourselves, proud of the National Front and of everything that it has achieved 
after twenty years o f its foundation; like the sailor, we also have known fatigue and 
discouragement. Sometimes even despair. But we have surmounted it. We have been victims of 
lies, defamation and persecution. And we continued to be ... we are truly treated in our country in 
that domain [the media] but also many others, as authentic pariahs.130
Why since its origins has the National Front been the object of persecution? Why 
is it that the community of “true France” is marginalized? To Le Pen the reason is simple. 
The National Front is the only party that informs the French people of the truth about the 
threats imperiling the nation’s survival. The vehement denunciation of this process of 
marginalization by the “political-media caste” has always been a chief element in the 
Front’s self-perception. Le Pen calls the French Republic a totalitarian democracy that 
aims at the destruction of the only “national opposition” to “The “System.”131 Since the 
foundation of the party there has been a widespread phenomenon of “intellectual 
terrorism” that was launched to prevent the National Front, the open-eyed “militant 
France,” from waking up the sleepy-eyed “passive France.” According to Le Pen the 
ultimate aim of this “intellectual terrorism” is to produce “brainless citizens”:
It serves to deny the people the knowledge o f realities he should know, to reduce [the people] to a 
blind and deaf mass, dazed by the unanimous and monolithical propaganda. It has as a goal 
concealing real problems, like the taboo, o f immigration ... Little by little, because o f the
130 “Discours du Bourget BBR -  13 Octobre 1991,” op.cit, pp.299-301
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criminalization o f our movement and our ideas, the French were forbidden to think, to reflect 
about the problems of our society ... it is this intellectual terrorism, totally irrational, that explains 
why our movement is today excluded from the official political field.132
The internal enemies are therefore all of those whom Le Pen sees as “foreign 
forces” or members of the party of “anti-France.” They include the mainstream media, 
the politicians of The System and all of those who are considered servants of the 
powerful forces of globalization, dedicated to the destruction of France and to the 
creation of an artificial world order, from immigrant activists to freemasons to human 
rights activists. Le Pen pays crucial attention to the enemies within the group of The Elect 
itself, warning constantly against hidden traitors, which helps to keep the group’s internal 
mobilization and energy level high. Past examples of traitors serve as admonition against 
the fate of future traitors.
In this way, and men are what they are, it is convenient that no one loses sight of the fact that the 
risks o f division that threaten all the human formations cannot develop within [our group]. We 
have to put aside all temptation of friction, to ban all worthless oppositions and devastating 
defamations. The individual ambition and the overestimation o f the Self have led Mdgret to the 
criminal adventure o f the split.133
The external enemies are the internationalist forces that put the French nation at 
danger. This theme is always present in rhetoric, though the primacy and even the face of 
the enemies may change over time. At the beginning the National Front saw as the 
greatest danger the Soviet Empire. “If there is a threat today it is the soviet [threat],” 
wrote Le Pen,
It is time, not o f choosing between being ‘red or dead’ or to give to our anguish or fear the form 
o f capitulation, but on the contrary [to opt for the road] o f resistance against death, we have to 
prepare ourselves to a confrontation that could be military, subversive or revolutionary, we know 
that there will be a winner and a loser and that our country risks o f being the lose, even Europe 
and the Western World, if we do not know how to mobilize our forces to survive and win.134
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The Soviet threat was closely linked to the other big threat, massive immigration. 
Le Pen has incessantly talked about the “third world hegemony” that due to “the 
demographic explosion in the third world, particularly the Arabic-Islamic World, 
penetrates our country and is on the verge of colonizing it.” The communists were 
promoting this development because immigration had the final goal of preparing the way 
for a communist revolution in France.
For more than forty years the improvement of the standard o f life o f the working class posed a 
problem to the Marxists. The members of the national proletariat, once heralded as the iron spear 
of the Revolution, looked more and more thin. How to preserve the customers? ... The call to 
immigration is one o f the answers to this question. In importing the misery, welcoming a 
foreigner proletariat, they preserve the relevance o f class warfare, hoping at the same time to 
make those foreigners vote.136
Communism, therefore, promoted an internationalist ideology that was at odds with the 
natural order championed by Le Pen and the National Front.
After the fall of the Soviet Empire, Le Pen immediately found as a substitute 
what he calls the “American empire” guilty too of imposing the tyranny of globalization 
on the nations of the earth, with the help of cronies such as the European Union, the 
International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and Human Rights Organizations. The 
indictment of the United States of America started to be particularly visible after the end- 
of the cold war and the first Gulf War. The United States is seen as the driving force 
behind the implementation of a New World Order. Le Pen blasts what he calls the
117“American universalism,” which is based on the “fundamentalism of the market.”
The objective of this universalism, said Le Pen, is to create,
a World Government that will run the world in the next century. The Europe o f Brussels is, in 
practice, its ally. She [the European Union] was created to be just another stage in the process of 
globalization. [We have] borders that disappear, local and cultural specificities that blur to the 
advantage o f an universal culture, an ideology o f human rights elevated to the rank o f Holy 
Gospel, an appearance of democracy, a planetarian market economy, one currency (why not the 
dollar?), and the belt is buckled. The World Village is not a whim anymore. We witness, 
powerlessly, the edification of a true totalitarianism [that is] much more vicious than communism 
and much more destructive than it. It’s not an outlandish scenario anymore, a scenario of science
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fiction, but a nightmare: a communism ‘light’ or a totalitarianism ‘soft’, the endgame is the 
same!138
The European Union is therefore integrated in the malevolent globalizing process 
that is determined to strangle and eventually substitute the natural system of diversity of 
nations with an artificial and disruptive “internationalist” system. Le Pen described the 
approval of a new European-wide Constitution as just one more step towards this 
doomsday scenario. In a revelatory statement he said,
In creating a Constitution it is therefore hoped the emergence o f a [European] Nation, which 
means that [the goal] is to create one by force, destroying the historical nations that have shaped 
the essence o f world history, reducing them to a range o f provinces. The intention is to make a 
European Nation but what will emerge is a new empire, a prison of peoples, which will meet the 
destiny o f all the multinational artificial constructions, that is, a quick disappearance amid 
probable dramatic upheavals. We are at the very heart o f a new totalitarian utopia [that seeks to 
establish] a total break with fundamental political principles o f European civilization, a 
civilization of free peoples, thus sovereigns.139
Another powerful threat to France comes from Islam. The National Front, 
particularly since the late eighties has intensified its opposition to the development of 
Islamic culture and practices in the French territory. The National Front has led the 
opposition to the construction of mosques, a sure sign of the “conquering Islam.”140 Le 
Pen has always blamed what he calls the “immigration lobbies” for this trend that 
threatens the survival of the “France Frangaise”, that is Western and Christian. For him 
immigrants of Islamic countries, contrary to immigrants of other European countries, are 
impossible to assimilate because they are “ethnical and cultural” foreigners to French 
identity. The immigration lobbies use Islam as a weapon “against our country ... in order 
to eradicate from out spiritual and intellectual universe everything that attaches us to the 
Western, Humanist and Christian civilization.”141
The French government and the politicians of the system, left and right, are 
nothing more than collaborators in this process of globalization and massification
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“launched against France,”142 sycophants of their masters. In this context Le Pen sees the 
National Front, the group of the “Elect,” as absolutely essential in fighting for a France 
that has been attacked by powerful forces and abandoned by everyone but the National 
Front. Not one opportunity goes by without Le Pen reminding his followers of the crucial 
role they play as the remnant few, the remnant patriots, the sons and daughters of the real 
France who are struggling to maintain its integrity against overwhelming forces of evil.
If Globalization is nothing more than a metamorphosis of History ... a consequence of the 
abandon of the moral and civic rules that have governed us for centuries, then, we have to deal 
with what she is, a materialistic ideology following the example of communism, against which 
we have and we must fight in order to escape from it. It falls upon the most lucid, the most 
courageous and wise, to mobilize the peoples to assure in the world o f tomorrow not only the 
defense o f the Rights o f Man, but also those o f the Rights of the Soul [in order to do that] we 
have to take inspiration from the successes and failures o f more than three millennia of 
civilization.143
This rhetoric of fear is intended to strengthen the perception of the group as a 
besieged community. It is also closely aligned with a rhetoric of conspiracy. An anti­
national, internationalist plan has been gaining ground for a long time since the 
Enlightenment. Its current face is the neo-liberalist and American-led Globalization. Le 
Pen connects the dots and forms a coherent picture about a changing reality. Everything 
is part of a plan diabolic in scope and goal. The creation of a united and federal Europe, 
for example, is meticulously included in this mondialiste, and cosmopolitan project. Le 
Pen talks about “a secret plan imagined by Jean Monnet” who fell under the influence of 
the “big international American banks,” and became an apostle of a supranational United 
States of Europe. The implementation of this plan was made with the help of three 
organizations: The Council for Foreign Relations, the Bildelberg Group and the Trilateral 
commission.144 This plan encourages the collapse of birth rates in Europe and a policy of 
open borders and massive immigration; both intended to soften and ultimate destroy 
national identity. Le Pen explains the rationale,
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The internationalists want to organize the world according to their own utopias, fundamentally 
anti-national, anti-religion and inhuman. Men and women will be sacrificed to Humanity [sic] 
and the self-appointed experts will define and organize their happiness. This happiness will be the 
same on all the continents ... We recognize [in this plan], without any doubt, the same 
totalitarianism responsible in the 20th century of the death and suffering o f hundreds of million of 
men and women. In order to accomplish this Orwellian project it is necessary to uproot the people 
and to dissolve the familiar, religious, civic, social and associational links ... that is why the 
family and the Nation [sic] are their main targets. The family because it is the material link of the 
transmission of life and moral values. The Nation [sic] because it is a superior principle of 
effective solidarity, dignity and security.145
Le Pen derides the overall human rights philosophy ~ part of the American-led, 
totalitarian ideology hell-bent on the implementation of a “world government by Big 
Brother,”146 -- as “Droit de Vhommisme.” Le Pen accuses, for example, groups such as 
SOS Racisme, Licra (Ligue Internationale contre le Racisme et L’Antisemitisme) and 
Ligue des Droits de I ’Homme of being “anti-French.”147 Under the disguise of liberalism 
these groups want to impose an abstract and rootless program of Humanity on the natural 
and rooted realities of Nations and Le Pen accuses them of racism against the French. 
Behind the complot, the conspiracy, Le Pen sees the work of specific international 
organizations. He frequently mentions the Freemasonry and International Jewish 
Organizations. He cites the secret freemasonry organization Grand Orient as having an 
absolute control over a large number of French politicians. Another of his targets is the 
Jewish international organization B ’nai B ’rith which is accused of having a powerful grip 
on the French political system and of being a driving force towards World Government. 
Le Pen says repeatedly that the National Front is free of the influence of such obscure 
forces. “It is true,” he declared “that we do not obey to the talking points of any 
organization neither foreign like the B *nai B ’rith, or internal as the Grand Orient... like 
so many of the elected officials of the so-called Republic”148 Le Pen also denounces the 
neo-liberal Trilateral Commission formed by David Rockefeller in 1973, accusing it of 
putting minions in important political positions and controlling them behind the scenes, 
playing an important role in the army of the “Big Brother.” All of these groups are
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146 “Jean-Marie Le Pen -  Universite d’ete du Front National a Orange,” September 3 1999, in 
www.frontnational. com
147 Franqais d ’Abord! Quotidien, February 17 2004.
148 “Jean-Marie Le Pen -  176mc Fete des Bleu-BIanc-Rouge,” September 26 1997.
54
depicted as “forces that aspire to establish a reductive, global and equalizing ideology 
[by] playing a non negligible role in the creation of an anti-national spirit.”149
In sum, by claiming a worldwide conspiracy against his small group, Le Pen 
manages to give his followers a portray of their crucial role as defenders of France and 
French values in a period of rapid change. It provides his people a model for 
understanding the world that makes a complex and seemingly chaotic situation more 
rational and the role of the National Front more morally compelling. It also depicts the 
enemies of the group as powerful, mischievous, and diabolical, which removes any sort 
of ambiguity in the combat against evil.
The rhetoric of Le Pen is also catastrophic. To emphasize the deep crisis that the 
Nation is in and the dangers that lie ahead for the remnant patriots Le Pen uses a 
catastrophic vocabulary. Below are some typical examples of Le Pen’s litany of 
catastrophic threats to the Republic.
Communism
- “I tell the young men and women of my country: what is being prepared under your 
eyes is the establishment of the Marxist revolution that leads to the gulag, slavery and 
death.”150
- “It is necessary to remind the French that their existence, their freedoms, their 
prosperity are linked to the survival of the homeland, to the survival of a free Europe and 
she is objectively threatened. And if this threat is not fought off we will be in the gulag 
before the end of the century.”151
- “There is no national defense, no matter the material means employed, without a ‘spirit 
of defense,’ that is without an awareness of the danger, of its nature, its amplitude, its
149 “M.Le Pen et ‘L’intemationale juive,” in Le Monde, September 9,1989.
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imminence, and without the will to preserve ourselves. The choice to be made is between
1life and death, between self-chosen sacrifice or slavery.”
Immigration
- “The disastrous policy of our government has had catastrophic consequences because it 
opened the door, in an uncontrollable manner, to a migratory flux that we don’t even
1 r o
know the reality or statistics ... it is truly a tidal wave.”
- “We are going to assist to a real invasion, of which we have only seen the beginning, 
that will literally submerge our indigenous populations.”154
- “We are the victims of a worldwide mutation, of an invasion apparently pacific but that, 
evidently, is a deadly threat to our identity, our security, our culture.”155
- “Immigration ... the opening and suppression of our borders ... and the attribution of 
social benefits have giving it a torrential character, [that will be] cataclysmic in the 
future. It threatens us of engulfment and, soon submission, which means extinction.”156
Declining Birthrate
- “Declining birthrate is a mortal phenomenon. If continues, by the decline of vitality 
coupled with the demographic pressure from the Third World, we will be, before the
1 ^7arrival of the year 2000, submerged.”
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- “In effect, the gravest danger that threatens the earth is the collapse of birthrates in the
Western World confronted with the birthrate explosion in the Third World. That is why I
1 ^8estimate that homosexuality will drive us, if progresses, to the end of the world.”
- “While the lack of babies make us decadent, the rest of the world explodes, literally ... 
the conditions for a world cataclysm are assembled, and this cataclysm will happen. We 
have to make sure that this cataclysm does not happen among us.”159
Globalization
- “[The] triumph of materialism, of the Single Idea [sic], of the New World Order, the 
planned destruction of nations, the establishment of a totalitarian democracy, form the 
most hypocritical of tyrannies.”160
- “We are in the presence of a patient [France] who suffers from cancer and whose pain 
has been attenuated with palliatives, but where everyone is resignated to its imminent 
death. Our governments have abdicated! They don’t believe in France anymore, or in 
Europe. They serve globalization.”161
- “Lets remember the newest and apocalyptical threats that weight on our country, the 
frantic dictatorship of King-money, the complete miscegenation imposed on our people 
by a massive immigration and an anti-natality policy monstrously organized, the’
1 AOdisappearance of our civilization, our culture.”
Le Pen’s rhetoric is elaborated to create shock. It is deliberately constructed to 
exaggerate and in some cases caricaturize the problems in order to grab the attention and 
accentuate that the survival of France is at stake. In order to this Le Pen relentlessly uses 
biological images and metaphors. This is closely linked with his idea of the nation not a
158 “M.Le Pen: l’homosexualite c’est la fin du monde,” in Le Monde, June 13, 1984.
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rational “abstract” construction but as an organic living entity. “We know,” wrote Le Pen, 
“that like all the terrestrial homelands she [France] is mortal, notwithstanding the 
appearance of its exceptional longevity and because we know that we are even more 
attached to her.”163 The issues are always literally about life and death. There is no 
middle ground. “The National Front,” he said at another occasion, “is a biopolitical 
movement, a reaction of health against the threat of death contained in the decadence, 
subversion and foreigner invasion.”164 Le Pen has described himself as a “doctor in times 
of an epidemic outbreak ... when the doctor arrives the people are happy.”165In the 
discourse of Le Pen, France is depicted as a body in decomposition, decaying, putrefying, 
attacked by all sort of problems that are indeed described as diseases. “The crimes against 
the nation are all of those which attack its physical, moral and spiritual substance,” said 
Le Pen, “all of those who explicitly or not want the violent destruction or the rotting of 
this great organic entity that constitutes the nation.”166 He has talked about the fact that 
the “foreigner invasion” creates “gangrene” in France.167 Unemployment is also 
described as a “social cancer.”168 Regarding the proliferation of immigrants and security 
concerns Le Pen noted that “this proliferation resembles cancer cells, I’m not referring to 
the immigrants, but the [immigration] process in itself: If it’s not stopped immediately we 
will soon face forms of civil war or foreign subversive war in our territory.”169 He has 
denounced the “mental Aids” that afflicts society and calls his followers to “reconstruct 
the natural immunities.”170 A campaign of the National Front in the nineties consisted in 
establishing a parallel between Aids and socialism: “In politics, in economy in morality 
Socialism is Aids!”171
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Intimately linked with the life-death rhetoric and the conflation of his enemies 
with disease is the constant use of a Social Darwinist philosophy in describing the threats 
and dangers to the French nation. In a typical manner Le Pen said,
Generally, any weak country is a potential prey to another one who is stronger. Since the 
beginning of times the surface o f the earth has been agitated by fights o f influence between 
conquering countries and submissive countries. Entire nations and civilizations have disappeared 
because they could not fill the necessary conditions to their own survival.172
In this world where only the strongest will survive and the feeble are doomed to demise, 
France is in real danger. “The weak countries are the targets of all the predators of the 
world,” declared Le Pen in a speech. “When we are not capable of defending our identity, 
territory and culture, there will be others who come to impose [their culture] by force, 
sometimes with fusils, sometimes with babouches ”173 In a similar note he pointed out in 
a speech that
Civilizations are, alas, mortal and in different dimensions obey to the rhythms of the universe 
and, it seems, with stupefying parallelism ... the evolution [of civilizations], their birth, growth, 
life and death have a common trait noted by Toynbee and Oswald Spengler, Bruy as and 
Dupaquier, they come to an end due to foreign demographic submersion, when allogenic 
elements become too great in number to be assimilated, and when [civilizations] let their own 
vital dynamism weaken. What is known in History as the ‘great invasions’, which led to the death 
of a civilization, is what we are on the verge of living in our times, hie et nunc.m
The focus on fear, enemies, threats and danger is a powerful mechanism to induce 
a sense of foreboding in the besieged community. There is a sense of impending tragedy 
that pervades the rhetoric of Le Pen. He repeatedly calls immigration a “demographic 
bomb”, “immigration-invasion,” that is out of control and he warns against its 
“cataclysmic” consequences. Intimately connected is urgency to act. “The danger that 
threatens our country is a specific danger in the short term,” he wrote. “Our fate will be
17^ • *sealed before the end of the century [20th century].” He said at another occasion, 
“Before the end of the century we will have reached a point of no return. Then,
172 Le Pen, Jean-Marie, L ’Espoir, p. 12.
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decadence will be irreversible and irreparable. We have only a couple of years of respite 
left, very short, to inverse the course of the political choices that could create a 
fundamental change.”176 “What they hide from you,” Le Pen warned his supporters, “is 
that France is threatened with disappearance ... before the end of the century, before four
•  177years. What Chirac asks from us is to be accomplices of this national suicide.”
It is very symptomatic of this sense of impending cataclysm the way Le Pen 
describes France’s position in regard to globalization and the European Union. In a 
speech he said,
We must break o ff from this politics o f Death [Federal Europe] and announce that the 
cooperation with the peoples of Europe must be organized around nations .... We must combat 
boldly the Europe o f Brussels and break France away from it, with the growing help o f all its 
victims. Europe is working to kill France and all the historical nations o f the continent. At the end 
of this road there is nothing but servitude and war;178 It is clear that the project, better to say the 
global conspiracy o f which the Trojan Horse is the European Union of Brussels is committed to 
the goal o f destroying the nations for exactly the opposite reasons we want to defend and save 
them ... it is clear that the Europe of Brussels prepares the death o f France.”
• The National Front’s Exceptionality
In its depiction of the tragedy, Le Pen’s discourse obeys a permanent logic of 
polarization. The National front is portrayed as a community of the “Elect”, the true 
patriots, the representatives of millenarian France. They are usually described as sane, 
healthy and pure. Opposed to them are the “Mighty,” the false patriots, those powerful 
evil forces who want to subvert the structures and history of millenarian France. They are. 
repeatedly described as corrupt traitors who are beholden to secret forces.
The vocabulary of Le Pen is also belligerent, he talks about “battalions” and says 
that the National Front is engaged in the “battle for France.”179 The National Front, the 
defender of “true France,” is engaged in a mortal fight against the “anti-France.” As Le
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Pen said in a speech, “Only the Front incarnates and carries the national idea in the 
French political landscape.”180 “If the National Front has acquired today the political 
importance that has, it is also because France has returned,” Le Pen wrote in his book
t ft 1symptomatically called La France est de Retour (France is Back). Included in the side 
of “anti-France,” the “France of the foreigners,” are all the mainstream political parties 
that Le Pen derides as Gang or Band of 4 and the entire media establishment. They too 
know that there is a mortal war going on between them and the National Front, the 
“national opposition”, the only obstacle to the implementation of their “monstrous” 
project of killing millenarian France. As stated by Le Pen,
The National Front, who honors itself as being the Party of the French, suffers, like her [France], 
in its combat for the liberation of our people, from a systematic persecution from those who hold 
the power ... This persecution is visible in all domain [yet] It needs to end, together with the 
decadence o f the State and the Republic, the persecution o f the patriots and the servitude of 
France and the French ... Enough of the failure, the corruption, the homeland put in danger, 
enough. The time has come to chase away from power the liars, the corrupt, and the thieves away 
from power. The time has come for the people to make its voice heard and its will expressed.182
Because of its exceptionality as the last and only defender of the nation the National 
Front has been the victim of a nefarious and relentless campaign from the establishment. 
In the narrative of the party several episodes epitomize this persecution, such as the 1990 
profanation of the Jewish cemetery of Carpentras which was wrongly attributed to the 
National Front or the mainstream media accusations of Le Pen engaging in practices of 
torture during the Algeria war and never proven in the courts of law. The establishment 
of an electoral majority system that hurt the smaller parties is also viewed as part of this 
persecutory campaign against the National Front and has led to accusations of the French 
Republic as a “false democracy.” “In my view is not normal that democracy eliminates
1 S'!the political non-conformist families, such as ours,” noted Le Pen in an interview. For
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him Le Pen referendums are a way of giving true voice to the people and creating a true 
democracy.184
In his discourse Le Pen manages to put forward a framework in which the 
opposites are clearly defined and the options are unambiguous. To highlight even more 
the differences between the two camps even more Le Pen demonizes the opponents, 
occasionally physically, but especially morally. Writing about what distinguishes 
“France” from the “anti-France” Le Pen notes, “The gap is growing between the ruling 
intelligentsia, amoral and indulgent to all disorders, and the people [who are] 
fundamentally sane and who are the victims of those disorders.”185 “Authority is mostly 
moral,” noted le Pen about his opponent in the presidential elections, “but Chirac is a 
man with no reputation, a immodele, an anti-example.”186 The attack on the morality of 
the opponents is intended to increase the repulsion towards those who serve the interests 
of a “foreigner France” against the community of patriots.
In this polarized manner the National Front becomes the only possible solution to 
deal with the dangers faced by the nation. To counterbalance the forecast of the imminent 
demise of France, Le Pen offers hope. The National Front is the only path towards 
salvation. As written by Le Pen, “there is still time, there is always time to refuse 
annihilation and slavery. A surge of French can still reverse the apocalypse.”187 “Before 
the end of the century,” stated Le Pen to his supporters, “whether we [France] have 
carried out the Salvationist burst or we will be taken away by a cataclysm whose 
guidelines are already in place.”188 Only the embattled moral community of the “Elect” 
has in itself the power to turn around the decline of France and put forward a grandiose 
project of recovery, renaissance and salvation. In the discourse of Le Pen, they are 
constantly characterized as the last hope of the nation,
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The National Front, whatever the case, persists in its will o f  creating, soon, at national level, a 
pivotal center o f resistance to the decline and decadence . . .189; [The National Front is] the shield 
of France against which crash all of the projectiles emanating from people who are in rivalry with 
France or who wish to destroy her, to dissolve her, to demean her or to reduce her to slavery190; 
That explains, undoubtedly, ladies and gentleman, the hatred that follows the National Front, its 
militants and officials, because they constitute in truth the only bolt that allows the nation to 
remain and, tomorrow, to prosper to the detriment of the cosmopolitan interests.191
The discourse of fear in Le Pen is intimately paired with a discourse of hope and 
change. The National Front incarnates hope. In fact, he has often concluded his speeches 
stressing that the National Front has “a rendezvous with Destiny”192 pleading to the rest 
of the French population to “join hope.”193 To Le Pen, “in the face of the decadent 
political System [sic] there is only one opposition who can put forward a national politic, 
the only one capable of assuring the future of France and the French.”194 The burden of 
saving France is therefore on the shoulders of the “Elect,” the members of the community 
under siege, the National Front.
So far I have attempted to illuminate how, through his discourse, Le Pen solidifies 
the identity of the group as the representatives of France engaged in a mortal fight with 
the obscure but omnipresent forces of “anti-France.” Le Pen empowers his followers by 
repeatedly emphasizing their nature as the remnant few Patriots who have the 
aggrandizing mission of the salvation of France. In the next segment I will try to show 
how Le Pen manages to portray himself as the guide and savior of the “Elect” in their 
missionary road to save France. Such a savior is necessary because the danger is so great 
and the forces of evil are so many and powerful. There has to be a great leader to lead the 
minority in heroic combat. The way to victory is through moral rectitude and the 
cowardice of the enemy, who will collapse when confronted resolutely.
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3. Le Pen as the Savior
3.1 The Le Pen Industry
Since the foundation of the National Front in 1972 there has been a persistent, 
trend by the National Front to shift Le Pen’s position in the collective consciousness from 
the level of history onto the level of myth. There has been a relentless effort to 
mythologize the achievements and life stories of Le Pen in order to imprint the image of 
the Le Pen as the avatar of Millenarian France deeply upon the minds of his followers. 
The work of Le Pen’s closest collaborators, the central role of the leader in the party- 
machine, and the discourse of Le Pen himself have fueled this process of mythification of 
the leader of the National Front -what could be called the “Le Pen industry.”
• The Inner Circle
At the very basis of this Le Pen industry is the incessant work of Le Pen’s inner 
circle. They are not merely collaborators; their work could be more logically described as 
the work of disciples, and sometimes apostles who zealously sanctify the image of their 
leader. In writings and speeches they describe a sense of destiny about Le Pen. Francis 
Brigneau has written that the fact that Le Pen was bom in June 20, 1928, at the perfect 
midpoint between the end of World War I and the beginning of World War II (although it 
seems to be forgotten that World War II actually started in 1939), proves that Le Pen’s 
birth was no mere coincidence but of a man marked by destiny to play a cmcial role of 
combatant in history.195 Other friendly biographers have made a similar point.196 These
195 “La nouvelle question Le Pen,” in Le Monde, September 21, 1991.
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biographers have also highlighted Le Pen’s Celtic roots which seem to only add to the 
perception of Le Pen as a man of destiny. Francis Brigneau notes that “There were two 
fairies around the cradle of Jean-Marie. Two Celtic fairies .... The first one was the fairy 
of Eloquence, the second one the fairy of Imagination. It was them who gave the child his 
most precious gifts, also the most typically Briton.”197 “Le Pen is a Celt, a man [with the 
gift of] verbal enchantment,” writes another commentator, “his hands, his face, his pose 
become, due to their expressiveness, the mirror of his thoughts.”198According to Jean 
Marcilly,
[Le Pen was bom] on June 20, that is, the day of the summer solstice, the most important 
celebration of the Celts, his ancestors, o f whom we know more and more that they were a people 
carrying a profound religious sentiment. Bearers o f a unique civilization for the time, turbulent, 
belligerent, conquerors, we can say that the leader of the ‘National Front’ resembles them.199
The image of leader of the National Front as a man with a sense of destiny 
pervades the accounts of those close to him. Bruno Megret, the one time general delegate 
of the party, describes his first encounter with Le Pen as a life-changing moment: “I felt 
springing up inside of me something indefinable, called trust. Was it set off by [Le Pen’s] 
talent of persuasion, by the shrewdness of his analysis, or the strength of his convictions? 
I still don’t know. In any case, a simple certitude had invaded me: This man is one of 
those who force destiny!”200 Yvan Blot, a former FN member of the European 
Parliament, argued that Le Pen’s trajectory fulfilled a heroic “historical destiny” of 
rectifying the excesses of the Enlightenment. To Blot, Le Pen “is the man who incarnates 
the return of the baroque in the French political life. His combat against the 
cosmopolitans, his [the combat] for the French soul against the idolaters of the mind.”201 
Drawing from Blot, Pierre Monnier makes a similar point. To him, “voila!... Jean-Marie- 
Le Pen, is the irruption of the baroque in a world anemic, politically paralyzed, neo­
classic, narrow, Marxist and decadent... is the take-off of creative pleasure and freedom
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.... The innovators of the baroque, at once wise and restless defy the paralysis of the 
establishment. The breath of life blows off ideology.”202 Le Pen’s life and achievements 
are therefore integrated in a grandiose and mythical historical framework.
Another topic permanently stressed by the inner circle of the National Front is the 
image of Le Pen as a natural leader. The literature of the National Front, for example, 
makes a point of emphasizing that in the French-Celtic dictionary the French word Chef 
(leader) translates as Pen. “To those who believe in destiny,” one of the photo books in 
honor of Le Pen proclaims, “Le Pen’s destiny was already planned.”203 One of his 
childhood friends wrote: “Le Pen in Breton means head [and], therefore, the leader. Jean- 
Marie saw himself naturally at the head of all the expeditions organized by us.”204 
Biographer Roger Mauge noted how, even early in his life and in school, Le Pen “was the 
head of the game, the one who takes the lead, who speaks louder, the one who we are 
driven to admire and follow.”205 One of his fellow soldiers in Indochina remembered that 
“like everyone I had my confrontations with him and I’ve suffered from rejection after 
the confrontation: he had become the uncontested leader and inspired strong attachments,’ 
with his natural authority of a good leader.”206 His biographer Marcilly wrote that Le Pen 
has a “permanent behavior of leadership”207 As written by Martin Peltier,
Listen to [Le Pen] talk about Rwanda, about the affair Carlos, all kind of affairs, he has a clear 
and coherent language that slices through the silence o f some or the weak and embarrassed 
explanations o f others ... Briefly, Le Pen has the language o f a leader. As indicated by his name: 
Le Pen, the leader. The French people ... need a leader. A real one. A look that discerns, a voice 
that speaks, a hand that holds ... Our Republic today is a woman without a head. That is why the 
French suffer, that is why is they desert the traditional parties, that is why they need Le Pen.
The emphasis on Le Pen’s natural leadership qualities is coupled with the intense 
portrayal of Le Pen as a unique man. In the preface to a photo book dedicated to Le Pen,
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long time Le Pen loyalist Roger Holeindre writes that “this album is a symbol, a homage 
to and exceptional man, a herald of the homeland: Jean-Marie Le Pen.”209 In fact, in the 
eyes of his closest collaborators Le Pen is a man of rare qualities. His eloquence is 
praised. In the words of Francis Brigneau,
Brother o f the great Irish orators, o f whom he has the power o f evocation, the inspiration, the 
generosity, the gift o f the images and magical rhythms, [Le Pen] does not speak only to please. 
He speaks to achieve, to teach, to learn, to bring a little o f his knowledge, as much , as his 
intuitions and convictions that follow [from his knowledge] that is why he entered politics .... To 
transmit verbally the secrets o f tradition, without which the genius o f a community is swept away 
by the wind of history ... he excels himself and reveals himself as one o f the last natural orators 
of the epoch.210
A party biography praises Le Pen’s performances in the tribune as being “of a rare 
charisma.”211 One of his biographers states that “Le Pen is probably the last French 
tribun. He is an accomplished orator, speaking as much as with the heart as with the 
head, due to the fact that he has something to say and something in his guts that help in 
the delivery.”212 “We know that from all the politicians,” writes Pierre Monnier, “ he is 
the one who handles the French language the best, the one who expresses himself with 
the most ease and who’s never short of words even if he has embarked in one of his 
meanderings a la Proust.” His ability to deliver unscripted speeches is also praised by 
Monnier who notes that “we also know that he can occupy the stage for two hours 
without the help of notes.”213 The last of the great orators is therefore at the service of 
France.
Le Pen’s perseverance occupies a central place in the exaltation of his rare 
qualities. The fact that his father’s boat was named Perseverance is noted in all of the 
biographies or books honoring Le Pen 214 He is unrelentingly described as a man with a 
steady persistence in adhering to a course of action and to his ideals, and he is noted for 
showing an uncommon steadfastness in the face of so many obstacles. As stated by 
Megret,
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There you have a man [Le Pen] who has remained faithful to his ideas all o f his life. He could 
have had a more peaceful and interesting life outside politics. Nevertheless he has pursued, 
against winds and tides, a combat that for the moment has only gave him insults and slander. Isn’t 
there a sign that he is driven by an ideal and that he possesses those two qualities, so rare today, 
that are conviction and courage?215
Pierre Monnier makes a similar point:
In a world where everyone looks over his shoulder, [and is] is afraid o f taking a step without 
guaranties .... He advances, he fights, sturdy and indifferent to all hostility around him .... Ten 
years have passed during which he has fought, without success, but confident o f achieving what 
others have always thought impossible.216
“We cannot deny,” writes F rancis Brigneau, “[Le Pen’s] courage, his political 
straightness, his perseverance, his refusal of all politicking compromises.”217 If there is a 
dominant theme in the literature of the National Front dedicated to Le Pen it is that of his 
perseverance. In one of the photo books dedicated to Le Pen, in the chapter significantly 
headlined “Tenacity,” is written that “obstinate, Jean-Marie Le Pen holds the bar firmly
1^0
and, despite the difficulties, he remains faithful to his ideas.” Blot writes that Le Pen’s 
perseverance is closely linked with his sense of mission. As he notes in an article,
Jean-Marie Le Pen has the conviction that he has a message to deliver to the French so that 
France can remain France. Twenty years ago he knew that his message would not have had 
hardly any echo but still he continued to act because he felt that was his duty, his mission in this 
land. ‘Do what you have to, no matter what happens!’ It is the motto o f an ethic that is as old as 
the Iliad o f Homer which has 2800 years. It is the ethic of honor, based more on the sentiment of 
duty than the avidity of power.219
Le Pen is many times described as a “Menhir,” which not only connects him to 
prehistoric Celtic origins but also coveys the perception of someone who does not give 
away to pressure or persuasion. In the work of those close to him Le Pen is a man of 
unyielding character. Pierre Monnier says that his character is of “a granitic nature.” In
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anticipation of the presidential elections of 2002, the National Front published a book in 
praise of Le Pen that stated that,
For the fourth time, Jean-Marie Le Pen aims at reaching the supreme magistrature. His political, 
career is outside the norms. Never before has a public man been as slandered as he has. 
Nevertheless he kept firm, against winds and storms, with his convictions and ideals fixed in his 
heart. The menhirs cannot be knocked down. See you in 2002.221
In order to further highlight the distinction between Le Pen and all of his 
opponents Le Pen is constantly portrayed as an “honest man.” As stated by Marcilly, 
“The morality of the political action of Jean-Marie Le Pen is the reason why he prefers 
taking the risk of being unpopular in order to defend what he sees as the truth, informing 
his fellow citizens in spite of everything. It is his honor.”222 Eric Domard, journalist of 
the Les Franqais d ’Abord, takes the point further saying that, in Le Pen, we find “the 
constant refusal of the langue de bois [officialese], the search to speak the truth, 
denounced by his adversaries as politically incorrect, which has the merit of saying out 
loud what the militants and the voters think.” He added, “It is this anti-conformism, this 
temerity of language that cements the strong relationship between the president of the 
National Front and the militants.”223 Yvan Blot draws a stark contrast between the 
archetype of the “honest man” personified by Le Pen and the archetype of the Enarque, 
the mainstream politician groomed at an elite school such as the Ecole Nationale 
d ‘Administration. The Enarques are denounced as an inbred political caste, connected by 
privilege. They are characterized by laicization, technocracy, aloofness, and the doctrine 
of the “politically correct”, bent on imposing their vision of society on the rest of the 
population. Le Pen is different. In the words of Yvan Blot,
In face of the sclerosis of the dominant neo-classicism that transforms the thought and the action 
of our political class into a technocratic attitude to the detriment of the aspirations of the French 
people, Le Pen reintroduces the baroque in French political life. He incarnates its cultural type, 
that of the ‘honest man’. Everyone who knows Jean-Marie Le Pen knows of his love for the truth. 
That love for the truth characterized also the baroque century ... the enarque prefers Descartes to 
Pascal. He prefers certitude to the truth. He is much more at ease dealing with clear and distinct 
ideas that in facing the unstable and contradictory reality.224
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Along with Le Pen’s honesty, his loyalty in all realms of life, from politics to his 
personal life is emphasized. The depiction of this loyal side of Le Pen pervades not only 
his biographies but the entire literature of the National Front. “Every time Le Pen talks 
about France,” writes National-Hebdo director Yves Daoudal,
About the past o f France, o f the future of France, he emerges has the one who passes the baton of 
the French civilization, as the holder o f the flame, that French flame that comes from faraway
[and] which we do not have the right to let fade. His first ambition, regardless o f his own personal
225destiny, is to remain faithful to this duty.
Le Pen is depicted as someone who remained loyal to all of those who lived in 
overseas territories, such as in Algeria or New Caledonia, and wanted to remain part of 
France.226 It also stresses his unwavering loyalty and recognition to all of his friends and- 
or National Front members who either died or were the target of persecutions and 
aggression. The photo books of the party show Le Pen in the company of those who were 
persecuted giving them comfort.227 A widespread image is that of Le Pen with a bandeau 
on his eye after campaigning for a friend. Although it is a controversial episode, the 
literature of the National Front notes that “in campaigning for his [Algerian] friend 
Ahmed Djebbour, Le Pen lost an eye.”229
Besides the depiction of someone committed to ideas and friends Le Pen is also 
portrayed as a family man. Photos abound of Le Pen with his wife, three daughters and 
his grandchildren. However his devotion to his cause disrupted his private life and the
fact that his wife left him for another man (and former biographer) is viewed as a
consequence of the all consuming mission of someone who “didn’t have a minute for 
himself to organize his personal life.”230 As told by Yann Le Pen to one of her father’s 
biographers, “My dad, because of politics, has lost a lot of money, an eye, his health, his 
family life, and now his wife.”231 Le Pen re-married and continued to be portrayed as.
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someone who, despite all, is committed to what is called by the literature of the National 
Front as his “clan.”232
Clairvoyance is another of the rare qualities possessed by Le Pen. His 
collaborators and friends emphasize the fact that Le Pen has the gift of prediction. 
According to Francis Brigneau, Le Pen,
Saw correctly, before everyone else, about the essential problems o f immigration, education, 
natality, families, security, national security, relationship with the Muslim world etc. He saw 
correctly due to his lucidity but also due to the guiding principle o f his action: France and the 
French in the first place.233
A volume dedicated to celebrate the twentieth anniversary of the National Front 
emphasized how Le Pen was right about a variety of themes from immigration to the 
propagation of aids.234 Pierre Monnier praised Le Pen’s “anticipating clairvoyance.”235 
Roger Holeindre calls Le Pen a “visionary,” because “in the name of the people he tells 
the truths, [truths] that sometimes are misunderstood, but without which every hope is 
vain.”236 Dominique Martin expresses a similar opinion: “[Le Pen] is in politics for more 
than fifty years and has demonstrated that he is a visionary. Everything he has announced 
has materialized and, many times, his solutions are taken by his political adversaries, 
although in a different fashion.”237 Marine Le Pen noted that her father “has been the only 
one who has predicted the problems that we face today. To govern is to predict, he has 
predicted: the time has come for him to govern.”238 The image of Le Pen as a leader who 
is always right ahead of time is present throughout the discourse of his inner-circle.
Above all, the imagery relentlessly promoted by the National Front portrays Le 
Pen as a true patriot. This literature translates Le Pen’s life experience, from the military 
to political action, into the image of Le Pen as the embodiment and incarnation of 
millenarian France. Le Pen’s life has lent itself to this process of mythification; he is, in
232 Le Pen: images d ’un frangais, op.cit, p. 139.
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the words of Pierre Duran, “a show of examples, a gathering of French virtues.” Le 
Pen encompasses in himself and in his life the best that France’s history, culture and 
character has to offer: “[He is] a Frenchman that comes from faraway in time, nurtured 
by Greco-Roman and human wisdom,” asserts Monnier. “This Briton carries with him 
everything that is specific to our people ... ethics and culture.”240 The following words of 
Yves Daoudal, shed a light in this myth-ridden patriotic image of Le Pen. He wrote,
Jean-Marie Le Pen is not a Party man, and that is undoubtedly why career politicians reject him. 
He is the spokesman for France. That is, o f France gathered in all its history, in all its 
components, in all its generations. He assumes all the heritage [of France], that o f the saints and 
scientists, peasants and workers, heroes and soldiers, that o f the monarchy and of the republic, the 
victories and defeats, the shadows and the lights, in one big movement that carries the pearls and 
the scoria o f history ... No other politician underlines [like him] that our role is to collect 
respectfully what was given to us, to transmit what we have received, and make our heritage bear 
fruit ... that is the true ‘national’ dimension of Jean-Marie Le Pen. [That is] his historical 
dimension.241
Le Pen is the quintessential Frenchman. He is the rassembleur, the man who 
combines in himself the spirit and history of eternal France. Because of his patriotic 
credentials, he is the only one who can lead the remnant patriots of France to achieve a 
grandiose mission of recovery and renaissance. It is not surprising that the General 
Secretary of the National Front, Carl Lang, sees in Le Pen “the only man who incarnates, 
the hope of renaissance.”242 The literature of the National Front, particularly in the 
regular production of photo books in which Le Pen is the main character, depicts a man 
who from the very beginning has made great sacrifices in order to serve his nation, first 
in the military and then in politics. The attempts on his life and the overall hostility he has 
faced243 have only added to the picture of a man who has remained faithful to his 
principles and committed to serving the nation. The way Le Pen has overcome adversity, 
many times “alone against everybody”244, and has been able to stay the course and 
develop a national movement, has enhanced in the eyes of his followers his status as a
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hero. In the collective conscience of the National Front the life of Le Pen symbolizes the 
triumph of commitment and vision over inhospitable conditions. Le Pen has become a 
myth, a living symbol of potency and hope in the renaissance of France.
In this context it is not surprising that in the mind of those who at same point or 
another were his closest disciples or collaborators, Le Pen has acquired a quasi­
supernatural dimension. Louis Aliot has stated that the continuing strength of the 
National Front comes from “the providential-like meeting between a man who speaks 
clear and knows how to point the way and the patriot electorate in love with justice and 
truth.”245 The National Front published a book called “Passionately French: The Life of 
Jean-Marie Le Pen in Cartoon Strips” describing the rise of the “superhero” Le Pen from 
his humble origins to the status of messianic leader. In it, the authors noted that “his life 
has the taste of the essential, the flavor of the emotion, the force of the ideal.”246 The 
headline of one of the issues of National-Hebdo was: “Clovis - Jeanne d’Arc - Le Pen, 
the same combat!”247 Louis Aliot has stated that the continuing strength of the National 
Front comes from “the providential-like meeting between a man who speaks clear and
948knows how to point the way and the patriot electorate in love with justice and truth.” 
Francois Brigneau described Le Pen as an “inspired prophet,” comparing him to the 
heroes of the Flemish poet Verhaeren.249 Bruno Megret put Le Pen in the category of the 
“Great Man” of history: “they [great men] position themselves always outside the norms, 
because, as history teaches us, nothing great can come from respect of conformism. Is our 
society so low in its decline that it is not capable of admitting [that Le Pen is a great 
man]?”250 Patrick Binder sees at the core of the “very strong” relationship between Le 
Pen and the militants “the exceptional charisma of the President of the National Front,
951seen by everybody, justly, as one of the greatest French politicians of the century.”
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Yvan Blot wrote about Le Pen’s “refusal of resignation, of a heroical type.”252 Roger 
Holeindre, reminiscing about Le Pen’s life-episodes, declares that “I believe ... that it 
was necessary for this man [to have] a supernatural, almost divine, strength of character, 
for him not to abandon his combat.”253 In the literature of the National Front Le Pen 
emerges as a providential man who, in a time of crisis, has the mission of saving France. 
The following description of the context in which the leader of the National Front 
emerged, found in a book addressed to the militancy of the party, testifies of this deep- 
rooted belief.
Never has the world been more dangerous. Never has the future been more unpredictable. And, 
yet, never have the men who have the honor o f being at the head o f our country have appeared 
less confident o f themselves. It is like if, in the face o f the enormous and a little scary challenges 
of this end of the 20th century, their only answers are uncertainties. The reason for this arises from- 
the fact that they don’t know anymore who they govern for. And, when they know it, they don’t 
dare say it anymore. In the face of adversity, the only recourse is the will to fight. But this 
historical will must be rooted in faith. In these times of feeble values and tottered convictions 
Jean-Marie LE PEN [sic] is a man of faith. For him, decline is not ineluctable.254
Le Pen is, therefore, the charismatic missionizing hero with all of the rare 
qualities necessary to save France.
• The Leader’s Discourse
Le Pen himself plays a prominent role in the development of the “Le Pen 
industry.” In his discourse Le Pen puts forward a framework that accentuates on one hand 
the urgent need for a true leader who can fight decadence and lead a national renaissance 
and on the other hand his own role and attributes as “the right man” for the mission. Le 
Pen is outspoken about the need for a strong leadership. “The French, when they are 
helped by great ideas and true leaders,” he writes, “either in the domain of enterprise or
252 Blot, Yvan, op.cit, and p.225.
253 Le Pen: Une vie franqaise, op.cit, p.5.
254 Militer au Front, Institut de Formation Nationale, Editions Nationales, Paris, 1991, p.21.
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the army, [they] go further than the entire world.”255 In an interview he warned about a 
widespread decadence that cried out for leadership, “[a] crisis both moral and spiritual 
that our country knows,” that demanded a strong resolve from the nation, “Without which 
there will be no recovery and renaissance.” He continued by affirming that “I deeply 
believe that many French have hope in new formations and hope in new men.” In fact, 
Le Pen persistently promotes a “Great Man” interpretation of history. In his words,
All the peoples who have let themselves slip and became soft, either because o f materialism or 
the abandon of the great principles of collective and individual virtues, have been swept away by 
the barbarians. We believe that what lifts the peoples, what allows them to live, are the saints, the 
heroes, the martyrs. We do not say that we are saints, or heroes or martyrs, but we say that the 
peoples need them as they need poets and artists.257
The fact is that in his discourse Le Pen sometimes implicitly, other times openly makes 
himself a member of the “Great Man” club of history. He is able to insert himself in to a 
long tradition of historical heroes. At the time of the internal dissent led by Bruno 
Megret, Le Pen made the following analogy:
I was told: Is there any possibility of reaching an agreement? Any chance o f putting water in the 
fire, or that Cesar issues a pardon? ... The difference between Cesar and me is that when Brutus 
approaches Cesar holding the knife in his hand, it is me who pulls the sword and kill Brutus 
before he kills me!258
Le Pen makes an effort to infuse a mythic character into his public persona.. 
Explaining the “charismatic nature” of his persona, Le Pen mentions a “magical” 
dimension.
We only transmit what we have [charisma]. Thus, to spread one’s faith or ideal, it is necessary a 
strong belief and its vigorous defense. It is this faith in action that attracts and creates what we 
called the phenomenon o f charisma. [This charisma] may be heightened by qualities o f 
expression, however a good orator is not necessarily charismatic ... I Think there is something 
magic in the will of persuasion of a man. There are people who have a magnetic radiance and
255 Le Pen, Jean-Marie, Les Franqais d ’Abord, op.cit, p.25.
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[there are] also publics o f strong conductibility. When there is a match between the message 
transmitted and the aspirations o f the masses, there is abruptly synergy. Yet nothing can be 
transmitted without emotion, this synergy resembles love.259
He has repeatedly defined himself as the “Robin Hood who takes from the rich,” 
and the “Zorro of the poor and of the French.”260 Asked about what would be the 
National Front without him Le Pen answered: “What would have been gaullisme without 
De Gaule, the empire without Bonaparte, communism without Lenine? Probably very 
little. At the beginning of all great human enterprises there is always a man and an idea
i
that unite and give impetus.” He concluded his 1990 speech at the National Front 
congress in Nice with the legendary words of the General La Rochejaquelein during the 
revolutionary period in France: “If I advance, follow me; if I die, avenge me; If I retreat,
*yf*\
kill me!” The perspective of losing elections does not bother him. After all, “before 
becoming the president of the United States, Lincoln was defeated forty times.” Even 
the fact that Le Pen has named his private boat “General Cambronne,” a “detail” pointed 
out many times in the literature of the National Front, adds to shaping the perception of 
Le Pen as a legendary figure. After all, General Cambronne led the Old Guard in the 
battle of Waterloo and, when asked to surrender, his last words became etched forever in 
the popular imaginary, “The Guard dies, it does not surrender!”264 Le Pen does not miss 
an occasion to remind the National Front that “in our march we have the company, 
invisible but present, of the Saints, the Martyrs, the Heroes of our long History ...”
Le Pen’s emphasis on heroes of the past such as Joan of Arc and on the 
similarities between her time and the present only helps the listener to reach the natural 
conclusion of what is being implied: In the same way that she led France in fighting off 
the decadence of the past, Le Pen will lead France in fighting off the decadence of the 
present. In the words of Le Pen, “She [Joan of Arc] shows us the road of courage and
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faith. She teaches us that nothing is lost when we have the courage, a pure heart and 
tenacity.”266 This comparison between himself and Joan of Arc is always present in the 
discourse of Le Pen.
Le Pen puts forward a biographical account stressing that he, like the heroes of the 
past, personifies all of the necessary qualities of the leader that France dramatically 
needs. Le Pen not only charges himself with the task of being the spokesperson for the 
people but also identifies himself with someone who comes from the people. As he noted 
in an interview, “I think that [France] trusts men like me, who do not have to bend in 
order to reach the people, but who come from the people to express its aspirations, hopes 
and maybe to build with her [France] a future of freedom and hope.”267 In the preface to 
one of the photo books dedicated to his life story Le Pen emphasizes his common touch:
The images gathered here, could have been those o f your personal album ... They are those o f a 
Frenchman like you, proud of his homeland, o f his people, his kith and kin ... anyone can find 
here a reflection o f things o f his or her life, o f life: the family, the childhood, the mothers, the. 
women and girls, friends, school, army, work and the face o f those who do not live anymore but 
in our hearts. A simple story, in short.
He repeats the same point in the preface to another book. Writing about his life 
story he states, “This story is a simple story, in short. [It is] a French story that, although 
it is mine, could have been perfectly well yours also.” In his discourse Le Pen 
frequently mentions his family lineage of peasants and fisherman. Le Pen repeatedly 
states that he comes from an unprivileged upbringing. Reminiscing about his childhood, 
he wrote, “We were poor, but happy. The love of the family was the surrogate for 
comfort.”269 As he said in a speech to the militants, “I am a man of the people ... bom in 
a two-room apartment with no running water, my grand-parents didn’t know how to read 
or write.”270 By stressing his unprivileged background Le Pen not only underlines his 
similarity with the people but also sends a message that he, unlike the privileged elitists 
mainstream politicians, can relate to the hardships of the people. This is a common line of 
Le Pen’s attack. He assails the technocrats for being out of touch with the people: “They
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cannot imagine what happens to one who is unemployed, they have never imagined and 
they never w ill... they believe that the fishing industry and agriculture do not deserve to 
exist because they despise hard jobs.” Further, “They are afraid of making their hands 
dirty but it’s not the land that is dirty, it is corruption.”271 In a speech to his militants, Le 
Pen declared, “I was poor, I suffered from cold and hunger. And the poor, those who 
have known cold and hunger ... the lonely, the desperate, will always have a privileged 
place in my heart.”272 In an interview from the 1980s, he declared: “I am one of the rare 
political man who earns his life in an ordinary way, that is, to earn my life I have founded 
a record label.”273
To further legitimize himself with the people, Le Pen underscores his unselfish 
attitude towards politics. This is particularly important in an era where the mainstream 
political class has been hit hard by corruption, one of the “two taboos of the French 
political life, together with immigration”274 according to Le Pen. “I’m not like one of
7 7 ^those who want power for the sake of power,” he said in one occasion. He wrote that 
“I’m in politics not to ‘make money’ but to defend and advance my ideas. That’s what I 
ask from life _ and that’s what life has given me _ to live honorably and to give good 
conditions to my kith and kin.”276 “I have a tendency,” he noted “to imagine the people as 
I am: that is, straight, loyal, honest and genuine.”277
In fact Le Pen constantly evokes a homespun persona and carefully conveys an 
image of frugality although, after becoming the heir of a personal fortune of a friend, he 
lives very comfortably in the rich Paris suburb of Saint Cloud. However, “I don’t have 
any [expensive] passions, I don’t have a yacht or a sports car ... I live my life in 
simplicity, as often as possible with my family ... but I would be happy as well as long as
7 7 £I was surrounded by books, in a small room .... I don’t have a lot of needs.” To further 
his identification with the people, Le Pen plays up the image of a traditional family man
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in speeches. Photos capture him in the midst of everyday life with his wife, 
granddaughters and grandchildren. Such imagery helps people to identify with Le Pen, 
who enjoys the same pleasures as any ordinary man and contrasts him with the more 
reserved approach regarding family matters of typical French politicians.
In fact, images of his family have always been at the center of Le Pen’s discourse. 
His ordinariness plays a pivotal part in Le Pen’s strategy of saying what seems self- 
evident. He foments his reputation as someone “who tells it like it is,” and his arguments- 
are usually presented as obvious facts. “I express,” he writes “I think, ideas of common 
sense.”279 As noted in Le Pen Les Mots, this strategy “links the speech to an absolute 
knowledge, accepted by everyone, always true, that cannot be contradicted without 
challenging the most elementary good sense, the common sense, the knowledge 
ordinarily shared.”280 A typical example of what Le Pen calls “hierarchical affinities and 
attachments”281 comes from the way chooses to justify his policy of national preference. 
The following excerpt is repeated over and over again:
The beautiful spirits and souls of Paris [political class] refer to the politics that we defend as 
selfish, xenophobic and racist. It is nothing like that. In fact, what we do is to apply in politics 
what is the most elementary rule of good sense, that is, to apply our duties first to oneself and 
then to those close to us. I’ve said this many times: I love my daughters more than my nieces, my 
nieces more than my cousins, my cousins more than my neighbors. It’s the same in politics; I love 
the French the most. And no one will make me say something different.282
“However,” said Le Pen in an interview, “that doesn’t mean that we detest our neighbors. 
The fact of being Francophile doesn’t required being xenophobic. The fact that I prefer 
the French does not mean that I detest the English. I like them less than the French -  over 
a//.”283 Le Pen prides himself in speaking a language that is at odds with the perceived 
politically correct and “sensitive” language of mainstream politicians and media. 
According to him this pervasive political correctness is a way of avoiding the real issues 
and problems faced by France, from immigration, insecurity, loss of national 
independence and erosion of values. Le Pen sees himself as a “free man.” According to
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him, “politicians speak a stereotyped language -  not me! -  because they fear the 
censorship of the media ... they are afraid ‘to slip’ [to say something offensive], to say 
something outside of the normative system defined by the media.”
The choice of words at the beginning of his statements is intended to further Le 
Pen’s dimension of someone who is in touch with the most elementary common sense: 
“Its clear that,” “We all know that,” “As you have already figured out,” “We know very 
well,” “The truth is,” “The people knows very well,” etc.285 To bolster his credibility as a 
common man, Le Pen sometimes uses a very crude and vivid language. “France,” he said 
in one occasion, “has been sold to the left by conservatives who are [acting like] an old 
lady who, on the verge of being raped, folds up her skirt and blouse, to see if at least she 
can save her own clothes.” He concluded by saying, “France is not a brothel to six 
million of immigrants.”286 At a debate Le Pen asserted, “the day we have in France not 
five but twenty-five million of Muslims, they will be the ones in command ... and the 
French will have to keep their eyes down. If they don’t do it they will be told, “are you 
looking at me? Are you looking for a fight? And all you have to do is to behave otherwise 
you will be beaten up. That is why the National Front finds a lot of support in the popular 
neighborhoods.”287 Le Pen is also known for telling jokes to his audience, reciting poems 
from such authors as Verhaeren, Peguy or Brasillach, and regularly singing local, 
regional or popular songs from such performers as Yves Montand and Edith Piaf, for 
example.288 This creates intimacy and further accentuates his image as a popular man.
Le Pen claims he has the credentials to be a true leader for France because he 
comes from the people and he is, above everyone else, a true patriot. In fact, Le Pen 
repeatedly highlights his unwavering commitment and loyalty to France since the early 
days of his childhood. “I was lucky,” remembered Le Pen in a speech, “because my 
natural instinct of attachment to my land and my region was nurtured from the beginning 
of my life. Because I belonged to those generations who learned to love the homeland
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and to pray to God in the arms of our mothers.”289 The fact that, after the death of his 
father, he was adopted by the State as a “pupil of the nation” is a pivotal reference in the 
patriotic pedigree Le Pen exalts for himself:
I felt, as a child, a particular emotion in regard to that administrative formula that was issued by 
the civil courts when your father had died for France: “The nation adopts the minor Jean-Marie 
Le Pen.” All my life I felt that I had, because o f this formula, not two times more rights than the 
others, but two times the duties. And if I accepted responsibilities in the student world and after in 
politics, if  I decided to volunteer for the army, to go to Indochina ... it is because I had the feeling 
not only that was at stake the battle against communism ... but also because if  France did not 
receive the support o f the youth she would die of sadness and despair because in order to fight it 
is at least necessary that those whom we fight for are conscious [that we fight for them]290
Le Pen never misses an opportunity to instruct his audience that his life-episodes testify 
to his patriotism and entitle him to the leadership of the nation. In announcing his 
candidacy in the 1988 presidential elections, Le Pen returned to La Trinite-sur-Mer, the 
place where he was bom, to reaffirm his patriotism.
[C]hild o f the people, pupil o f the nation, I was raised by my mother in the love o f God and 
country. I myself have devoted my life to my family and homeland, to which I gave my best to 
serve for more than forty years, under the flag, in my military and political life. It is because I 
have the profound conviction that the homeland is in grave danger and that the French are 
threatened with being ruined, submerged, and enslaved that I have decided to engage in this 
decisive battle for the future of France.291
In the run-up for the presidential campaign of 2002 Le Pen wrote about the role of the 
public man in the contemporary world. It gives a particularly relevant testimony to Le 
Pen’s use of his biography to bolster his sense of entitlement, as a true patriot, to become 
the head of the nation.
Only child, alas! Pupil o f the nation when I was fourteen years old, I’ve been always in search of 
that brotherhood that I have lacked, and maybe that is the principal source o f my vocation as a 
public man ... [the public man] makes an effort to act in the general interest o f his people and of  
his nation. [The public man] is a patriot. In any case, it was in this spirit that I have dedicated 
m yself to politics: the most difficult art and the noblest service together with the army ... 
Adopted by the nation after my father was “killed for France,” I have always felt more
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responsible [to the nation], more in debt to her than my fellow citizens. When I was a child we 
did not doubt God since we were Christians, or the homeland because we were French.292
Le Pen plays therefore a substantial part in the “Le Pen industry” that consolidates his 
image as the leader necessary, in his words, to “guide [France’s] surge and its 
renaissance.”293
• The Personalized Party
The overall structure and dynamics of the National Front as a political party plays 
an important function too in the strengthening of the process of mythification of the 
leader. Since Le Pen accepted the leadership of the National Front he has maintained a 
powerful grip over the party. The party has a centralized power structure based around its 
president. Every three or four years the National Front holds a Congress. A pool of 
delegates chosen from regional mini-congresses constitutes the participants. The party 
congress elects the members for the central committee of the National Front. From these 
members Le Pen chooses those he wants for the party’s political committee, the bureau 
politique (composed of thirty to fifty members). Finally from these members Le Pen 
personally chooses those who will be part of the executive committee, the bureau 
executif. The party has a defined hierarchical structure that has the president of the party 
at the top. Le Pen has always justified it as a necessity. To him, “the National Front has 
always been hierarchized and disciplined because that is a fundamental necessity for its 
unity, guarantee of its survival and its progress in a milieu that it is very hostile to 
him.”294 The party’s political committee has a strong hold on the regional expansion of
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the party, and there have been cases of local and regional leaders being replaced by Le 
Pen for displaying too much autonomy.295
The discretionary power of Le Pen was evident, for example, in the congress of 
Nice in April 2003. Even though his daughter, Marine Le Pen, came in only 34th out of 
137 candidates voted by the delegates in the election for the central committee, Le Pen 
appointed her as vice-president, thereby giving her an automatic seat on the party’s 
executive committee. He dismissed all criticisms or accusations of nepotism as, “some 
small pitiful upheavals, and some small sourness. Talent always creates some 
irritations” and accused the critics of “confusing their personal interests with the 
interests of the cause, which is essential.”297 Le Pen made sure to let everyone know that 
he, as always, was in command. He addressed reporters by saying that “the mission of the 
president of the National Front is to maintain both the unity and dynamism of the 
movement.”298 The executive committee (composed of eight to ten members) is 
comprised by advisors who discuss the general policies of the movement, but Le Pen is 
always the one who has the final say. Yann Piat, a former member of the political 
committee in the eighties described the meetings in the following terms:
Around the table there was supposed to be an exchange o f ideas. In reality, apart from the very 
technical and straightforward reports of Stirbois [former General Delegate] no one dared to 
discuss, much less criticize ... when Le Pen speaks everyone is silent; when Le Pen decides no 
one risks murmuring the smallest contradiction. At that time, the Front, the executive committee, 
was the court o f King Jean I.”299
The decision process for choosing the president of the National Front 
parliamentary group is elucidative. Le Pen declared, “‘I will be a candidate for the 
presidency. Anyone running against me?’ Half of the members laughed. The other half 
looked down. ‘Very well, if no one is a candidate against me, I am therefore elected
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president unanimously.’”300 In every congress, Le Pen, is reelected president of the 
National Front by acclamation from the delegates.301
Under Le Pen’s leadership the FN has had a high level of cohesion, and he does 
not tolerate any sort of opposition. For Le Pen dissension is potential insurrection or 
rebellion against his rule. Over the years Le Pen has regularly reminded his troops that he 
is the leader. As he said in a speech,
We have to remain vigilant... it is necessary to clearly dissipate all ambiguities. [As] founder and 
president o f the National Front for 25 years ... I will continue to assume the plenitude of my 
functions that your trust has not ceased to confirm. There is none but, and I say that in friendship 
and affection, only one number, the number 1, elected unanimously by the congress. Then, I 
announce that I will be the head of the list for the European Elections [1999]”302
A similar warning was issued at the end of the 2003 Congress in Nice. The 75- 
year-old Le Pen made clear that any talk of a successor would be a waste of time since, in 
perfect health, he was “the only master on board”303 and “would remain at the head of the 
party until I’m 95.”304 He has jokingly asked his audiences to start calling him “Jean- 
Marie Methuselah,” an allusion to the bible patriarch said to have lived 969 years. In 
an interview he announced that he would be the candidate of the National front in the 
Presidential elections of 2007. “As long,” he added, “as my health lets me.”306 In the 
spring of 2004, during a period where some FN officials criticized the “lack of debate” 
inside the party and Le Pen’s choices of candidates for the European Parliament 
elections, Le Pen reminded again everyone of his supreme authority. He reiterated that “it 
is up to the president to decide according to the superior interests of the movement, as 
understood by him.” Le Pen’s way of dealing with this internal tension followed a 
familiar pattern that he has been using since the early moments of the National Front.
In any case if there is a perception that a National Front official has a growing 
influence within the party Le Pen relegates him or her to the sidelines. The process can be
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slow or fast, but it inevitably ends with a purge from the party. The most famous case is 
the purge of Megret at the end of the nineties, but there have been various expulsions in 
the history of the party. In the-mid eighties Le Pen saw Jean-Pierre Stirbois as a potential 
threat to his rule and a process of marginalization was under way when he died in 
1988.308 In order to solidify his primacy in the party, Le Pen has opted for a “divide and 
rule” philosophy. The political apparel of the National Front is constituted by two rival 
structures: the general Delegation that supervises the ideological orientation of the party 
and the general Secretariat that supervises the local implementation of the party. Many 
times their tasks collide, and there is not a distinct separation of roles. In this context, Le 
Pen becomes the arbiter and the one whom everyone looks upon to resolve the rivalries. 
This only adds to Le Pen’s control over different factions of the National Front.
There is a powerful identification between the National Front and Le Pen. The 
party literature is oriented towards the promotion of the leader. For some time the 
newspaper of the movement was called La Lettre de Jean-Marie Le Pen (The Letter of 
Jean-Marie Le Pen). The official party periodical, Les Franqais d ’Abord! Is promoted as 
“the magazine of Jean-Marie Le Pen.” The party has launched video games where Le Pen 
fights his political opponents.309 In the marketing department militants can buy badges, 
key rings and even Champagne with photos of Le Pen. In the official website of the 
National Front cybemauts can listen to the “Radio Le Pen,” audio files that contain, for 
example, excerpts of his speeches. In the website there is also evidently a strong 
emphasis on the patriotic biography of Le Pen. Under the headline “A Fervent Patriot,” it 
is asserted, “Jean-Marie Le Pen is one of those rare contemporary political men who put 
his life at risk for his homeland and ideas.”310 The mythologization of Le Pen is only a 
click away on the Internet.
The “industry Le Pen” is arguably a collective work that involves the discourse of 
Le Pen, the work of his inner circle and the solid identification of the political party with 
the leader. The end result is the mythification of Le Pen, which facilitates his promotion
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Le Pen has always denied any supernatural dimension to his persona or to the National
Front. Asked about the total devotion that his inner circle expressed for him, sometimes
comparing him to a prophet, Le Pen replied: “we live in an State-spectacle ... I have
never encouraged that kind of vision, but it is true however that I believe that if people
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knew me better, they would like me better.” He has always rejected any comparison 
between his role as the leader of the National Front and that of the prophet leading his 
people to the Promised Land. In fact he puts his disbelief in terrestrial paradises at the 
very center of the core difference between a right wing and a left wing ideology.
The Right is modest, the Right says: Regarding men, almost everything is known, almost 
everything has been thought out and written, and men will remain as they are. The big difference 
is that the man of the right, when he believes in paradise, he knows that it is not on the earth; the 
man o f the Left, I don’t know if  he believes it, but he claims that it [the paradise] is on the 
earth.312
In fact, one of Le Pen’s favorite mottos in his assailing of the left was for a long time, 
“No to paradise! Neither red nor rose.”313 In an interview he noted,
The golden age is a notion of the left. It’s a constructivist, Rousseau-istic notion. It’s the 
enlightenment... I don’t believe in earthly paradise. My paradise is in another world. [Happiness] 
is a personal conception. What it is is that there are conditions of unhappiness .... Without having
311 “M.Le Pen (FN): pas de renaissance de l’Europe sans remise en ordre de la France,” in Le Monde, June 
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the pretension of creating a happy world, we try to create the conditions o f a less unhappy. 
world.314
However, as we have seen, the leader of the National Front has always put 
forward a narrative that has at its center an apocalyptical face-off between the forces of 
true France and the army of the anti-France. This battle is regularly described by Le Pen 
as a final confrontation between purity and corruption, light and darkness, good and evil. 
In his discourse, both verbal and symbolic, Le Pen casts himself as a man who has 
embarked on a mission to lead the remnant few patriots, the community of the “elect,” 
into combat against evil in order to redeem and save France. Many times he depicts this 
confrontation in specific religious terms. According to Le Pen the values that drive the 
National Front are “simple values,” that is “those [values] that have governed the 
development of our civilization. They are the basis [of civilization], through the respect 
of God, the respect of man, the respect of fraternity, they are the rules of the Decalogue 
that have been imposed on our civilization.”315 In his book Les Franqais d ’Abord Le Pen, 
writing about the communist threat, prophesizes that “the first rider of the apocalypse, the 
one who all the world slowly knows by its name, without daring to affront it with clarity 
and firmness, is international communism.”316 “A surge of French,” he added, “can still 
stop the apocalypse.”317 “International communism,” he said in another occasion, “has 
given examples of the variety of methods that it is capable of employing in order to reach 
its supreme and, we can say, satanic, goal: the domination of the world by one religion,
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by a monstrously inhuman dogma.”
In one revealing statement to his militants, Le Pen declared his “confidence in the 
instinct of our people, following the example of Saint Michel, to combat the demons of 
renunciation, decline, decadence and servitude.”319 In a speech given at the annual 
National Front tribute to Joan of Arc, Le Pen stated emphatically that,
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Today we live in an identical [to the time of Joan of Arc] crisis o f civilization, with extremely 
comparable social and sociological consequences regarding the corruption o f power, the 
dissolution of customs, and the preference given to the material over the spiritual. Today the 
riders o f the Apocalypse are called immigration-invasion, the murder o f nature and life, the 
economic and social ruin, the loss of security and the death of public freedoms.320
As he noted in another meeting with his militants,
The fact that we have faith in her [France], in her destiny, not comparable to any other, is at the 
basis o f our renaissance. Our crusade ... [our reforms] will not be realized, in fact, without 
fighting adverse powers that came out apparently from hell, what we justly call the ‘anti-France.’ 
To those who hesitate it should be remembered the flamboyant expression of Joan [of Arc]: 
“warriors will fight and God will give the victory.” As stated in the holy gospel: “If the Lord does 
not defend the city, in vain stay up those who guard her.””321
To convey an idea of how grave the crisis of France is, in a speech to his militants 
he said, “The country is, evidently, ladies and gentleman, engaged in a downward spiral 
that will throw it into the eternal fire.”322 The use of the metaphor of a “descent into hell” 
is regularly used by Le Pen as a way of describing the deep-rooted crisis of France. Le 
Pen constantly uses Biblical metaphors. He repeatedly describes the ideologues of 
internationalism as worshippers of Moloch, a divinity worshipped by the idolatrous 
Israelites, and followers of the Golden Calf, an object of worship among the Hebrews.
In both cases the implication is of a Jewish plot to dominate world affairs in anticipation 
of the apocalypse. The European Union, in Le Pen’s mindset a crucial component of 
internationalism, is many times regarded as a “Tower of Babel,” that sooner or later will 
collapse.325
Le Pen sees an apocalyptical battle going on between the forces of good and the 
forces of evil. The natural order of the world is being maliciously destroyed and, 
“between good and evil, the state cannot remain neutral.” In a meeting with his
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followers he declared that time had come “to put order in the house, let [those who are] 
evil tremble and [those who are] good be reassured.”327
He has prophesized about signs that announce the radicalization of the battle: “We 
are going to enter an agitated period; without being millenarian, we can perceive the first 
signs of various confrontations. I can be wrong but I think that at that moment it is better 
to have a captain who still has strong arms to hold the helm than people with less 
experience.” Throughout the discourse of Le Pen we find references to the upcoming 
of dramatic events -  characterized by widespread disorder, violence and destruction -  
that will push France either to annihilation or salvation. The following excerpt of a 
speech that Le Pen delivered to his militants during one of the traditional meetings in 
honor of Joan of Arc testifies of his apocalypticism:
The time has not brought yet generalized disorders, although they are getting close, [I hope] at 
least that the youth start to open their eyes and look beyond the present times to the events that 
will force their destiny ...Even if they don’t know it [the youth] is in the frontline ... only the 
French people, awakened by the proximity, the imminence o f the mortal danger, can, with the 
best, the most lucid and courageous of their sons engage in the Battle till the victory.329
In another occasion Le Pen warned about “a torrent of social, political and moral 
decadence that seems to drive the world towards unknown but already presentient
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apocalypses.” The former general delegate Bruno Megret sees in what he calls the 
“catastrophism” of Le Pen an “excessive behavior.” As stated by Megret, “[Le Pen has 
the] idea that we can only change the situation after the arrival of chaos ... [E]vidently, it 
is necessary to radically change politics, but within the legal system at our disposal, 
without calling for the destruction of everything that exists.”331 In the discourse of Le Pen 
God is not neutral. Sometimes ambiguously, other times openly, Le Pen stresses his 
belief that a supernatural agency will help him in his quest for the salvation of France. As 
noted by Le Pen, “History, in its intimacy is not a simple succession of causes and effects 
but an abrupt apparition of founding events,” of what he calls “hours of destiny ... one of
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those manifestations of the Providence.”332 In a meeting with his militants the leader of 
the National Front invited the French people, using an expression made famous by John 
Paul II, to “cross the threshold of hope,” adding: “we are not alone. The people of France 
have started their liberation and the Providence supports us in its invincible arm.” At 
another meeting Le Pen said,
In truth I tell you, I need you, [I need] your forces, your spirits, your will, your hearts, your souls, 
for the service o f only one cause: the sacred cause o f France. But the worse is not always certain, 
men and the Providence can by their will and their efforts to change the direction of destiny.334
But “having God on their side” is not an invitation for passivity. As asserted by Le 
Pen to his followers, “Providence may act no matter how weak is the spirit if resistance. 
But [Providence], as we know it, only helps those who help themselves.”335 In the “Battle 
for France” Le Pen has challenged the militants of his movements to “listen [to Joan of 
Arc], to battle, and God will give us the victory.”336 The use of religious rhetoric by Le 
Pen has found the opposition of some sectors of the Catholic Church. During the 
presidential electoral campaign of 2002 the Paris archbishop, Cardinal Jean-Marie 
Lustiger asserted in a press release that “The Church and the Christians cannot accept that 
the meaning of religious symbols and convictions be changed to serve the political 
debate.”337
Concomitantly, Le Pen’s tendency of devising an apocalyptic scenario in his 
discourse has made even some members within his party uncomfortable. During the 
schism of the late nineties Le Pen’s apocalyptical tendency was invoked by some as a 
reason to leave the party. The members of the National Front’s Union in the universities 
said that one of the main reasons they were departing from Le Pen was because they 
could not recognize themselves in a man who “declares that he will come to power _ 
which testifies to a national surge in his eyes _ in the afterward of exceptional, even 
apocalyptical events in our country .... We want to come to power not in chaos but after
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convincing a majority of our compatriots.”338 The fact of the matter is that the vision of 
the apocalypse has always fueled the discourse of Le Pen.
• Rituals
The National Front has regularly promoted rituals that continually reinforce the identity 
of the group as the last of the patriots and saviors of the country and the role of Le Pen as 
their guide towards salvation. These organized mass events occur several times every 
year. Among them are: the celebration since 1981 of the BBR, the Fete des Bleu-Blanc- 
Rouge or party of the Blue-White-Red, the colors of the French national flag; the tribute 
to Joan of Arc, held since 1979 on the May first of every year to celebrate the 15th 
century French Heroine; the Universite d ’ete or Summer school, where the ideology of 
the party is debated and discussed; the rentree politique, the start of the political season, 
held many times in Le Pen’s hometown in Brittany, La Trinite-sur-Mer. The focal point 
of all these celebrations is a grand discours, a solemn speech by the leader of the 
National Front. Together with these events, the National Front organizes several street 
protests and parades, many times headed by the leader himself, to denounce either the 
wrong policies of the establishment or the persecution of the National Front by the 
“political-media caste.” All of these rites help to foster a sense of collectivity and play a 
crucial role in legitimizing the Salvationist function of Le Pen. In these events there is 
often an interchange between the political and religious realm where Le Pen deliberately 
positions himself not as a mere political person but as a preacher with a message of 
salvation. This ambiguity is dominant in the rites of the National Front.
For example, in his campaign against the treaty of Maastricht, Le Pen decided to 
give a speech to his militants in the historical city of Reims, where Clovis converted to 
Christianity, a pivotal moment in the consolidation of “eternal France.” This speech 
became known in the literature of the National Front, appropriately, as “the sermon of
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Reims.”339 Originally the plan of Le Pen was to give a “solemn declaration,” inside the 
square of the cathedral of Reims. To his outrage the authorities barred the interior of the 
cathedral to Le Pen invoking the 1905 law that codified the separation of church and 
state. At the occasion the spokesman of the bishops of France noted, “It seems that the 
National Front likes to keep alive some sort of ambiguity.”340 Le Pen went ahead with the 
meeting with his militants positioning himself slightly outside of the cathedral space. In 
his sermon, Le Pen put forward a narrative that abundantly stressed his mission of saving 
France. In a typical manner he emphasized “many times [in history] the idea of homeland 
was kept alive by a few men,” and noted that “the peoples do not forge their destiny 
alone. To guide them heroes, wise men, saints and martyrs are needed.”341 These words 
served as the background for a prime example of Le Pen’s missionizing messianic 
rhetoric. He declared,
My dear Frenchmen and Frenchwomen, my dear compatriots, people ask you, What is the 
authority that Jean-Marie Le Pen has to talk as an equal to the authorities o f the Republic? To 
pose as an expert on diplomacy? And who has given me [Le Pen] the power to make myself 
heard, through you, to millions of our compatriots? ... History teaches us that in a battle when 
the general is injured, or dies, or betrays, the most senior office replaces him. And on and on 
until, if  necessary, the simple soldier, the most courageous, raises the flag. Well, that’s what we 
do. True, the leaders o f France have not died, but they have deserted combat [and] betrayed the 
interests of the nation.... I accuse therefore the authorities o f France o f having sullied the flag of 
France by the incessant display of their corruption and their renunciation ... I accuse the French 
government and their accomplices of wanting to deliver our flag to an anonymous synarchy... 
[I]n this context o f dereliction, suffered from the people o f France, I, myself, in your name, 
picked up the flag from the mud where they have left her. And I hold her tight to my heart.342
After identifying himself with the hero who guides the army of true France in the battle 
for its salvation, Le Pen read a “solemn declaration” having all the attributes of a prayer, 
an act of communion between the leader and his followers.
[The Maastricht treaty] initiates a process [that will] ineluctably lead to the loss o f our freedoms, 
the dissolution o f the state, the erasure o f our language and finally to the death o f France. 
Assembled in Reims, this sacred altar of the homeland, symbol o f its foundation, rootedness, and 
perpetuity, we solemnly declare that we refuse the treaty o f Maastricht, whose signature and
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ratifying are sullied o f nullification ... we swear to demand justice for the heinous crime and 
betrayal that would result from abandoning any small fragment o f our national sovereignty; we 
swear to defend the freedoms, the independence, the identity o f the French people, its culture, 
language, and humanist and Christian civilization against the political genocide that constitutes 
the infamous Maastricht treaty; we swear to fight until the renaissance o f our homeland and the 
recovery of our people.343
In order to stress the “suicidal” path that is leading France to enslavement and 
“death,” Le Pen holds rallies at sites that evoke the sacred nature of the French nation. At 
these events and in these sacred places, Le Pen delivers his most passionate missionizing 
sermons, enjoining the community to persist in its mission of saving the nation. In 
January 1999, just before the approval by the French parliament of the treaty of 
Amsterdam that furthered European integration Le Pen rallied his militants in the city of 
Versailles. After leading a cortege Le Pen delivered an “appeal” to the French people. In 
it the history of France is elevated to the condition of myth. Here’s an excerpt:
In the difficult moments o f women and men, and it is the same for the life o f nations, destiny 
sends us signs. It speaks, it manifests itself, it adverts, it shows the way. It is maybe because 
France, our country, lives today [through] very difficult moments that destiny has decided to 
multiply those signs. Look firstly around you. Something mysterious is talking to us ... We are 
on a Sunday, January 17, 1999. 206 years ago, in the same day, Louis XVI was sentenced to' 
death and, with him, it was the monarchy’s sovereignty that it was sentenced. Today it is the 
sovereignty o f the Nation that the men of the Europe o f Maastricht and Amsterdam, the men of a 
federal order, are getting ready to sentence to death.44
In Versailles, living symbol of France, Le Pen, in an emotional manner, reminded his 
militants of the grandiosity of the nation, a living and Holy Communion of people, 
history, territory and destiny, threatened of debasement and extinction:
France, mother o f Saints, Heroes, Martyrs, mother o f the French people bom from the Celts, the 
Greeks, the Galois, Romans, Visigoths, Franks, Britons, Normands and others, that commune in 
one of the most beautiful languages of the world, the clearest one, the most classy. France o f the 
menhirs and dolmens, o f chapels and cathedrals, caves and palaces. France that doesn’t stop its 
downhill trend, that doesn’t finish giving itself away to the point o f forgetting its own children. 
France ? Are you at the end of your path o f suffering and glory? A few hundred felon
343 Ibid.
344 “Manifestation contre le traite d’Amsterdam a Versailles,” January 17,1999, in www.frontnational.com
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parliamentarians are going to sell you to the Europe o f merchants and financers, under the 
indifferent eye of the dumbfounded people?345
Le Pen concluded by identifying the struggle of the National Front as “the combat of 
good and [the combat] of life.”346 Le Pen, surrounded by close advisers and militants, 
regularly visits sites that for him represent the sacredness of the nation, the land of 
“Saints and Martyrs.” For example, in August 2001, on the day he delivered the speech 
that started his political season, in his birthplace, Le Pen spent the day touring different 
sites. He started with a prayer in the Basilica of Saint Anne, followed by an homage in 
the memorial of the Britons who died “for the homeland” in the World War I, and finally 
to a visit to the mausoleum of the General George Cadoudal, French Royalist who 
remained true to his cause after the revolution and was sentenced to death after a failed 
attempt to kill Napoleon. In a press conference when asked about why he committed so 
much time visiting these sites Le Pen replied,
I choose the symbolic places o f the history o f our country. Since many people accept without 
knowing, what is going to happen to them, that France will cease to exist tomorrow, I remind 
them of what this people has been, what was demanded not too long ago o f the French: the 
possibility o f sacrifice of one’s life for the defense o f  sacred notions, [emphasis is mine] those of 
territory, o f the Republic, of the nation and its people, with its freedoms and independence.347
Intimately linked with Le Pen’s casting himself as a savior is his relentless 
promotion of the sacred nature of his message. His words gain the stature and the 
symbolism of a prophecy. Le Pen elevates himself to the status of the bearer of a sacred 
truth that the forces of anti-France are constantly conspiring to hide from the French 
population. The rituals of the National Front foster an alternative symbolic system to the 
one encouraged by the establishment. The construction of this alternative world of 
symbols and rites is essential in the solidification of the identity of the group. As stated
345 Ibid.
346 Ibid.
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by David Kertzer, “the struggle of groups seeking to delegitimize the new order involves 
a fierce struggle over symbolism.”
The alter world of the National Front has at its basis in an alternative history, a 
different interpretation of the present and a different concept of truth. In this narrative, 
only a minority shares and valiantly defends the truth announced by Le Pen. But slowly 
the truth will be delivered to the rest of the French population and they will be set free 
from the false truth that has brainwashed into them over the years. As noted by Le Pen, 
“to survive is not only a right but a duty for everyone ... but to survive it is necessary to 
know. That is why nothing is more worthwhile than creating the truth. [When the truth] 
starts its march, nothing will stop her.”349 In a solemn speech to his militants assembled 
at one of the Blue-White-Red celebrations, Le Pen declared,
That is why our political combat is firstly and above all a combat for the first o f the values, the 
truth. Because, as stated by John the Evangelist “It is the truth that will set us free” ... It is normal 
that our courage and lucidity be recognized. [Our] perspicacity to discern the truth and the 
courage to tell it at any cost ... be it about immigration, unemployment, insecurity, finance, 
demography, national defense, moral laxity, drugs, aids, we were proved right. And I could 
legitimately display all over France: “Le Pen was right.” He was right and he continues to be 
right! Together with you!350
As noted by Le Pen, “I think that one of the fundamental missions of the public 
man, in a democratic world, is to reveal the truth.”351 In fact a typical way that Le Pen 
describes any surge of support for the National Front is by declaring that “the French are 
finding the truth.”352 “We want to tell our compatriots the truth that will set us free,” is a 
regular motto in the meetings of Le Pen with the militants.353 The identification of Le Pen 
with the truth is a constant in the imagery of the National Front. Le Pen is heralded as a 
liberator because when people come to know the sacred truth revealed by Le Pen they 
become liberated and join the community of the “Elect.”
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His arrival at one of the congresses of the party was accompanied by the sound of 
“The Choir of Slaves,” from the Verdi’s opera Nabucco. 3 5 4  This not mere folklore but 
rather a powerful symbolism revealing the mission of Le Pen, “The Liberator.” A series 
of poster promoted relentlessly by the National Front showed Le Pen gagged under the 
headline “Le Pen tells the truth, they gag him,” or “they want to gag France.” In his 
political career Le Pen has incessantly described himself as a common sense politician 
and has said many times that “he says out loud what most French people think.” At the 
same time he indicts the French population for not coming forward, for not having the 
courage to join the community of the patriots, and for letting themselves be methodically 
brainwashed by the forces of anti-France. They are letting their natural defenses, their 
instinctual common sense being destroyed by unnatural ideologies. As Le Pen as written,
France is in a bad state, much worse than it seems. She is on the verge o f a decline that can 
rapidly lead to her disappearance and the people, drugged, socially and by the media, does not 
know it, although many have a presentiment about it. In order to avoid her [France] terrible tests 
she must react as soon as possible. The truth must help her to find herself and to resume in the 
twenty first centuiy the glorious road that she has draw during the centuries.357
A poster distributed all over France promoted a personal message from Le Pen to the 
French people: “I ask the providence to inspire all the French the lucidity, the courage, 
the pride that is too often lacking them today .. .”358
To further his dimension as a truth-bearer Le Pen hardly misses an occasion to 
stress his clairvoyance. Le Pen has repeated that the ability to predict should be 
characteristic of politicians. “We are,” he said, “those who light up the politics [of 
France], that is why our logo is a flame.” Regarding the evils of communism Le Pen 
asserted that it was the National Front “who saw clearly, who saw far ... this prescience, 
this prediction of communism was imprinted in our permanent action and in the 
denunciation of communism we were the first.”360 The same can be said about the 
phenomenon of Aids, “A few years ago I was the first one to cry out public alarm for the
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danger.” Regarding excessive immigration Le Pen observed: “It was the National 
Front, I claim, that put this affair at the center of public discussion. Historically it will be, 
our honor ... I had a presentiment about it and I said it at a time when it was not easy to 
be heard.” To him the controversies surrounding the French state’s ban on headscarves 
in public schools are just an offshoot of the real issue, “anarchic and uncontrolled 
immigration.” The headscarf ban, the street protests of Muslims that followed and 
bomb attacks and vandalism acts on Jewish and Muslim sites only proved that the 
National Front was right in alerting the public against the disruptive and dangerous 
phenomenon of immigration.364 The Islamic terrorist attacks in Spain constituted a 
“solemn warning” because France was “the most vulnerable European country due to a 
mad immigration policy for more than thirty years.” As Le Pen said in a speech,
Who has had up until now the courage to tell the truth about the unemployment, immigration, 
insecurity, aids, infected blood, Chernobyl, mad cow disease? The National Front!! ... Therefore 
it was our analyses that for thirty years have been proved right, our criticisms have been proved 
just, and our solutions constructive.366
Linked with the image of Le Pen as a truth teller is the image of Le Pen as a 
victim. Because Le Pen “tells the truth” the powerful forces of anti-France persecute him. 
Le Pen becomes in this way “the martyr,” the one who makes great sacrifices and endures 
suffering for his beliefs and his unconditional defense of the French people. Referring to 
what was perceived as a diabolical campaign launched by the political and media 
establishment against Le Pen during the runoff for the 2002 presidential elections Yves 
Daoudal wrote, “Le Pen [for the establishment] is not the candidate defending French 
independence and for putting France in the right track: he is fascism, Hitler, he is the 
absolute Evil: he is the devil.”367 Daoudal called it a “media lynching”368 of Le Pen. 
Every time Le Pen perceives bias from either the political establishment or the press
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against him or the National Front, he promotes a campaign with solemn declarations, 
street protests, parades denouncing his persecution. After being barred as a candidate in 
the regional elections of 2004, for example, because he failed to prove that he lives in the 
Provence-Alps-Riviera region, Le Pen lambasted what he saw as a “mini-conspiracy” 
against him and cast himself as a victim: “As in Iran with the guards of the revolution, in 
France the guards of corruption eliminate in advance their opponents.” A 
demonstration of support was organized, and Le Pen gave a speech to his militants in 
which he declared himself the victim of a bureaucratic-administrative persecution. The 
newspaper close to the National Front National Hebdo put Le Pen on his front-page 
under the headline, “the guards of corruption persist in their fight against their only 
opponent.”370 This is a typical manner in which Le Pen props himself up in times of 
adversity and at the same time deeply imprints his status as a martyr and hero upon the 
collective imagination of the community of the loyal party members. This rite of 
martyrdom is repeated with regularity.
These party rituals correspond both to a worshipping of Le Pen, as the interpreter 
through whom the will of the nation is expressed, and of the sacredness of the collective 
mission of the community of patriots. They further correspond to what Emile Durkheim 
called a “totemic experience” of the members of a clan, a repeated way of revivifying 
“their common faith by manifesting it in common.”371 As written by a militant, “in his 
meetings Le Pen becomes the prophet and he infuses in his public the great poetry that is
'xnobom from the nationalist sentiment, that meeting of conviction, courage and faith.” 
National Front ideologue F rancis Brigneau called the party’s Blue-White-Red 
celebration a liturgy, a “Mass,” because, “[French] that come from all the regions of 
France, from all sorts of creeds and social status, and who in the past have had 
disagreements, commune together, and fervently demonstrate the love that they feel for 
the homeland, the land of the fathers.”373 At the same time the Blue-White Red 
celebration is “above all a tribute to Jean-Marie Le Pen.” In Brigneau’s words,
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A whole little people, swarming with life and hope, express to him their gratitude for having 
managed to create, progress, and defend (sometimes against his own self-interest) this 
unprecedented national gathering. For the simple people, whom bourgeois conformism has not 
ruined, the man they call Jean-Marie possesses a number of rare qualities in today’s [world]. He 
has physical and intellectual courage ... that is why the BBR are a day of celebration for Jean- 
Marie Le Pen. It rewards him for so many hardships, disappointments, blows.374
Pierre Monnier expressed similar sentiment writing about the National Front’s 
annual tribute to Joan of Arc. To him the mainstream technocratic political establishment 
could never understand the attachment between Le Pen and his people. According to him,
They don’t understand, those beautiful minds, that the French who salute the statue o f Joan and 
that march on the road where one of them waits, a Briton named Jean-Marie Le Pen, in whom 
they recognize themselves ... Charles Peguy called these French the “pietaille” [the infantry] ... 
they advance side by side with “the little girl hope” ... I think that if, although it is impossible, 
Jean-Marie was attacked by lassitude, it would be enough for him to look at those children, those 
women, those men who march towards the statue of Joan.375
• A Moral Community
In fact, when Le Pen addresses the militants of the National Front he puts special 
emphasis on the emotional values that bind the community together. Sacrifice is prime- 
among these. In order to reach the goal of saving France the community of patriots goes 
through enormous sacrifices. “We think,” he noted, “that the spirit of devotion and 
sacrifice is an integral part of our doctrine of action ... the homeland is not constituted 
only by those who are alive but also those who died as heroes, those who sacrifice 
themselves for the defense of their freedom.” Le Pen asked his militants at a meeting, 
“don’t you feel a little bit of happiness for coming here?” He added, “Don’t you feel 
already rewarded, being so close to each other, for all the sacrifices we have to make?377 
According to Le Pen, “the militants of the National Front are the civic elite of the nation,
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the soul of its continuity ... if there is still a chance of renaissance for France we can say
< 5 7 0
that it is due to them, to their devotion, to their sacrifices, their enthusiasm.”
Furthermore Le Pen often describes the National Front as a community of love. Le 
Pen has always described himself as a “patriot of love.”379 In a speech he noted, “in the 
France in which we call all French to fight for ... the criteria is the criteria of love, that is 
the criteria of the service of France.”380 To him, “[when] we love our compatriots, the 
ideal entity that they represent, in time and space, we construct and develop in our hearts 
and souls the love for the homeland.”381 In fact, when Le Pen addresses his militants, he 
repeatedly stresses the fact that they are gathered together “in the same love for the 
homeland.”382 The virtue of hope is also dominant in the discourse of Le Pen. At a 
meeting he asked, “What will the future look like? Only God knows it. But we have, we, 
the imperious duty of trying to discern its shape, evaluating the dangers but also the 
promises, because men need hope to live.”383 Le Pen declared at one of the Blue-White- 
Red celebrations, “As long as there are men who love France and devote themselves to 
her, as long as there is a French people, conscious of being French, there is a serious hope 
of victory.” “For the people we offer ... a future of hope, conscious that the people 
will build a future of hope with us.”385
In the discourse of Le Pen the community of the remnant patriots is glued together 
by faith. He stresses that it is this faith that makes them overcome all the obstacles in 
their road to save France. “We know that the main enemy is inside of us,” observed Le 
Pen, “it is doubt, the renunciation of effort and of independence, discouragement, and 
despair.” Faith, however, is the answer to man’s weaknesses:
Sometimes people ask me, “Facing such adversity, aren’t you discouraged, desperate?” I confess 
that sometimes doubt comes to me like it has come to the minds of the greatest saints. It’s true,
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our forces apparently are so feeble compared to those o f our opponents or enemies, at a time 
when a torrent o f moral, political and social decadence seems to push irresistibly the world 
towards unknown apocalypses ... It is necessary then to study in doubt, but to act in faith. There 
is only one cure to doubt: it is prayer. Well, the prayer of the militant is political action.387
Le Pen has repeatedly described the work of the militants in terms of faith. Political 
action is neither a minor nor an expedient activity but a way that the militants give 
meaning to their lives and fulfill their faith in the mission of salvation of France. Le Pen 
has emphasized the faith-based character of the National Front militancy many times, in 
different ways. To him the internal dynamics of the National Front’s militancy 
corresponds to those of a pious group that is united by a common faith and devoted to a 
common cause. “The church [of the militant],” said Le Pen at one event, “is the National 
Front.” In this way it is not surprising that Le Pen talks about political propaganda in a 
proselytizing manner. The ultimate goal of the militant is not to simply convince others, 
but to convert. In the campaign against the Maastricht treaty, Le Pen made an appeal to 
his militants: “Any one of you, any conscious citizen must considerer himself as a 
missionary ... in order to snatch the undecided, those who don’t know or haven’t already 
understood, or those who make excuses.”389 “Joining the National Front is a solemn act 
of engagement,” he said at another occasion.” “It represents a promise of action ... [the 
militant] has to recruit others who in turn recruit others in order to make a snowball that 
will end up to be the majority.”390 At meetings he regularly thanks the militants for 
“testifying” with their presence their faith in the National Front.391 At the end of a speech 
in the city of Dions Le Pen thanked his audience “for making an effort to come here” and 
added that “I believe that one day you will be proud to say: ‘I was in Dions, me too, to 
testify for the National Front.”392 “Thank you all of you” he opened his solemn speech at 
one of the Blue-White-Red celebrations, “who came from the most remote areas of 
France to find your friends and compatriots, and testify to the vitality and ardor of the
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National Front.”393 The militants become witnesses to the spreading, in the words of Le 
Pen, of “to bonne parole,” (the good word).394
The rituals promoted by the National Front increase this dynamic of integration 
into an alternative world where the community of believers, who go through great 
tribulations in order to reach their salvific mission, is set apart from the ordinary reality 
and celebrate their collective identity as the “Elect.” The President of the National Front 
of Youth describes these meeting in specifically religious terms. According to Louis- 
Armand de Bejarry,
As in religions, the great gatherings keep alive the ‘faith’ o f the militants: they notice that they are 
not alone in having their ideas, that the National Front is powerful, organized, gatherer. The 
speeches, in front of thousands o f people, serve to give the watchwords, slogans that the militants 
will use to persuade people. It is exactly the same function as the Sunday mass: the communion to 
bind together the believers, and the sermon to give instructions or explains some details o f the 
doctrine ... [The militants] can also personally meet the officials, shake their hands, and talk to 
them. For them it is a sort of reward. These gatherings give courage and the will to fight to the 
militants, who go home very motivated.395
This internal process of integration is coupled with an external dynamic of 
integration. Several studies have shown that a person who joins the National Front 
experiences a gradual process of stigmatization from the rest of society. On one hand, the 
National Front promotes an alternative world on the other hand, the party is often 
perceived as a dangerous pariah to members of the “other France.” This dynamic of 
outsiderhood is essential to an understanding of the missionary nature of the community 
of true believers of the National Front. They see themselves as different and set apart not 
only from militants of other parties but also from that “passive France,” still resistant to 
the Front’s message yet whom the militants are duty-bound to convert. The following 
words of Eric Domard attest to this notion deep rooted among the militants of being a 
community under siege who endure pain, sacrifices, and persecutions in order to realize 
their mission:
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It is difficult today to be a militant of the National Front. To belong to and defend the ideas of a 
party constantly demonized, vilified, put in the dock of society, may be difficult to live [through] 
and endure. To be a militant of the National Front demands a surplus o f courage, determination 
that we do not find anywhere else. Through the adversity and the hostile environment in which 
they leave, the militants of the National Front bind themselves into a moral force and [develop] a 
capacity to take blows. It is this supplement of motivation that illustrates the difference between 
the militants of the National Front and those of other parties.396
From its beginning the National Front has been the target of protests and counter­
manifestations, and there have been confrontations and aggressions with anti-Front 
groups, such as Ras Le Front which, in the name of “anti-fascism,” pledges to disrupt the
^ 0 7meetings and fight the militants of the Nation Front across the French territory. The 
National Front media registers every attack on its militants and accuses many times the 
authorities of complacency.398 This perception of being constantly under physical threat 
and danger fuels the integration process of the militants of the party. As noted by Patrick 
Binder, “differently from other militants, those of the National Front are regularly 
assaulted, verbally or physically, every time they engage in militant action (holding signs, 
postering, etc)”399 The following words of Louis-Armand de Bejarry offer a powerful 
testimony of a community who feels besieged.
The militants o f the National Front are different from other militants. Their degree o f engagement 
is truly superior: they put up posters at night and many times are attacked. They distribute leaflets 
on the streets, many times under insults. The militants o f the National Front never trigger the 
indifference o f people, contrary to the militants o f other parties. They often trigger hostility, 
which creates among them a particular mentality, a sentiment o f being apart, o f having almost the 
entire world against them, which makes them bind together [even more] closely. The militants 
form a true community.400
In this scenario where political action is not partial but all-consuming and full of 
sacrifices and risks, Le Pen, in the eyes of the militants, appears as a true authentic leader. 
His life-story, his role as the founder of the party and all the perceived campaign of 
hatred against him dramatically bolster his leadership credentials. In their eyes, Le Pen, 
constantly demonized and persecuted, embodies all the tribulations that the militants have
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to go though. He offers a powerful example, to follow and be emulated, of someone who 
-  under trying circumstances - never wavered in his commitment to the mission of saving’ 
France. According to Dominique Martin, “Jean-Marie Le Pen gives us the desire, the 
taste, the courage, the pride ... of fighting for France, for their elder and their 
children.”401 In this manner, the leader plays also plays the function of the first militant of 
the group. “Maybe the militants see Jean-Marie Le Pen a militant like themselves,” 
commented Bejarry, who added that,
It cannot be forgotten that before he became an elected official for the FN, in 1984, for almost 20 
years he had been in politics almost alone, leading a minuscule party. He has been very obstinate 
and always believed in his chances. All of that cannot but seduce the militants. In fact, Jean- 
Marie Le Pen is more a militant than a politician. He has the mentality o f one who gives 
everything without expecting anything in return, he has the plain-spokeness and the comradeship 
of a militant. He is like a ‘primus inter pares,’ the first of the militants of the National Front.402
This personal attachment between the militant and the leader is a crucial aspect of the 
leadership of Le Pen. Le Pen relentlessly tours France and participates in all kind of 
gatherings with the militants from local sections, in such occasions such as “breakfast- 
debates,” “dinners-debates,” festivals or picnics in the countryside. During times of 
dissent and schism, Le Pen embarks on what he calls “patriotic meetings” in order to 
reinforce the militants’ commitment to his person. Le Pen gives his followers an 
opportunity to publicly recognize their leader and to testify to their loyalty. In these 
occasions the militants see, hear and talk to their leader. These patriotic meetings were 
particularly active, sometimes held twice a week all over France, during the big schism of 
the late nineties 403
At a time when party militancy in France and in Europe in general is on the wane, 
the militancy of the National Front remains strong and mobilized. Militants actively 
participate in the rallies, parades and meetings of the party. A recent study has shown that 
the militants of the National Front are the most active and visible cybernauts on
400 Louis-Armand de Bejarry, President of the FNJ (Front National de la Jeunesse), June 4,2004.
401 Dominique Martin, President of the FN Group in the Haute-Savoie region, May 22,2004.
402 Louis-Armand de Bejarry, President of the FNJ (Front National de la Jeunesse), Interview with the 
author, June 4,2004.
403 “M.Le Pen tente de reconquerir ses militants et les electeurs,” Le Monde, 17-18 January 1999.
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discussion groups of the Internet.404 Also, the electoral support that they give in each 
election to the FN is consistently high. In contrast, militants of other parties vote for their 
parties in much lower numbers. The typical FN militant is a loyal voter and a dedicated 
party worker 405 Valerie Lafont sees the National front as a “total institution, similar to a 
religious sect revealing the world ...by an ideological discourse that wants to change 
history ...offering in the first place the dream and hope in a different future, a better 
future.”406 Le Pen acts as the guiding Prophet who empowers his followers by 
elucidating for them who they are, who the “others” opposing them are, and what the 
collective mission is. The leader gives them a sense of purpose and potency, a sense of 
participation in history.
• Charisma
Le Pen’s popular level of charisma has undoubtedly helped the party. He is a 
powerful speaker, and his interventions are full of formulas and sound bites that captivate 
the media. In today’s visual media-oriented elections Le Pen has the ability to put on a 
good show. Le Pen is an entertainer. “He is at ease,” wrote Nonna Mayer, “He provides 
formulas, counterarguments ... and each of his appearances constitutes a show.”407 
However, Le Pen’s main asset within the National Front is his capacity to develop a 
missionary level of charisma that makes him the avatar of the aspirations of the entire 
community of patriots. Throughout his leadership, the charisma of Le Pen has been 
maintained by the incessant work of what I call the “Le Pen industry,” and the 
development of powerful religious rites and symbols of integration.
404 “Le Front National dans les Newsgroups,” Datops 2004, www.datops.com
405 Mayer, Nonna, Ces Frangais Qui Votent Le Pen, Paris, Flammarion, 2002, p.207
406 Lafont, Valerie “Les Jeunes Militants du Front National: Trois Modeles d’Engagement et de 
Cheminement,” Revue Frangaise de Science Politique, Vol.51, No.1-2, February-April 2001, p.195.
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3.3 The Succession of the Charismatic Leader
Finally, and particularly since the beginning of this decade, the 75-year-old Le 
Pen has been preparing a post-National front without his leadership and working actively 
to raise the status of his own daughter, 36-year-old Marine Le Pen, within the party. A 
lawyer in her second marriage and with three children, Marine is telegenic and well 
spoken. She appeals not only to the media but also to the female electorate that over the 
years has showed itself to be more resistant to the National Front. She has taken on her 
shoulders the task, in her words, of “de-demonizing” the party’s hard-line image.408 Le 
Pen has said that “she has the material to become, one day, the president of the Front.”409 
She has been gaining increasing visibility in the media and influence within the party 
although there are veterans within the party who do not seem comfortable with the 
prospect of Marine Le Pen succeeding her father. The ascension of Marine Le Pen seems 
to be a natural corollary of the personal charismatic leadership of the National front. Le 
Pen has always given prominent party roles to family members, from his son-in-law 
Samuel Marechall, to his wife and daughters. This has caused some to accuse Le Pen of 
nepotism. In the words of the former National Front general delegate Bruno Megret, “Le 
Pen always favors his family, his ‘clan’ ... [and] even wanted to put his wife has the head 
of the list to the European elections of 1999 although she’s never been involved in 
politics. The National Front is a family enterprise.”410 To him the National Front is too 
intricately linked with its leader: “The National Front lives by and for Le Pen”, which 
will undermine its future when the moment of replacement of leadership comes.411 There 
is an anti-Marine Le Pen wing in the National Front led among others by Jacques 
Bompard, the National Front mayor of Orange and Bernard Antony, the founder of 
Chretiente Solidarite, a Christian group close to the party. Marine Le Pen is accused of 
trying to lead the party into a dangerous path of “normalization.” To these critics, Marine
407 Mayer, Nonna, op.cit, p. 186.
408 “The New Face of France’s Far Right,” in The New York Times, op.cit.
409 “Marine Le Pen ou la gageure de la dediabolisation,” in Le Monde, August 23,2003.
410 Bruno Megret, President of the MNR (Mouvement National Republicain), Interview to the author, July 
2,2004.
411 Ibid, June 28,2004.
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Le Pen, who repeatedly states that “we cannot gain power by being just rebels,” in her 
desire to approximate the party to more mainstream parties is putting the party in danger 
of losing its own identity and of being a “true alternative”. These more traditionalist 
voices accuse her of being too soft on such issues as immigration abortion and gay 
rights.412
But the fact of the matter is that Le Pen’s effort in raising his own daughter profile 
within the party as a “potential next leader” is part of the continuous work of 
maintenance and protection of his charisma that he has performed since the foundation of 
the National Front. However the method has its obvious risks due to the fact that Le 
Pen’s choice is contentious within the National Front. The party, after having been held 
together in large part by the charismatic domination of the founder, may well split as a 
result.
4. The Missionary Model- Politics as Salvation
In the verbal and symbolic discourse promulgated by Le Pen, the National Front is a 
movement that continually progresses on a path of salvation. Le Pen is persistently 
represented as the guide leading the National Front on the road towards the renaissance of 
France. A common image in the official literature of the party is that of Le Pen walking 
alone on a beach towards the horizon where the sky and the sea meet.413 The first decade 
of life of the National Front is commonly described as La Traversee du Desert, or “The 
Crossing of the Desert.”414 In fact the analogy of the desert is constant in the mythology 
of the National Front and suggests the image of a suffering people led by the prophet in 
the direction of the Promised Land. Addressing his followers Le Pen once said,
412 “La Perspective de la succession de Jean-Marie Le Pen attise les tensions,” in Le Figaro, August 23, 
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This movement has existed for ten years: The National Front! I have to say that this crossing of 
the desert ... makes us proud, [for we have] the pride, in the face o f adversity, o f continuing to 
mark the history o f our country with a strong will to not be let down by discouragement, 
aggressions, calumnies, insults, as long as God gives us life. And the History [sic] o f our people 
shows us that spectacular new developments, sensational renaissances have always been 
possible.415
On another occasion he thanked his followers, “all of those who have been persecuted 
because they wanted to remain French,” for having the courage of “keeping the faith 
[while] in the desert.”416 In this way the National Front, through Le Pen, illuminates the 
path to salvation to the other French who have still not joined the movement.417 In fact Le 
Pen has always subscribed to a bigger conception of politics. According to him,
The government o f men has the primacy above all other aspects o f the life o f the community. 
That’s what implies the famous ‘politics first,’ that is, politics must be not below but in front of 
all the other activities o f the city. Theories, no matter how brilliant, must help people to see. This 
vision is what characterizes politics. It is this vision that Max Weber demands o f the politician, 
together with passion and sense o f responsibilities. They cannot be assigned to the simple 
manager who lacks the vision of the future and undoubtedly the passion that arises from a sense 
of urgency. The need for vision in politics ... arises from situations o f crisis [for] in those 
moments where society can be reduced to nothing or worse to slavery, it is necessary to find the 
supreme defender of the collective values and laws.418
Politics in a time of crisis is therefore not the domain of technocrats who see it as 
a judicial activity but the domain of those who, as Le Pen put it to his followers, embrace 
politics as a “priesthood, the service of the community understood as a disinterested 
devotion to the cause of natural entities: Family [sic], City, [sic] and the corollary of 
everything: the Nation [sic].”419 At the basis of Le Pen’s philosophy is a willed, rather 
than bureaucratic, conception of politics. Drawing no doubt from his heroic vision of 
history Le Pen puts emphasis on the power of the will to fight resignation and change the 
course of events. “We are voluntarists,” he said at a press conference, “That is, we 
believe that men can act on their destiny.”420 In the vision of Le Pen, France is
415 “Discours du 9 mai 1982,” in Marcily, op.cit, p. 150.
416 “Discours de la Mutualite,” Ibid, p.205.
417 See, for example, “Conseil National du Front National,”, op.cit.
418 “La Politique: Une vision au service du people,” Identite : Revue d’Etudes Nationales, 
September/October 1989.
419 “J’appelle La France a combattre le declin, la decadence et la servitude,” op.cit.
420 “Plan de paix et conference de presse, 22 aout,” in Le Pen 90, op.cit. p.82.
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immobilized and at the mercy of the destructive forces of internationalism. Mainstream 
politicians, due to their technocratic nature, have resigned themselves to an irreversible 
fusion of France in the “euro-internationalist magma.” The following excerpt reveals the 
voluntaristic nature of Le Pen’s philosophy.
We think that as long as there are men with will power, there will be a better path [that] France 
will remain! Events are unpredictable today, and they will play their role, but so the will o f men, 
especially those who are the most loyal and courageous ... We refuse to believe that [the death of 
the nation] is ineluctable and that the worst is certain. Providence can act no matter how weak the 
light o f the resistance is. But [Providence] only helps, and we know it, those who help 
themselves.421
Behind this grandiose conception of politics is Le Pen’s vision of purification and 
renewal. The community of “The Elect,” led by Le Pen, is the source of this purification, 
and when the moment comes they will redeem the entire community. In fact, the 
renaissance and recovery demanded by Le Pen is at its very basis moral and spiritual and 
is undertaken in order to reverse France’s drift into materialism. To Le Pen, “the national 
Front does not restrict its political action to some proposal of amending the constitution 
or to a narrow political program .... We know that the recovery of the country implies a 
spiritual and moral renaissance.”422 “Before the economy comes politics,” observed Le 
Pen, “and before politics comes morality.”423 Referring to the national recovery defended 
by The National Front, Le Pen said,
Our country has a vital need: literally, to comply with the natural order o f the world. As stated by 
Peguy, “order, and only order, creates freedom, disorder creates servitude.” Our children need to 
be raised in the respect o f true values, in the respect o f the Good, the Beautiful, and the True. 
That is our first duty as parents and politicians.424
To Le Pen, France has been drifting away from the natural order of the world 
since the Enlightenment. The development of an artificial and increasing materialistic 
internationalist ideology has corrupted the natural and eternal spirit of France. According 
to Le Pen, “materialism, rationalism, scientism, will be defeated by a formidable
421 “University d’ete 1999, du Front National a Orange,” op.cit.
422 “Discours du Premier-Mai,”, Le Pen 90, op.cit, p.30.
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aspiration for a spiritual renewal... a vital reaction against the programmed death of the 
human civilization in all its diversity.”425 The spiritual degeneration of France is the 
most “profound” cause of all the other problems that afflict France. “The enemy is in 
you,” declared Le Pen in a speech. He added, “It is in the soul of the French that 
deformation was made. It is at the very end of our heart, our families, our divorces, our 
churches, our schools, our newspapers, our courts, our books, our false ideas, our. 
negative thinking, that we find the evil that weakens France, the Nation, the State, its 
survival.”426 In the eyes of Le Pen, France’s future is endangered to the point of 
soulnessness and only a spiritual purification can save her from extinction. For Le Pen 
when the dangers are abolished the community can engage in a peaceful, balanced and 
spiritually rich era. He described this scenario of happiness in the following manner:
There are things necessary to the happiness o f men, the poetry, the music, the theatre, the 
language, the taste of being together in these landscapes, the love for the land, the warmth of the 
family, o f the friendship, the communal and shared moral and spiritual values, the sense o f God, 
the love for the creatures and the nature that surround us, a certain taste o f happiness. All the 
things that we have nurtured, developed and defended in France and which make her a model, 
creating a true need [for France] in the world. Yes, the world also needs France!427
Some of the French, those whom Le Pen likes to call “the most lucid and 
courageous,” have already followed onto the path towards salvation. In Le Pen’s vision, 
these true believers, bonded by love and sacrifice, have on their shoulders the collective 
mission of saving and redeeming the entire community. Their reward will be an ultimate 
recognition as pioneers of the renaissance of the French nation. In the words of Le Pen,
Those who have fought and continue to fight until the end of their strength, will look at the path 
covered and say, “mission accomplished,” with pride: I was there. They advance together with all 
of those who, greater in number everyday, see very well that they do not have any other solution 
than the nation hence the National Front, [and] with eyes fixed in the goals o f tomorrow say: I 
will be there.428
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In the case of Le Pen the development of a missionary ethos of politics involves a long 
and careful construction of an enclave mentality that relentlessly defines the primacy of 
Le Pen as the guide and the identity of the group as a monolithic community led by one 
leader and united in a common mission of saving France from the forces of corruption 
and disintegration.
Umberto Bossi and the Northern League
1. The Crisis -  Renunciation of the Present
The discourse of Umberto Bossi is primarily anchored in a world-rejecting mentality. The 
political movement initiated by Bossi is centered in a renunciation of the world as it is. 
According to him, the modern international system of Nation-States initiated a frontal 
assault in the identity of communities in northern Italy and is therefore responsible both 
for the present crisis and for centuries of oppression suffered by its peoples. In Bossi’s 
vision the process of unification of the Italian state in the nineteenth century transformed 
different ethnic, cultural, and economic regions into colonies within an oppressive, 
centralized, and bureaucratic entity called Italy. From the beginning of the unification 
process, the resources and economies of the north have been exploited and transferred to 
a backward and dependent south, and its ethnic distinctiveness has been undermined by. 
an oppressive and artificial Nation-State. As stated by a doctrinal document of the Lega 
Nord (Northern League), “what has entered in crisis is the modern State, based on 
centralism and bureaucracy. The idea of State is slowly losing the importance that has 
marked the three last centuries of European history.”429 This perceived attack on the 
identity of the north of Italy constitutes the structural or historical background for the act 
of the renunciation of the world by the movement led by Umberto Bossi. The first article 
of Umberto Bossi in Lombardia Autonomista, written in 1982, identified the Nation-State 
as the source of northern desperation:
Today, Lombardy does not belong to the Lombards, Padania does not belong to the people of 
Padania. [The north] is only a geographic expression without any political value; it is only a 
territory without rights and facing the invasion of others. Its people is one mass deprived of
429 “Federalismo e Devoluzione,” Segreteria Politica Federale, September 2002, p.5.
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political identity, anonymously incorporated in a failed Nation-State that drags down [the north] 
in its endless and hopeless crisis.430
This perception of a deep-rooted crisis has both fueled the discourse of the leader and 
served as a powerful bond to cement the identity of the group. For Bossi, since the 1950’s 
the dominance of a corrupt system of cartel politics431 has made the exercise of 
government an oligarchic affair between the same old parties, and the judicial 
investigation of early 1990’s (denominated “Clean Hands”) that unveiled the mask of 
favoritism, illegality and corruption of the old party-system were the symptoms, not the 
causes, of a long-simmering crisis dating back to the formation of the Italian state.
The initial political program of the Lombard League has as its first point the claim 
for “the self government of Lombardy, overtaking the centralized State with a modem 
federal State that knows how to respect all the peoples that constitute it.”432 Since the 
outset Umberto Bossi has put forward a framework that identified the group he led as a 
true “vanguard” of northerners conscious of their identity and united in the mission of 
liberating the entire community from the subjugation of the centralist and tyrannical 
Italian State. In order to illustrate this, I will first show how Umberto Bossi reinforces the 
identity of his group as a revolutionary force that is at the vanguard of history.
2. The Group as the “Vanguard”
• Historical Continuity
Umberto Bossi and his acolytes have made a relentless effort to link the ethnic 
and cultural roots of the north of Italy to the Germanic branch of Indo-European tribes 
that populated the continent of Europe in the early Middle Ages. The Lombard and Celtic
430 “Lombards!” Lombardia Autonomista, No.l, March 1982.
431 On this point see Mair and Katz, “Changing Models of Party Organization and Party Democracy: The 
emergence of the Cartel Party,” Party Politics, 1 (1), January 1995.
432 “II Programma definitivo della Lega Lombarda,” Lombardia Autonomista, Giugno 1983.
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peoples are heralded in the discourse and literature of the Northern League as the glorious 
ancestors of the Padania, the term chosen by Umberto Bossi to describe the area north of 
the Po River Valley in the central-northern regions of the country. “The Padania,” 
observed Bossi in an interview, “is a full-fledged country, a Celtic country.” He added, 
“Nothing in history unites Latinos and Padani.”433 According to Bossi:
The Padania has roots and traditions that lose themselves in the darkness o f time, if  we observe 
events without ideological glasses. All the peoples o f Padania, in fact, descend from the same 
originary peoples ... the last group is represented by the Goths, the Lombards and all the 
Germanic populations stationed in these lands with the fall o f the Roman Empire. They influence 
the physical traits of the Padani and have left us the heritage o f attachment to local autonomies 
and the undying aspiration to freedom. [Those who live in the south] are in fact heirs to the 
Etruscan, Greek and Italian populations stationed first in the Mediterranean basin and then in the 
coasts of the peninsula. So-called Italy is therefore cut into two ethnic roots.434
Bossi’s intent is to bond the community with the traditions and history of central Europe. 
The Padania is many times described by Bossi as part of Mitteleuropa, the regions of 
central Europe once part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. To Bossi, the area of 
Mitteleuropa “is the natural market of our area [and has] common traditions, cultures and 
mentalities.”435 In Bossi’s view the Padania has more affinities with countries such as 
Hungary, Austria and Slovenia than with southern Italy.
In order to emphasize the autonomist tradition of northern Italy, the historical 
example of the first Lega Lombarda is a major reference in Umberto Bossi’s discourse. 
In 1167 the communes of the north of Italy swore in Pontida to stand together against the 
expansionistic intentions of the Roman-German emperor Federico Barbarossa. It became 
known as the Oath of Pontida. The battle of Legnano of 1176, where the Lega Lombarda 
led by Alberto da Giussano defeated the troops of Barbarossa is heralded as a pivotal* 
example of the tradition of liberty of the peoples of the North. The image of this medieval 
warrior raising a broadsword became the symbol of the Lombard League and later the 
Northern League. The party of Bossi is commonly known as “the Carrocio” in allusion to 
the war wagon drawn by oxen used by the medieval republics of Italy. The attempt to
433 “Niente unisce Padani e latini,” in La Padania, July 31, 1998.
434 Bossi, Umberto with Daniele Vimercati, Processo Alla Lega, Sperling & Kupfer Editori, Milano, 1998, 
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link the two Leagues pervades the literature of the movement. For example, the headline 
of one of the issues of Lombardia Autonomista was: “1167:defeating the imperial 
centralism of Barbarossa opens in Europe the democratic age of the communes in 
Europe. 1989: defeating the centralism of Rome, opens the democratic age of peoples.”436 
Bossi establishes constant parallels between the struggle of the first historical union of 
the peoples of the north and the struggle of his contemporary movement:
Eight hundred years have passed since the great battle of Legnano, that Hegel regarded as crucial 
for the history o f Europe. In Legnano the emperor and his imperialism were defeated and the 
communes o f Europe were able to stand up. Almost a millennium has passed, and it is as if it 
were yesterday. Also today the peoples of the North unite to hunt the Barbarossa that is in Rome. 
The new League recovers its origins and is committed to the final battle at the end o f which there 
will be no prisoners: The Padania or the Roman State, one o f the two will perish.437
The movement led by Bossi wants to have the same historical impact that the movement 
led by Alberto da Giussano had in the world. The first Lega Lombarda, as Bossi declared 
in a speech,
Signaled the birth, with the spirit of Padania, o f the first liberal civilization. It signaled the birth of 
the communes, a revolutionary institution that the Lega knew how to defend from the emperor, 
who did not get what he wanted but instead went down to a defeat that marked the end of  
feudalism. That is why the Padania is an historical force, because it is the catalyst o f the new 
federal era as it was in the past when it invented the modem world.438
For Bossi, the tradition of freedom of the northern community was undercut by the’ 
unification of Italy in the nineteenth-century, a process that became known as 
Risorgimento. “The nation that has never existed is not the Padania, but Italy,” observed 
Bossi.439 For the leader of the Northern League,
The division o f Italy, therefore, is not the exception but the rule, and only a dishonest 
historiography can find in the past any justification for the present borders o f the Roman State. 
The truth is that the unified State posX-risorgimento was a military construction at the expense of 
old territorial entities that were based on centuries-old autonomies and freedoms.440
436 Lombardia Autonomista, July 1988.
437 Bossi, Umberto, II Mio Progetto, Sperling & Kupfer, Milano, 1996, p. 125.
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The centralist tradition brought by the Risorgimento persisted through the times and 
remained untouched by different political systems and regimes. The Italian Republic of 
post World War II was in essence not different from the fascist regime of Mussolini. In 
the words of Bossi:
This is not a Republic bom from the resistance [against fascism] as stated by the official rhetoric; 
This is the same old State, untouched from the Risorgimento  to the liberal period, and from 
fascism to the Republic. I don’t see any fractures in this history .. .The State, our centralist State, 
has never truly overcome fascism. It is the same logic o f continuity from the bureaucracy to the 
magistrates that has absolutely not changed [and] us of the League will try to break, for the first
i • • 441tune, this continuity.
Prominent in the pantheon of heroes of the Northern League is the figure of the 
Lombard Carlo Cattaneo. In the nineteenth century he had been one of the main 
supporters of Italy as a confederation of republics and not as a united Republic. 
Cattaneo’s federalist project included the formation of an autonomous Lombardy-Veneto 
regional entity. Bossi regularly quotes Cattaneo along with other nineteenth-century 
federalists, drawing a historical continuity between the federalist project of the nineteenth, 
century and the fight of the Northern League for a federal Italy. In the literature of the 
party Cattaneo is called the “noble father of federalism,” and due to insistence of the 
Northern League, a bust of the philosopher was inaugurated in the Montecitorio, the 
Italian Parliament.442 The non-adoption of Cattaneo’s project is viewed as treason against 
the desire for freedom of Northern Italy. However, in the words of Bossi, “after the 
betrayal of hope in the risorgimento, the Lega Nord, the popular movement, has finally 
opened the possibility of federalism.” Umberto Bossi puts the Northern League at the 
receiving end of a positive historical tradition fighting against all of those forces that 
represent an oppressive, artificial, and evil historical tradition. The side embodied by the 
Northern League “is the heir to the Italian traditions of the Renaissance, to the communal 
multiformity and freedoms, that favored arts, literature and the wealth of the city.” The 
other side, instead, “originates from the habits and social order of the papal, House of
441 Bossi, Umberto with Daniele Vimercati, Vento Dal Nord, Sperling & Kupfer, Milano, 1992, p.128.
442 “Carlo Cattaneo, Busto a Montecitorio,” in La Padania, June 18, 2003.
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Savoy, and Bourbon courts, sucking new lymph from the unified Centralist State.”443' 
Bossi identifies the Northern League as the avatar of centuries-old aspiration that can 
finally be materialized.
• The Definition of the Group
For Bossi, those who join the struggle of the Northern League join a revolutionary 
movement, a vanguard of men and women who are united in their efforts both to put an 
end to the “subjugation” imposed by Rome and to “liberate” the peoples of the north. The 
Northern League is the harbinger of a new period in time, the “creative factor, the 
catalyst of a new era, that will be federalism.”444 Allies can change, policies can shift, the 
movement led by Bossi can be either in opposition or support of the central government;, 
but the sense of the Northern League’s dispensation as a revolutionary force of grandiose 
proportions remains unchanged from the very beginning both in Bossi’s discourse and in 
the party’s literature. For Bossi,
It must be clear, for those who have forgotten: If the League has any reason to exist is to bring 
federalism to Italy, to liberate the peoples o f the peninsula -  and Europe -  from the yoke o f the 
State ... For this it was bom, for this it has grown and fights without mercy against its eternal 
enemies. If successful, it wins its historical battle. If not, it fails. There is no middle ground.445
Those who join this movement of liberation are a vanguard of courageous people 
conscious about their history and roots. They represent the foremost position of the 
peoples of the north. Because they are conscious, aware of their place in history, they 
have the responsibility of stimulating and awakening the dormant and passive sectors of 
the northern population who have still not joined this historical struggle. In the words of 
Bossi,
443 Bossi, Umberto with Daniele Vimercati, La Rivoluzione, Sperling & Kupfer, Milano, 1993, p.207.
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Courage is the first great gift that the League has brought to the Italians. The courage to challenge 
the corrupts, to remember the roots o f history. The courage to confront the old and surpassed 
ideologies...the courage to denounce the bad government in the Mezzogiorno [south] and to be 
amongst the people and to listen to the people. The League has brought hope for a better future.446
“The true problem that we have,” declared Bossi in a speech, “is that so many people 
who do not vote for us would if only they understood the Padania, the project.”447 The 
supporters and militants of the Northern League have a higher historical consciousness. 
Those who do not still support the Northern League lack that consciousness. The party 
has to work hard to help them regain it: “The problem, is how to clarify them, how to 
remove their ideologies, their fears, their false consciences, their superstitions. This is the 
problem.”448 The goal of the Northern League, as a revolutionary elite, is to spread the 
word among the population in order to elevate them from their slumber. For Bossi,
[The self-government o f Padania] is also an ethno cultural demand more and more felt by the 
population which is achieving self-consciousness step-by-step. We know that the origins o f a 
nation are irrefutable religious, cultural, ethnic, and socio-economic homogeneities; but it is 
above all the self-consciousness o f itself, limited at the beginning to some elites and gradually 
extended to the entire population. In this first phase we find the Padania, whose homogeneity ... 
is being gradually recognized by the people who as each day goes by understand the colonial 
mechanism that made them a victim for decades.449
The electoral failures of the Northern League are periodically interpreted in terms 
of lack of conscience or courage. “It is a problem of our people’s maturity,” declared 
Bossi in a speech “they continue to vote more for continuity than for change. We should 
not try to find the reason why we do not have the freedom that we want somewhere else, 
[because] the problem is ours, it’s internal, [to] our peoples who have not yet acquired 
full conscience.”450 In fact for Bossi there has been a process of “brainwashing” for 
decades by the propaganda of the north’s enemies, which has buried the conscience of its 
population. One of the earliest and most persistent goals of the party has been the 
development of its own media in order to stop this perceived brainwashing. “Soon we’ll
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447 “Intervento dei Segretario Federate Umberto Bossi,” September 7 1998 in www.leganord.org
448 Ibid.
449 Bossi, Umberto, IIMio Progetto, op.cit, p. 163.
450 “Intervento del Segretario Federale, On. Umberto Bossi Seduta Pontida,” June 4 2000, 
www. leganord. org
118
have Padanian television,” observed Bossi once, “We’ll develop information that is no 
longer a carbon copy of the regime. That way, even those Padani who are still ‘chickens,’ 
who don’t understand our battle for freedom, can realize what is happening.”451 “To read 
our daily newspaper, said Bossi, “is to have self-consciousness, to want the change that 
our battle represents.”452 Those who join the movement refuse the alienation and 
submission promoted by the regime and, because they are no longer “cowards,” are less 
prone “to kneel down before the Italian oppression.”453 Society in itself promotes a 
culture, particularly trough the visual media, that encourages passivity and alienation. 
“Now people seem to be accustomed to the superficial,” says Bossi, “to the image of the 
politicians, not to the content.”454 If they were not brainwashed and alienated, their 
conscience would rise and they would actively participate in the liberation of the north.
Umberto Bossi uses a metanarrative that reinforces the identity of the Padani as a 
“chosen group” whose importance assumes world historical proportions. By linking the 
past with the present, Bossi identifies them as the heirs of a combative tradition of 
freedom in the north. Bossi further links their activity in the present with a glorious future 
that will open “a new chapter in history.”455 In order to do this the vanguard of the 
Northern League has had to reach out to the rest of the population. The peoples of the 
north have been oppressed for such a long time that many of them do not realize their 
subjugated condition and have forgotten about their true roots. As Bossi declares:
The League aims at the recognition of the inalienable right to self-determination o f our peoples. 
This is an ambitious goal, I recognize that, also because decades o f roman slavery have clouded 
the ability o f our people to understand and [the ability] react. We have only one goal that is 
profoundly different from those o f all other parties that have occupied the seats o f roman power: 
We aim at the Padania.456
It is up to the vanguard of men and women led by Bossi to take the lead in the battle for 
liberation and to save the north from the bondage of oppressive and centralist Rome. The 
goal is to save the community and redeem their peoples from their state of
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“enslavement.” The mission of the vanguard is therefore total in the sense that aims at the 
salvation of a specific group, in this case the communities of the north of Italy.
• The Group is Under Siege
Umberto Bossi has never missed an occasion to stress the fact that due to its disruptive 
and revolutionary force his movement has been from the very beginning the target of 
relentless attacks by the forces of Rome. Bossi’s narrative constantly highlights the 
notion that the vanguard of northerners under his leadership have always been under 
siege, surrounded by powerful forces determined to destroy them. In his words,
If the delivery [of Lombard League] had been difficult, the childhood of this populist and popular 
movement was even more complicated. Being a diverse organism of those parties who occupied 
the State, by this time reduced to a committee o f affairs and detached partially or totally from 
their ideological labels -  socialist, Christian, communist, liberal -  the League has been from the 
beginning the target o f a furious and encompassing attack. The partitocratic powers and not only 
those - occasionally some sectors of the Vatican and international finance have contributed -  have 
hurled against this new and democratic political entity ... physical threats, psychological 
blackmail, economic pressure: nothing has been spared to stop the advance o f the first great 
federalist party o f the history of Italy.457
Bossi said in a later interview: “Our challenge was unthinkable to the system of the time 
[which] used all of its weapons to annihilate us, in particular the mass media.”458 Both 
Bossi’s discourse and the narrative of the party assert that the centralist forces of Rome 
launched two powerful weapons against the advance of the outsider Northern League: 
electoral reform and the work of the judicial system. “The majority system was made to 
prevent us from winning,” said Bossi, “With a proportional system we would have all the 
mayors in the towns of the north.”459 At the same time Bossi accuses the judges of the 
“Clean hands” operation of helping to preserve the old balance of power of the Italian 
State. The fact that they also accused the League of taking bribes proved that they were
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interested in undermining the only “true force of change.”460 Another episode regularly, 
recounted in the discourse of Bossi and in the party literature is the search conducted in 
the party headquarters and in houses of militants, by order of a public prosecutor, during 
the secessionist period of the Northern League. In this period, the regime “put Papalia 
[the name of the public prosecutor] into action, [who instituted] the trials for freedom of 
speech, invaded offices and houses of militants and of all of those who were suspected of 
supporting a democratic secession... all of the machine of the print and electronic 
journalistic system, all of the famous journalists were put at the service of repression.”461 In 
the League’s narrative these episodes are telling examples of the persecutory nature of 
the Italian State. “As the Hebrews remembered their persecutors,” said Bossi in a speech, 
“we should not forget any of the crimes perpetrated against the Padani patriots.”462 This 
narrative serves to strengthen the identity of the group as a besieged community 
surrounded by hostile forces.
The construction of a group identity necessitates a definition of the “other” (what 
the north is not; what the north is against; the enemies), which plays a steamroller 
function. Bossi warned that “an impressive alliance was mobilized against the League, 
composed from a variety of forces and only hostile to each other in appearance.”463 “It is 
pointless to hide it brothers,” declared Bossi at a rally, “The enemies are many. They are 
hidden enemies, if they were transparent the enemies would not succeed, the people 
would win immediately, [the people] would have already won.”464 Above all, the enemies 
of Bossi’s group have always wanted to preserve the centralist and oppressive Roman 
State at the expenses of the north. As Bossi declared in one of his first writings: “As in all 
the [historical] periods where the demand for freedom was prominent today the enemy to 
defeat is the centralism of political power. After the ‘continental centralism of Vienna’, 
after the ‘nationalist centralism of Fascism’ today it is indispensable to overcome the 
‘partitocratic’ centralism.’”465 The forces that maintain the system are allied in what
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Bossi calls Partitocrazia, “the inextricable bond between the media, big economic 
groups, and political parties.”466 Partitocrazia maintained the failed centralistic system 
that transferred resources from the most dynamic and productive party of the country (the 
north) to the most backward (the south) creating a culture of dependency in return for 
electoral support in the south. Through time Bossi has denounced this system and has 
used different expressions to describe the forces that keep it together. They suffer from 
“Italian nationalism,” “a violent and antidemocratic monster... bom of the necessity of 
creating the myth of the nation because there was no nation when the Italian State 
emerged.”467 They are followers of a totalitarian belief-system that Bossi calls “the 
meridionalista [southern] ideology, which even becomes a kind of religion.”468 
Centralism and the political parties and the media and economic groups that support it,, 
have a permanent place on the enemy’s list of the League. The media are always 
perceived as instruments of the regime. “Big Capital” is still interested in hijacking the 
productive forces of Italy in order to destroy the small and middle enterprises. The name 
of the political parties that are enemies of the League may change, depending on the 
circumstances. Forza Italia has changed status several times. The same can be said about 
the center-left parties. However, at least one group of parties is always singled out as the 
representatives of a rotten system: the voices of “Rome”, the anti-League.
Another permanent group in the field of enemies of the League are all of those 
who are perceived as undermining the roots and traditions of the communities of the 
north of Italy. Although the intensity of anti-immigration sentiment may vary over time 
and periods, it has always been an issue in the discourse of Umberto Bossi. Particularly in 
the early-period, anti-southern sentiment helped to consolidate the identity of the group. 
Southerners were usually described as terroni, a pejorative term for people from the. 
south. They were described as agents of the colonization of the north imposed by Rome 
who brought with them the “laziness” of the south in contrast to the northern enterprising 
virtues of vigor, drive, and competition. According to Bossi, until World War II,
The ethnic integrity in Lombardy and in almost all o f the nations o f the north o f Italy was 
preserved. One who really knows our land is aware that entire cities, entire valleys, had not been
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affected by the migratory fluxes ... and what matters most, our work ethic -  a curious mixing of 
Calvinism and Catholic morality -  has not been changed, [the work ethic] represents, I think, the 
shared patrimony, together with individualism, liberal democracy and municipality o f our peoples 
from the north of Italy.469
The denunciation of immigration from regions outside of the European Community -  the 
extracomunitari -  gained increased relevance since the late eighties. As Bossi declared at 
a rally: “We are tired, tired of being a land of invasion, first from the south and now from 
the Third World.”470 The League was one of the most outspoken voices against the 
Martelli immigration law of 1990, which it viewed as too soft regarding foreigners and 
immigrations. “There is no political will to prevent immigration,” observed Bossi,
The goal is to transform our country into a multiracial, multiethnic and multireligious society. We 
are getting there: we already have one million “legal” immigrants, plus one million who are 
clandestine. The American model is advancing; we will all live in an immense cosmopolitan 
metropolis where there will be no trace o f the traditions and culture o f our people. But I don’t 
think this should be inevitable... I think we should revolt against this “inevitability,” the 
multiracial society is closer to hell than paradise.471
In the late nineties the League also led the campaign against a new immigration law, the 
Turco-Napolitano, proposed by the center-left government. “With the Martelli law, 
although confusedly, the borders were open,” noted Bossi “With the Turco-Napolitano, 
which we want to cancel, the goal is to construct in a scientific way the aberrant and 
failed multiracial society.”472 To stop the advance of this multiracial society the Northern 
League, together with its allies in government created a tougher immigration law, called 
the “Law Bossi-Fini,” that included some ethno-nationalist elements such as the 
definition of an Italian identity on the basis of ethnic criteria, such as blood ties.473
In this later period the discourse of the Northern League has paid particular 
attention to Muslim immigration, and has stressed the millenarian struggle between 
Christianity and Islam. Historical battles are reinterpreted in the light of the increasing 
Muslim immigration to Europe. For example, the headline of one of the issues of the
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party daily was “From Poitiers to the Cruzades and Lepanto, Padania [was] the arm of 
freedom against Islam.”474 Historical figures that distinguish themselves in fighting 
Islamic forces are brought back to the center stage; for example, the priest Marco 
D’Aviano who rallied Christian resistance to the Ottoman Turks siege of Vienna in the 
seventeenth century 475 Parliamentarians of the Northern League even drafted a proposal 
to establish Marco D’Aviano as the “patron saint of Europe.”476 The League has been 
particularly active in its opposition against the construction of mosques in Italy.477 The 
threat of Islamic terrorism has led some members of the party to request the closing of al 
mosques in the Lombard region. “Until now it has been missing the necessary severity
A HQ
and firmness against these centers of terror,” said one of the officials of the party. Not
surprisingly, in the campaign for the European Elections of 2004 a dominant theme was, 
as stated in a campaign pamphlet, the “NO to the Islamic invasion”479 and the refusal of 
the entry of Turkey into the European Union. A document of the party for the election 
emphasized this point further:
Turkey, historically and culturally is not European, she has been in Europe (ottoman military 
occupation of the Balkans till the siege of Vienna) but it is not Europe ... If it would become a 
member of the European Union , almost 100 million Turks, in the vast majority Islamic, would 
automatically obtain European citizenship, electing in this way a number of members of tho 
European Parliament greater than those o f Germany.480
Also among the enemies of the Northern League are all of those who are said to 
promote an internationalist ideology that is bent on erasing diversity and imposing a 
homogeneous way of life on the rest of humanity. Because it threatens to disrupt the roots 
and traditions of the north of Italy, Bossi targets the international system of globalization 
as one of the main enemies of the Northern League. This theme has been prominent in 
the discourse of Bossi particularly since the late eighties. Originally, the criticism of 
globalization was mostly linked to the criticism of massive immigration and the ideology
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of the “melting pot.” As observed by Bossi in 1989, “the multiethnic and multiracial is a 
society that, by its nature, is against man [and is] destroying the process of ethnic 
identity.”481 Gradually, the criticism of globalization evolved into a robust defense of the 
ethnicity of the populations of the north of Italy. It is a defense of the “natural” ethnicity 
of the north against the “artificial” order imposed by the globalizers. In the words of 
Bossi,
Today the capitalist system brings the immigrants here to favor the birth o f a multiracial society, 
of identical men with the same ambitions and without traditions. In sum, the big consumer, fat 
from hamburgers and drowned in a sea o f Coca-Cola. Economic internationalism and Catholic 
universalism, in a way, speak the same language and aim at the same result: a world society in 
which all consume the same things and worship the same God. Agnelli [the founder and owner of 
Fiat] and the pope have the same perspective, both want the multiracial society, because none of 
them gives any value to the differences ... It is not only an economic problem, [The League] 
wants to stop globalization and to prevent that everything is made into a product. [That] man is 
reduced to a thing, always the same, homo economicus, without soul and identity.482
For Bossi, the very logic of globalization is rooted in the utopian fervor of the 
Enlightenment. The globalizers “imagine earthly paradises without noticing that earthly 
paradises, in practice, turn into hell... we refuse to bend over to the dictatorship of 
homogenization, to the [dictatorship] of the cancellation of peoples.”483 According to 
Bossi:
The Enlightenment, that 200 years ago brought rights to men, the possibility o f taking into their 
own hands their own lives, now wants to take [the rights] away. No one can have their own 
society, their own history; on the contrary, history has ended for the globalizers. In reality there is 
a mistake in this world turned upside down, because the Enlightenment is not the Western World, 
but only one o f the doctrines of the West which is, besides ideas, made of real things: o f peoples, 
that is, history, men of flesh and bones, that is [the West is made] of us, o f our work that is made 
in our land that is not for sale. The true problem is that behind the ideas there is a system of  
interests that wants the west to be more virtual than real.484
In Bossi’s view, the consistent effort to weaken and dismantle the family as an institution 
is a crucial part of this full-fledged assault by the globalizers on the true nature of the
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peoples. The events of 1968 marked the beginning of the assault and the Northern League 
was in government to put an end to this attack. As stated by Bossi in an interview:
The iconoclast period, initiated in 68 is ending. [In this period] all the rules were thrown away 
and modem publicity was bom: they used this system to substitute for reality the artificial, the 
image that creates reality. The world was turned around. The last time there was such a difficult 
period was with the French revolution, which turned around all the existent rules... these 
iconoclastic periods are distinguished by the reversal o f all the rules, by the unhinging of all 
traditions. Tradition means family especially. Napoleon used a system to disrupt the family that is 
still in vigor today: prostitution ... 68 used the same system. Prostitution becomes a model, the 
last act to destroy the family, bulwark of traditions.485
The spreading of pornography is an important component of the supposed planned
AQ£destruction of the family. If prostitution represents “the sexual alternative to the wife,” 
pornography “when it is taken to its extreme is transformed into obvious pedophilia and 
homosexuality. We will fight until the end against these deviants, from the Left but not 
exclusive [to the left], who talk about human rights and freedom of expression only to 
hide their dirty interests.”487 Adoption of children by gay couples is rejected on the same 
basis of defending what is natural against imposed artificialities. “We don’t have 
anything against homosexuals, anyone is free to do what they want in bed,” declared 
Bossi at a rally, “However we must be clear [about the fact] that the laws cannot give 
what nature cannot give. [The League defends] natural families, natural children .... 
Against what is corrupt and artificial.”488 In the narrative of Bossi the ideologues of 
internationalism through massive immigration and the disruption of the traditional family 
use globalization to dilute the roots of centuries-old cultures such as Padania.
The vision of Europe in the discourse of Bossi serves as a proof that the field of 
enemies of the Northern League is not static but is always evolving. At the beginning, the 
process of European unification, was seen as a positive development for Padania due to 
the fact that it seemed to weaken the sovereignty of Nation-States and promote micro­
nationalisms across the continent. “Why not substitute the centralism of the unified States
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with a more articulate system, characterized by a plurality of institutional sites, each one 
with its competences?” asked Bossi in the early nineties, adding that this tendency “is 
already at work with the process of the European unification.”489 However, the increased 
power of a centralized structure in the European Union led the Northern League to an 
increased hostility toward the European Union. Recently, the League accused the EU of 
favoring the same “Jacobin” system of globalization, the imposition of an artificial order 
on peoples:
The legislative excesses o f Brussels sometimes can make us laugh, like the standard for the length 
of peas or carrots. However, behind these things it lays a lethal design for the future and the 
freedom of peoples: the birth o f a European Superstate, according to a Stalininist idea. I call it the 
Soviet Union of the West and I’m not wrong to define it like that ... we want a confederationist 
Europe, because without the Nation-State democracy dies. Without States we will have a USSR 
of the West, dominated by technocrats, and the stateless bureaucracy o f Brussels, elected by no 
one. Democracy is at stake.490
Bossi further explained that “there are two distinct models of Europe: the one of the 
Superstate of a Neo-Jacobin type that we are against, [and] the model of a Union of 
States which is the model of the peoples, the model of a society balanced between the. 
global and the local.”491 Bossi has been particularly adamant against European measures 
such as the EU-wide arrest warrant that, according to him, only demonstrates the 
dictatorial nature of the European Union. “This arrest warrant makes me think that this 
Europe is the synthesis between the French Revolution and the Bolshevik Revolution, 
inventing a European community law that will cancel the residual autonomy of the 
States,” said Bossi in an interview “It is necessary to oppose this Nazi madness with 
maximum strength.”492 From this perspective, the community of Padani is now the target 
of a despotic and dangerous European Union.
Old enemies can also become friends. For example, in the Northern League’s first 
stage the Catholic Church was defined as a natural enemy of the freedom of the north, 
because it had been colluding with the oppressive centralist forces since the process of 
unification of the Italian State. The Vatican and the ecclesiastical hierarchies in particular
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were denounced as reactionary forces and enemies of northern liberation. “Catholicism -  
not Christianity -  is at the origins of our evils,” said Bossi “One God, one pope, one king. 
One, one, one ... Catholic absolutism has created absolutist and anti-democratic 
states.”493 “Catholicism is a lower sect of Christianity,” said Bossi in another occasion, 
“that believes that it must have temporal power to in order to take care of the souls.”494 
The Vatican was also attacked for actively promoting the policies of open borders in 
order to increase the number of the faithful in the West. However, the discourse of Bossi 
has gradually come to view the Church and the Pope be in a more positive light, in sync 
with the League’s gradual emphasis on Christian and traditional values as a response to 
the dynamics of globalization and the threat of Islamization. To him,
This Pope is a great [man], he is the first [Pope] for one hundred years who does not retreat in 
front o f the rnasomy and anti-Christian doctrines ... I thought that the Church was over, that had, 
sold out, instead I must recognize that what John Paul II has been doing for a long time is on the 
side o f Man. His defense o f the family, o f procreation, o f values, have been always part o f our 
own battle ... the position o f the Pope is commendable, the Church is starting to wake up.495
Accordingly, for Bossi there are two models that fight each other in today’s 
Europe: “The Neo-Jacobin model, of the universal and multiracial society, standardized 
by the market... and the Christian model of the peoples; of a society balanced between 
present, future, and past, between local and global, between new forces that put pressure 
from the outside and historical values rooted in tradition. This is the side of the 
League.”496 In the ongoing battle against Islamization the Northern League does not miss 
an occasion to remind everyone of the endangered Christian roots of Europe. As stated in 
the Electoral Program of the Northern League for the European Elections of 2004,
The people o f Padania want instead a Europe founded on common values, prime among them, the 
Christian value: Just when at a global scale Islamic terrorism is manifestating itself, in all the 
gruesomeness that distinguishes it, it is fundamental to strongly emphasize the identity of Europe, 
which is founded on that value [Christianity].
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Thus the church was transformed from enemy to friend of the Northern League. 
But some enemies remain constant. The United States of America has always occupied a 
place in the group of favorite targets by the Northern League. From the beginning the 
American, “melting pot” model of society was derided as the antithesis of the ethnic 
model of society defended by the Northern League. This vision has not changed. One of 
the most recent official Northern League documents, regarding the issue of immigration, 
is clear in its rejection of this aspect of American society. “Those who fight to preserve 
the survival of their nations,” it reads, “represent the field of diversity of cultures, of true 
tolerance and freedom, while the neo-American multiculturalism represents [the field] of 
uniformity, rootedeness and subjugation.”497 “Patriotism,” it continues, “is the last 
obstacle to the progression of the universal American and Islamic empires.”498 In more 
recent times, particularly since the Northern League became a member of the 
governmental coalition, the rhetoric against the United States has been somewhat toned 
down. This was particularly visible during the American intervention and occupation of 
Iraq. Italy is an ally of the United States, and the reaction of the Northern League and its 
newspaper to the Iraq war favored the Bush regime. This was radically different in 
comparison with the Kosovo war of 1999, which was derided as just one more imperialist 
projection of power and influence. The American model of society and its perceived 
attempt to export it to the rest of the world, however, remain firmly in the imagination of 
the Northern League as a mortal enemy.
A powerful device employed by Bossi to increase his followers’ perception of 
belonging to a community under siege is the pervading use of a logic of conspiracy. For 
Bossi, powerful enemies, who are regularly portrayed as united in a shadowy network 
that shelters the anti-League alliance, constantly persecute the vanguard of men and 
women he leads. The idea of conspiracy becomes a uniting force for the vanguard. The 
discourse of the leader regularly blames Freemasonry for the evils that afflict the group. 
The finding of documents from the Masonic Lodge Propaganda Due (P2) that alluded to 
a hegemonic plan to control the Italian State have a central place in the discourse of Bossi 
as proof of the powerful role that “occult worlds” and “secret societies” play in Italy. In
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the past he regularly established a link between the plan of P2 and the creation of Forza 
Italia by Silvio Berlusconi. “In the same way as the P2 Lodge” observed Bossi, “the 
party of Berlusconi is not bom, as people say, from the people, from social-political 
forces that come from below. It [Forza Italia] is an invention of powerful men, a creature 
constructed in a lab, and put forward through the private monopoly of television.”499 He 
has accused both Berlusconi and the leader of the National Alliance of “pursuing a 
similar project to the one of democratic recovery conceived by the Great Master of the P2 
Lodge... ‘True power resides in the hands of those who hold the mass-media’ declared 
the venerable Gelli, leader of P2, the Masonic lodge of which Berlusconi has the member 
card no. 1816: these are things that must be remembered! ... The League has opposed 
this anti-democratic project.”500 In fact events from the past and present are interpreted in 
a conspiratorial manner. The hidden hand of the Freemasonry has its fingers everywhere. 
Explaining the reform of the electoral system, Bossi remembered that “the Masonic logic 
of the Roman Parliament proposed the change of the electoral system from proportional 
to majority so that all the parties of the Roman oppression could rally against the League 
and the freedom of the north.501 Regarding the attacks of a newspaper against the League, 
Bossi asserted that “the Gazzettino is the front-rank of attack against the League. Behind 
it are some small businessmen and Masonic milieus that do not want Northern unity and, 
therefore, try to break the Northern League.”502
Of the many occult forces that push the international system of globalization, 
Bossi highlights Freemasonry’s prime role. In fact globalization is essentially a Masonic 
project aimed at establishing Masonic ideals everywhere. In the view of Bossi:
Mass immigration appeals to Rome because it floods Padania; and by giving immigrants the right 
to vote it manages to transform Padania into a permanent colony. Moreover, the ideologues of 
globalization are allied with international bankers ... they want to reduce the man to a microbe, 
alone in front o f globalization, without links, without traditions, without a sense of belonging to a 
community. In sum, the project o f the Masonry: “without family, without house, without God, 
without religion, without children.” You can see very well that behind the law ‘turco-napolitano’ 
is the work of shady figures, well hidden, faraway, but also very close.503
499 Bossi, Umberto, Tutta La Verita, op.cit, pp.31-32
500 Bossi, Umberto, IIMio Progetto, op.cit, pp.91-92
501 “La bufera sta per arrivare,” in La Padania, July 23,1998.
502 “II Gazzetino centrale del meridionalismo,” in La Padania, September 20, 1998.
503 “Intervista a Umberto Bossi,” in La Padania, May 15,1999.
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The conspiratorial Masonic nature of globalization is repeatedly pointed out in the 
discourse of Bossi. As he said in an interview, “Masonry is the instrument thro504ugh 
which globalization acts at an ideological-cultural level, in support of economic 
decisions... The idea of the traditional family, is in radical contrast to the vision of the 
American Masonry, [it is an obstacle] to the attempt from this octopus to take control of 
the world though globalization.”505 The danger posed by Masonic globalization is 
eminently spiritual, because “according to the Masons there is a need to destroy the 
family and to blend religions, so that the only God left, a single God for everyone, is 
money.”506 The project of the European Union has been increasingly regarded as a tool 
for the Masonic domination of world affairs. An article published in the party daily 
described in detail the dynamics of Jean Monnet, “Masonic plan” 507 at the origins of the 
European Union. The European superstate is usually derided as the “Europe of the 
Masons.” According to Bossi,
When we took hold o f the government o f our country the “monster” [the Nice treaty that furthers 
European integration] was already in flight. The band of the Masons, Amato [former socialist 
prime-minister] and his ilk, have been already in Nice and it is difficult to stop the “monster” 
when it is flying ... now we have to stop the “offence o f racism” [the European legislation that 
criminalizes racist comments], which only serves to put those who are opposed to the project of 
destruction of peoples pushed forward by Masonic fundamentalism in jail.5
In the center of the collusion of forces that push globalization in order to destroy 
humankind as we know it is America. For Bossi, globalization is a tool in the hands of 
Americans to impose their multicultural model of society on the world. To accomplish 
this project they use sycophantic European elites, who serve as their lackeys. “Ah 
America,” observed Bossi, “these masters of ours, where everything is controlled by 
money ... the diplomacy of the dollar cancels our cultural identity and out historical 
dignity. European intelligentsia is reduced to identifying the promise land as the rootless
504 “II Piano massonico di Monnet alia base dell’Unione Europea,” In La Padania, September 25,2002.
505 “II corpo humano non e dello stato,” in La Padania, February 6,1999.
506 Ibid
507 “II Piano massonico di Monnet alia base dell’Unione Europea,” In La Padania, September 25,2002.
508 “Ma il superStato europeo non passera,” in La Padania, October 27,2002.
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civilization on the other side of the ocean.”509 Explaining the American project Bossi 
said,
The design of the masters of the world, those who through international economic power want to 
create a unique race and thrown the world back to the Middle Ages o f the papacy-empire is clear 
and lethal: [to] destroy the roots o f peoples in order to subjugate them politically ... 
Unfortunately with the fall o f the Soviet empire, the winner was not the desire for freedom and 
democracy but the more terrible face o f globalism, under American guidance. In the Middle 
Ages, the empire o f Acquisgrana [Holy Roman Empire] dominated, today is the turn of [another 
empire] whose royal palace is in Washington. America wants to impose its vision of the world: 
mercantilist, consumerist, and advocate of the disastrous “melting pot,” the multiracial society 
that has failed everywhere. We Padani, together with so many other peoples, refuse this project of 
utter cultural and ethnic destruction, in the name of the values o f democray and freedom.510
Bossi sees the hand of America behind the massive immigration to Europe in the last 
decades. The goal, he says, is to eradicate ethnic attachments in Europe and, particularly 
through Islamic immigration, to destabilize Europe in order to weaken its potential 
economic and political rivalry with the United States. “It is clear,” noted Bossi, “that if 
the European economy is hit by million of immigrants it will be so overburdened that 
America can regain again its primacy over the economy. This is their objective.”511 
Behind this goal there is the work of “invisible Masonic powers, the Trilateral, the 
Bilderberg, the tools of the big American bankers.”512 At the same time, particularly in 
the nineties, the Northern League denounced the American project of “Islamization” of 
Europe. The party daily gave great relevance to authors who defended this thesis, 
particularly the French intellectual Alexandre Del Valle. For Bossi, the Kosovo war 
was the result of the economic interests of American corporations and was intended to 
reinforce the Islamic presence in Europe. According to the Leader of the Northern 
League,
Obviously, for a long time, Washington has had in mind the creation o f an Islamic spine [in 
Europe] and now they are close to accomplishing this plan ...in  putting together all the 
‘vertebrae,’ the Americans will create the Muslim ‘spinal column’ that will serve to prevent the
509 Bossi, Umberto, La Lega: 1979-1989, Editoriale Nord, 1999, p.l 11.
510 “Bossi: Un risoluto blocco padano battera Roma,” in La Padania, July 19, 1998.
511 “Padani ed europei,” in La Padania, January 21, 1999.
512 Ibid.
513 See, for example, “Islam-Stati Uniti, quella strana alleanza,” in La Padania, November 26, 1998.
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birth o f a political Europe ... using the pretext of the expulsion of the Kosovars, Clinton has 
created the conditions to hide the project of an “Islamic spinal column” [that was] planned by the 
global corporations from the eyes o f the people ... [As part o f this plan] corporations want to 
open Europe to Turkey and all the 170 million Muslims which would annihilate Christianity and 
above all Catholicism.514
Bossi says that in Italy the parties of the Left, Big Capital, and the Church have also 
taken part in the alliance to destroy Europe through their support for relaxed immigration 
policies. The Left “searches for a new sub-proletariat that can vote for her,” the Church 
because “tries to fill its empty seminaries with religious people who it now only finds in 
the Third world,” and the Big Capital “unloads on the citizens the costs of its own 
development through the immigration from the Third World.”515 A 2002 Northern 
League document dedicated to immigration denounces a similar alliance of different 
forces. It reads,
The orphans o f Marxism and o f the dictatorship o f the proletariat in a ca ttocom u n ista  
(cattolicism+communism) mix, followers of internationalism, carry on in this way [approving the 
turco-napolitano immigration law], their subtle work of destruction o f European civilization 
using immigration as a picklock and future element o f destabilization and chaos; but in their road 
they have found the Northern League ... the multiracial society is mostly supported by an alliance 
between the global finance and the international Left, based on common economic and 
ideological reasons.516
Time and again the same conspiracy element reappears in the discourse of Bossi.' 
Powerful elites -  many times described as “The Illuminati”517 - work together against the 
people, hiding their secret plans from them in order to continue their self-serving project 
of world domination. The conspiracy element increases the Northern League’s self­
perception of being surrounded by hostile and evil forces. The hidden hand is larger than 
life and omnipresent; those who recognize its dark powers must combat it at every step.
In order to increase the mobilization of the group against evil forces Bossi’s 
rhetoric relies on catastrophic imagery. Here are just a few examples.
514 “Kosovari vittime anche della Nato,” in La Padania, April 7, 1999.
515 “Discorso di apertura del congresso della Lega Lombarda, on. Umberto Bossi” op.cit.
516 “Ragionare sull’Immigrazione: La Nuova Legge Bossi,” op.cit, pp 11-19.
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The centralist state
- “The alternative in Europe and even in the world at this stage, is truly between the
CIO
explosion of ethnic or racial conflicts and complete federalism.”
- “The League is engaged in a fight without truces that can only have one of the 
following outcomes: or the destruction of the League and the incarceration of its officials 
starting with the [federal] secretary, or the collapse of the State and the start of a liberal 
revolution based upon the principles of self-determination.”519
- “[Federalism] is the only alternative to the system, to the centralist dictatorship. Pay 
attention citizens who love freedom; if the League lowered down the standard or, even 
worse, [if the League] disappeared, an abyss would open in front of the peoples of the 
north.”520
Immigration
- “Be aware that we are facing an apocalyptical invasion, not just a few hundred people. 
There has been talk about thirteen million of immigrants falling upon us in the next ten 
years.”521
- “Think about what may happen if there are no limits, no confines. The entire world 
would rain upon our European countries. And this situation will not bring development, 
will not give benefits, but will lead to the collapse of our society. It will lead to a crash 
and, therefore, to the end of democracy.”
517 See, for example, “La Lega a difesa dell ’identita,” in La Padania, September 18,2001.
518 “Discorso di apertura del Congresso Della Lega Lombarda, on. Umberto Bossi,” op.cit
519 Bossi, Umberto, with Daniele Vimercati, Processo Alla Lega, op.cit, p.105.
520 Bossi, Umberto, with Daniele Vimercati, Vento DalNord, op.cit, p.88.
521 “Intervista a Bossi,” in La Padania, May, 15, 1999.
522 “Mondialismo contro democrazia,” in La Padania, January 14,2001
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- “Immigration has to be stopped ... it is at stake our existence, our future ... either we 
manage to regain the lucidity and the love for our future or we will all be dead.”
European Union
- “The United States has supported the birth of the Fourth Reich [European Union] 
because it serves them to start uniting the European States. Afterwards they will open 
Europe to the Islamists and the French-German axis will find it difficult to maintain the 
control of the Fourth Reich. [When this happens] only America, ‘the chosen people,’ will 
lead the world.”524
- “The way the project [the European Union] is emerging should give everyone the 
creeps. So many peoples, each with a different language, forced to be together by a 
higher power. Something like this has already happened in history, when the Soviet
O f
Union was created, with the results that we all know for democracy.”
- “Regarding Europe we do not want a Neo-Jacobin structure, standardized by the market 
and disaggregating the nation State ... the Neo-Jacobins masons want to give us a new 
slavery. But the peoples will not let themselves be crushed and a decisive confrontation 
will happen.”526
Globalization
- “If we don’t want man reduced to dust, to a ‘microbe’ addicted to consumerism and 
materialism and not in charge of his own future, it is necessary that peoples organize and 
enter directly into politics.”527
523 “Bossi: fermiamo l’invasione. E’ a rischio la nostra esistenza,” in La Padania, September 29,2002.
524 “Euro, Europa, Quarto Reich,” in La Padania, November 28,1999.
525 “Lega, forza di popolo al govemo del paese per il cambiamento,” in La Padania, December 11,2001.
526 “Sara un’Europa dei Popoli,” in La Padania, July 2,2003.
527 “Parte la riscossa dei popoli,” in La Padania, November 20,1998.
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- “[Globalization] is an enterprise of massification and worldwide de-personalization that 
threatens to extinguish ethnic cultures and nations ... it is evident that a system that 
destroys each cultural past is not a civilization but on the contrary is a system that makes
M O
everything the same like the cells of a malign cancer.”
- “The mystics of the market economy assure us that in the future we will all be richer,
M Q
but I fear that in the meantime we will be all dead.”
Bossi’s rhetoric to the besieged community is sustained and permeated by a sense 
of impending doom, of cataclysmic events in the waiting. It is filled with images of 
“death,” “destruction,” “collapse,” “extinction,” and “abysmal future,” that suggest a 
scenario in which the “end of the world” is a strong possibility. The use of biological 
imagery serves to augment the power of the message of doom. To Bossi, “if the Padania 
remains in Italy, Padania dies.” Many times Bossi associates the enemies that threaten 
the group with diseases. “Nationalism,” declared Bossi, “is a symptom of a mortal 
disease.”531 “If there’s no democracy,” said Bossi about the situation in Italy, “there’s the 
diffusion of a mechanism of impunity that affects the elites and then, like a cancer, the 
entire social body.”532 His images suggest vivid images of degeneration and putrefaction. 
At one occasion he said, “We are trapped in the cadaver of a society swarming with 
worms.”533 A typical manner Bossi describes the destructive affects of globalization on 
human society is by comparing man to a defenseless “microbe” swept away by forces 
outside of his control.534
No matter what the subject, a sense of foreboding is present throughout the 
discourse of Bossi. Subjects such as centralism, the European Union and globalization are 
described in a way that portends or cataclysmic disasters on the horizon. “What will be 
the way out?” asked Bossi about the situation of Italy, “The great reform, restoration,
528 “Intervento del Segretario Federale, Venezia,” September 15 2002, op.cit.
529 “L’intervento del segretario federale della Lega Nord Umberto Bossi pronunciato a Pontida,” May 4,
2003, op.cit.
530 “In Padania sara rivoluzione,” in La Padania, April 28, 1998.
531 “Patriotismo in camicia verde,” in La Padania, March 29,1998.
532 Bossi, Umberto, with Daniele Vimercati, Processo Alla Lega,, op.cit, p.41
533 Bossi, Umberto, La Lega: 1979-1989, op.cit, pp.l 19-120
534 See, for example, “Intervista a Umberto Bossi,” in La Padania, May 15, 1999.
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armed confrontation? I don’t know; it has not been decided yet. For now, we from the 
League have managed to keep the anxiety of change from degenerating towards armed 
revolution. But at the next crisis what will happen?”535 At another occasion Bossi said, 
“the time of change has come: it can be like a steady wind that turns the pages of the 
Italian book or like a storm that will sweep it away.”536 Writing about the situation of 
Padania in Italy, Bossi said that:
When there is not a basis of common historical roots or a common ethno cultural matrix, or when 
this basis is thin ... then problems arise and there are two solutions: either the State accepts the 
plurality o f regional cultural traditions and makes them contribute to the Nation, in a way that all 
the cultures contribute in the making of the rules o f the system, or [the State] tries to liquidate 
them, if  they let themselves be liquidated.537
“After the fall of the Berlin wall,” Bossi declared at a rally, “a new historical phase was 
opened, simultaneously wonderful and terrible.” It was terrible because “the era of 2000 
has been opened, full of hopes but also of great unknowns for Italy, which the way it is 
now is not ready to enter,” the new era.”538 “Give us this freedom,” said Bossi at another 
occasion, “before it is too late.”539 As Bossi stated at a 2002 meeting,
Only a cataclysm provoked by extreme revolutionary violence (as happened in France in 1789 or 
in Russia in 1917) can extirpate the nomenclature at the roots and open a new historical time. But 
also, authentic democracy can become a revolutionary force capable o f setting off a completely 
new epoch with federalism. When I’m having serious difficulty advancing federalist reform I will 
call you to shake the palaces of pharisaic falsity, o f aversion against our peoples; I will give you 
the names o f the racists who fake bonhomie and democracy but who, in reality, are against the 
people, especially our people and its freedom.540
Bossi’s discourse is aimed toward ultimate ends and “final battles.” As he 
observed: “Today our land is engaged in a mortal battle for independence.”541 This 
ominous mentality is visible in the way that Bossi interprets globalization and all side 
effects he sees associated with it. “It is not only federalism that matters,” observed Bossi 
at a rally. “There are epochal changes that we know we must contribute to. It may be a
535 Bossi, Umberto Tutta La Verita, op.cit, p.205.
536 “Intervento del Segretario Federale on. Umberto Bossi,” March 28,1998, op.cit.
537 “Dio assista la Padania,” January 27,2004 in www.leganord.org
538 Bossi, Umberto IlMio Progetto, op.cit, p.30.
539 “II Senatur stoppa I nazionalisti Verdi,” in La Padania, March 31, 1998.
540 “Intervento del Segretario Federale, Venezia,” September 15,2002, op.cit.
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question of life and death.”542 Because globalization corresponds to an artificial 
perversion that corrupts the nature of man and society, there is a sense of urgency in 
stopping this process. “History is not dead, “observed Bossi, “Men will play a role again; 
but it needs to be soon, because the enemy destroys at a high speed.”543 According to 
Bossi, “internationalism is losing ground [in this battle] because those who wanted it to 
win have not managed to cancel the identity of peoples. However to win this battle [the 
peoples] need to be supported with even more strength.”544 The League’s criticism of the 
European Union is also viewed in terms of a final confrontation between those who favor 
the “Jacobin and centralist dictatorship,” of a European Superstate, and those who side 
with a “Europe of the peoples.” The end of this battle will bring either democracy’s death 
or victory.
• The League’s Exceptionalism
As already implied the discourse of Bossi is characterized by a constant 
polarization that simplifies realities and focuses his group on what separates the Northern 
League from its enemies. This polarization is applied either to national or international 
visions. In the Italian political system the pole of the Northern League (in coalition or 
not) is always defined as the last resource available against an antagonistic pole where all 
the other parties and forces are lumped together. Bossi described what was at stake in the 
national elections of 1994 in the following way: “There is a virtual pole constituted by 
three groups: the fascists, the Christian democrats and communism. They support the 
welfare policies that have ruined Italy [and] want a centralized state. Against them is the 
new, represented by the Northern League.”545 In 1998 on one pole was “Italian
541 Bossi, Umberto and Daniele Vimercati, Processo Alla Lega, op.cit, p.45.
542 “L’intervento del Segretario Federale della LegaNord Umberto Bossi pronunciato a Pontida, “ May 4, 
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nationalism,” representing the old forces of centralism: the Vatican, the parties of the left, 
the former neo-fascist National Alliance, the big financers, and the Mafia. They 
incarnated the centuries old forces of centralism. On the opposite pole was the “Padani 
patriotism” of the Northern League, constituted by those who “have united their forces to 
fight the beautiful battle of freedom.”546 In 2002, Bossi saw the political system divided 
in two blocks: “The block that we represent is indeed ‘small enterprises,’ federalism, the 
power that comes from below [the people]. It is very different from the [other] block, 
‘Left, Big Capital.’”547
This polarizing technique can also be seen in the way Bossi describes the 
function and role of the Northern League in the international system. The European- 
Union is always described in an either-or manner. “We have to ask ourselves,” said Bossi 
at a rally, “what kind of Europe we want: the one of the peoples, that we defend, or the 
one wanted by the Jacobins, where some thirty so-called illuminati want to command 360 
million citizens imposing them a unique model.”548 Bossi sees the struggle against the 
international system of globalization in a similar manner: “Enterprises, peoples, identity 
against virtual finance and rootlessness ... these are the terms of the political dialectic 
that is progressing. One time in Europe it was Atheism against Christianity, now it is 
materialism against identity.”549 In Bossi’s discourse the League is always portrayed as 
being on one side of the spectrum while all the others are lumped in an opposite, hostile 
side -  including Americans and Muslims, capitalists and communists.
At the same time this use of polarization reinforces the group’s self-perception of 
the Northern League as a unique movement, an exceptional force different from all the 
others. In the discourse of Bossi, the League is the only movement that the peoples of the 
north can look to when they feel their cultural and ethnical traditions in jeopardy. The 
vanguard of men and women led by Bossi is the only hope for the north. As Bossi stated 
at a rally,
We have defeated the centralist counterrevolution because we [unlike all the other political 
forces] are not [founded] in a palace feud but are a force o f nature that has shattered the basis of
546 “Intervento del Segretario Federale On. Umberto Bossi,” March 28 1998, op.cit.
547 “Questo sciopero e contro I giovani,” in La Padania, April 16,2002.
548 “La Lega a difesa dell’ identita,” in La Padania, September 18,2001.
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partitocrazia  and influenced the political life of the last twenty years. The League uses power to 
put ideas capable o f transforming society in place ... without us our land would be without 
identity, [it would be a land] plowed by invaders.550
Not surprisingly, for Bossi “the vote for the League has more value than other votes [for 
other parties]. The League has the honesty and the courage to transform in projects the 
ideas of the people. With the League politics is indeed the only instrument that the people 
have in order to matter.”551
I have so far attempted to show how, through his discourse, Bossi strengthens the 
identity of his group which is characterized as a vanguard of men and women who are 
conscious of their history and under siege by powerful and demonized enemies. Bossi’s 
use of conspiracy, catastrophic imagery, and repeated polarization serves to mobilize and 
increase the focus of the group; the mission of defending the north from those hostile 
forces -  be it the dictatorship of centralism or the tyrannies of the European Union and 
globalization -  rests on the shoulders of the vanguard elite who are engaged in a final 
battle and, therefore, are the last hope of the peoples of the north of Italy. In my next 
segment I will demonstrate how the discourse of the Northern League Bossi idolizes 
Bossi as a savior and messianic guide of the vanguard mission to save the communities of 
northern Italy.
550 “Federalismo oppure morte,” in La Padania, June 25,2002.
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3. Bossi The Savior
3.1 The Bossi Industry
Since the early days of the Lombard League and on through its solidification in the 
Italian political and social landscape, the official literature of the party, coupled with the 
narrative of the leader himself and his strong personalized hold on the party have 
contributed to a process of mythification of Umberto Bossi. I refer to this process as the 
“Bossi industry. To outline this industry, I will first look at the role played the inner circle 
in mythologizing the figure of Bossi. This includes reviewing party literature, interviews 
and public interventions by Bossi’s closest collaborators, parliamentarians, or those who 
occupy public offices as members of the party.
• The Inner Circle
Bossi’s inner circle goes to great lengths to emphasize the role played by the 
leader in the formation and development of the party. The successes of the Northern 
League -  and its ancestor, the Lombard League -  are characterized above all as the work 
of Bossi. The preface to a compilation of writings by Bossi about the history of the 
Northern League, written by the director of La Padania, offers a good example of 
lionization of the leader among the party faithful:
This tale, if  seen in its totality and slow fluidity, manifests all the characteristics o f an 
extraordinary authenticity. Because, without hiding torments and mistakes, it outlines first hand 
the faithful itinerary o f a lonely intuition [of Bossi’s] that becomes, step by step, a valuation of 
local culture and therefore an ideal o f liberation till it expands to an identification with a full 
fledged political project.552
552 Baiocchi, Giuseppe, “Preface,” in Bossi, Umberto, La Lega: 1979:1989, op.cit, p.6.
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Christina Malaguti and Stefania Piazzo, describe the early days of the movement in the 
following manner: “In this way, the strength of an idea, [and] the genius of a man became 
the idea and the strength of all the peoples of the north, in a ‘ferment of recovery and 
revival’”553 As asserted by a contributor (under the pseudonym Camisa Verde), to the 
party daily, the advent of the Northern League represented “a formidable union of 
freemen launched with determination by Umberto Bossi to gain the independence of their 
lands.”554 And another contributor writes: “Umberto Bossi [is] the father-brother ... 
father of a movement created for us and brother in all the battles, victories, and 
defeats.”555 Roberto Maroni, long time party official, emphasized the indispensable role 
played by Umberto Bossi, saying that “At the beginning, in the League, it was practically 
only Umberto Bossi who had ideas. Without him we wouldn’t even exist, because a 
movement that hasn’t tradition, a common history cannot survive without a strong 
leadership.”556
This trailblazing function of Umberto Bossi in the early days of the movement is 
commonly stressed. “[The militants] must remember the immense debt of recognition, “ 
said Senator Pagliarini, “that all of us have and always will have towards Umberto Bossi 
and those few people that had the courage of founding the movement and the strength to 
make it grow, against everyone.”557 According to Giuseppe Leoni, founder of the 
Lombard League together with Bossi, its enemies knew of the primal role of Bossi for the 
movement, which is why they concentrated their attacks on him. As Leoni wrote in the 
party organ of the eighties,
[These attacks] are naturally focused against senator Bossi, National Secretary o f the Lombard 
League, because he represents the turning key of our movement. However, the end result o f these 
attacks had the opposite reaction hoped for by the perpetrators: [The attacks] have contributed to 
bind instead o f separate the militants o f the movement around their great leader [sic] who 
because o f his capacity, determination culture and also because o f his honesty and unselfish 
idealism has few equals.558
553 “Una voce per la liberty,” Lega Nord-Padania Indipendiente, December 9, 1996.
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In the testimony of those close to the leader he is a man of a spellbinding 
personality. “From the first time that I listened to him,” remembered the parliamentarian 
Elisabetta Bertotti, “all my doubts ceased to exist. I sleep two hours at night, I dedicate 
all my time to the League.”559 “What impression has he made on me?” asked Maroni, 
“[That of] a man of a very strong personality, fascinating. We could listen to him for 
hours without getting bored. He was prepared [to discuss] any subject.”560 Maroni puts 
the “bewitching” power of Bossi’s personality at the center of the group. In his words,
We were all bewitched more by this great personality than by the project. He was a sort of Hindu 
Holy Man who enchanted not so much by what he said but by what he did, because Bossi knew 
how to be always in the frontline, the general that guides the assault with the bayonets... I have 
been in the League for so many years because o f this strange, unusual relationship that tied all of 
us to Bossi, almost like a psychological hook that forced you to put part o f your time committed 
to this insane, unachievable project.561
Franco Rocchetta, one time president of the Northern League, noted that one of the 
determining factors of the party was that it was led by a “man with a strong, exceptional 
personality.” Long time loyalist Giovanni Meo Zilio sees the spellbinding nature of 
Bossi as the driving force of the Northern League. As he wrote in La Padania,
We should ask ourselves why it is that the League, notwithstanding everything [schisms, 
mistakes] survives. As always in political phenomena, and in human phenomena in general, the 
reason is not univocal, but rests on the conflation of factors. However there are prevalent factors. 
In this case it is general opinion that that prevalent factor, even determinant, rests on the personal 
charisma o f  the leader [my italics] ... [Which] represents an emblematic case in the recent 
history o f our politicians and would deserve to be studied by political scientists and experts in 
political psychology. The fact is that Bossi, independent o f his stature as a statesman (with all its 
lights and shadows: in truth more lights than shadows) not only drags masses along with him and 
is the only political man that manages today to summon 50.000 people, but also exerts “political 
fascination” even on us, men of science used to critical evaluation, objectivity, reality. This is a 
very telling thing.563
In the eyes of his acolytes, Bossi is relentlessly described as a unique man and an 
avatar with rare qualities. Among those qualities praised by those close to him is his 
clairvoyance. He is regularly depicted as someone who sheds light unto the group, the
559 Ottaviani, Achille and Rafaello Canteri, I cento giorni della Lega, Euronobel, 1992, p. 15.
560 Zanzi, Carlo, Maroni L’Arciere, Lativa, 1994 pp.47-48
561 “Come la vedo io, di Roberto Maroni,” op.cit, p. 144.
562 Canteri, Raffaelo and Achille Ottaviani, op.cit, p.25.
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person who can see what others cannot. Current events are interpreted as a proof of 
Bossi’s prophetic ability. According to senator Carlo Pisati, “Bossi, long before the fall of 
the Berlin, had foreseen everything and said that left and right were dead, and that the 
Christian Democrats would follow communism in its fall.”564 In the view of one of the. 
national secretaries of the Northern League, “It is enough to read what Bossi said five, 
six, seven years ago. We find exactly everything that is happening today. You don’t 
believe it? Go and check it.”565 Roberto Cota, one of the national secretaries of the 
Northern League, noted that “more than seven years ago some accused Bossi of lunacy, 
saying that federalism in Italy was impossible. Today no one has the courage anymore to 
call himself anti-federalist.”566 In an interview with La Padania Leoni hints at an almost 
supernatural capacity of Bossi to predict events as he reflects about “the confine that 
exists between the free will of man and Providence, which makes impossible paths 
feasible. I’m thinking about my battles alongside Umberto, when I was beside him from 
the birth of the League, and the goals reached [by Bossi] with strategy, anticipating all 
the signs of the political world.”
Bossi is repeatedly portrayed as a man with rare foresight. Official documents of 
the Northern League emphasize this quality. One party biography refers to Bossi’s 
“formidable political intuition” in the eighties when he “understood that the first thing to 
do was to initiate a fight without mercy to combat the political situation.” Bossi, 
“intuited very early that a solely ethnic claim would not have led to concrete results.”569 
“Suffice to say,” the same document states, “that one more time Bossi foretells the 
political turn that the League must undertake.”570 In the words of Senator Staglieno, 
“[The project of] federalism is the future of Europe and, I would say, of the entire world. 
This has been the splendid intuition of Bossi, who has updated the federalist doctrine of 
Cattaneo.”571 According to camisa verde, “our leader is not right a priori [but] the facts
563 “La Lega contro la globalizzazione,” in La Padania, January 4,2000.
564 In Canteri, Raffaello, and Achille Ottaviani, op.cit, p.37.
565 “E ci davano dei razzisti,” in La Padania, December 6, 2000.
566 “Cota: Festeggiamo un giomo che ha cambiato la storia,” in La Padania, September 17,2002.
567 “Leoni: figuriamoci se gliele dara vinta,” in La Padania, March 14,2004.
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tells us that he has never made a mistake. Thank goodness, because if it depended on 
some of us, the Padania would remain an unachievable mirage.”
Unlike all other “self-serving” and elitist politicians the leader of the Northern 
League is heralded as someone who understands and serves the true interests of the 
people because he comes from the people. “His human qualities, above all the fact the he 
is someone from the people, and is not a politicker like the others,” notes one of his 
collaborators Filippo Pozzi, “serve as an example for the people of Padania who reclaim 
the freedom to decide their future without the intromission of the Roman palaces.” He 
added, “He speaks with the language of the people, not [the language] from the 
palaces.”573 Giancarlo Giorgetti, the National Secretary of the Lombard League 
emphasizes the popular nature of Bossi as a crucial element of his relationship with the 
militants: “Party militants see him as truly being one of the people. He has a very 
informal style and avoids being perceived as a man of power.” For Giorgetti, “he speaks 
the language of the people, to the people, about the problems faced by the people.”574
Therefore it is not strange that Bossi is perceived as someone who has always 
honored his duty to fight for the people and has never been in politics for personal gain or 
naked ambition. “He doesn’t think about power [for the sake of power],” noted the 
Director of La Padania Gigi Moncalvo, “his goal is not to seat in comfortable armchairs, 
but to fight for the dignity and the pride of his people, against Rome.” To Moncalvo, “he 
has always showed and continues to show that honesty and honest words are the most 
important thing for a political man, for a representative of the people.”575
There is a natural tendency of the party’s inner core to associate Bossi with the 
Northern League itself. Particularly in times of crisis, especially those due to internal 
schisms or electoral defeats, Bossi is hailed as both the incarnation of the party and the 
only leader that can point the way out of the crisis. In 1993, after the League was hit by 
accusations of corruption and internal dissension, longtime loyalist Giuseppe Babbini 
declared in an interview that “The League is Bossi. Bossi is the only leader: there’s no 
one else. Lord forgive me, but I feel like saying the following: There will not be another
572 “Padani, ci vuole coraggio,” in La Padania, April 8,1998.
573 Filippo Pozzi, Segretaria Politica Federale, Interview with the autor, May 13,2004.
574 Giancarlo Giorgetti, Lega Lombarda, Interview with the autor, May 19, 2004.
575 Gigi Moncalvo, Direttore La Padania, Interview with the autor, May 31,2004.
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Bossi outside of me.”576 In that period, the parliamentary group of the Northern League 
made known its loyalty to Bossi by this press release:
If anyone believes that Umberto Bossi does not still represent the genius-like and unquestioned 
leader o f the League in the fight for the triumph of a fulfilled democracy, a State o f rights and 
federalism, it is better that they disillusion themselves immediately... [T]he sword of Alberto da 
Giussano is firmly in the hands of Bossi, and the armies of the Carroccio are united today as they 
were yesterday, and more.577
The inner core’s testimony that Bossi is the personalization of the party and its 
goals is repeated over and over. During a period of internal divisions and erosion of 
electoral support in 1999, another wave of declarations of faith in the leader emerged. 
Stefano Stefani, then president of the Northern League, declared that “Bossi represents 
and incarnates the project of the Northern League, for which our Movement was bom and 
has fought for years.”578 Another member of the League apparatus noted that “if the 
Senator [Bossi] leaves, the League will fragment into pieces in ten days.”579 After the 
disappointing results of the party in the national elections of 2001 a longtime official of 
the Northern League, Senator Tabladini, proposed the creation of a “Reformed League.” 
Although very critical, he did not cast Bossi’s primacy under doubt. And his proposal 
specifically stated that “the figure of Bossi is not under discussion, not so much because 
he hasn’t made mistakes but because [he is] the only glue powerful enough to prevent the
f O A
dissolution of the party in one week.” In the account of his acolytes, Bossi is many 
times depicted not only as someone who is the face of the party but also as a leader who 
is the Northern League.
In the narrative put forward by those close to him, the leader emerges as someone’ 
who will leave an indelible mark in history. Bossi belongs to the category of “Great 
Men.” In a photo book dedicated to the early years of the Northern League, a full page 
picture of Bossi is subtitled with the following caption: “The true director of the political
r o i
revolution of the last years in Italy. He hasn’t finished yet.” To a local official of the
576 “I veleni vengono da fiiori, La gente sta con il Capo,” in II Corriere della Sera, December 11,1993.
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579 “Umberto, pichia duro contro Roma,” in La Padania, July 2, 1999.
580 Tabladini, Francesco, Bossi: La grande illusione, Editori Riuniti, Roma, 2003, p. 19.
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146
Northern League, “Bossi is one of those men who write the story of a country, a true 
charismatic leader. Everyone recognizes it, even from other parties.” In the writings of 
long time party official Giovanni Meo Zilio, Bossi is hailed as one of those uncommon 
leaders destined to a permanent place in history as a hero:
Umberto cannot be regarded as a normal man. But a “monster” (in the etymological sense), in the' 
same way that all o f those who left a mark in history were monsters ... characters who feel that 
they bear an imperative and ineludible mission, to which they dedicate their lives in a 
superhuman manner, with a perseverance that is so opposed to the philosophy of ‘quietism’ that 
should be defined as “heroic.” They don’t withdraw in the face o f obstacles, they don’t know 
physical tiredness, and they are above all ‘ruthless’ with themselves, refusing relaxation, comfort 
and wealth. [The leader gives] everything in order to achieve the ideal, for which the leader o f the 
League has declared more than once (and he was not kidding) he was ready to pay, if  necessary, 
the ultimate price. When we hear him repeating that the League ‘is a force that breaks from 
nature’ we cannot avoid thinking that, first of all, the force that broke out o f nature was him; and 
that it is the League that grows in [Bossi’s] “image and similarity.”583
Followers acclaim Bossi as a visionary committed in a missionary manner to a 
project that will transform history. “There are men to whom we owe the changing of our 
way of imagining the world,” writes La Padania, “one of those men is certainly Umberto 
Bossi.”584 “Umberto Bossi is the only, truly, enlightened political man that Europe has 
had in the last three centuries,” noted long time friend and colleague Erminio Boso, who
r o f
placed Bossi, “side by side with Cavour, Mettemich, Churchill, De Gaulle.” One-time 
parliamentarian Simonetta Faverio sees in Bossi the harbinger of “a revolution of poets”: 
Bossi set off “a revolution of great dreamers. And the greatest dreamers are those who 
fulfill their dreams, or at least they try hard with all their strengths.” Paolo Grimoldi, 
the Federal Coordinator of the Padania Youth, stresses the missionary commitment of 
Bossi to his project as an important aspect of his appeal. “Umberto Bossi is important for 
several reasons,” he says in an interview, “above all by his clear political ability. But it is 
not only political; [It is] charisma, constant presence in the territories [of Padania],
582 Luca Zaia, Presidente Provincia di Treviso, in La Padania, “Fatto del giomo,” June 2,2004.
583 “Bossi ha il carisma di Garibaldi,” in La Padania, December 12,2000.
584 “Bossi: possono anche fermarci, ma ormai il cambiamento e un passagio irreversibile,” in La Padania, 
March 16,2004.
585 In Negri, Sabina, Secessione, viaggio nel Nord inquieto, Foedus Editore, 1996.
586 “Sara la storia a fare giustizia,” in La Padania, September 23, 1998.
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personal sacrifice, perseverance.”587 Giovanni Meo Zilio expresses a similar view that 
“the psychophysical strength, the idealistic tension and the objective charisma of the 
Senator can be connected, mutatis mutandis, (but the fabric is the same) to those of 
[Garibaldi] and so many other ‘monsters’ in a positive way.”588 As we can see in the 
narrative of the leader’s inner circle, Bossi is relentlessly portrayed as someone with the 
missionizing, charismatic qualities necessary to save the north of Italy and create a new 
reality. To the inner circle, these qualities testify to the Salvationist nature of the leader.
• The Leader’s Discourse
Umberto Bossi’s own discourse also plays a powerful role in the development and 
consolidation of images that portray him as a missionizing and savior figure. Whether in 
books, speeches, or public interventions, Bossi assumes a prime position as the sole guide 
of the vanguard. Bossi repeatedly emphasizes the fact that the movement is in essence the 
fruit of his missionary commitment and vision. He regularly traces back the origins of his 
calling to the meeting with the autonomist Bruno Salvadori. Using a religious analogy, 
Bossi noted in one of his books,
I thought I was on my way to a good professional career when Salvadori opened a new world in 
front of my eyes, made of political and social commitment in the service of a great idea. For me it 
was like ending up on the road to Damascus: Something had released the complex of the apostle
589in me.
In Bossi’s personal discourse the creation and development of his movement take the 
shape of a quest in which he himself plays the role of the heroic leader. In a compelling 
example of missionizing rhetoric, he writes:
Fifteen years ago, in the heartland of Lombardy, something happened that recalls the sagas of  
Brittany. A fairytale began: a man of the people has extracted the sword from the rock and used it 
to defeat adversaries that looked invincible. In the open field the League has always triumphed...
587 Paolo Grimoldi, Interview, April 14,2004.
588 “Bossi ha il carisma di Garibaldi,” op.cit.
589 Bossi, Umberto with Daniele Vimercati, La Rivoluzione, op.cit, p.87.
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at the end o f the battle, in any case, the blade will return to the rock. And the man who had 
gripped it, who is a man o f the people, will return to the people.590
Bossi always identifies fervor for the cause as the driving force for his entrance into 
politics. He always portrays his motives as profoundly unselfish and pure. In his own 
account power is not an end in itself. It only matters as long as it is a means to an end: the 
cause, the ideal. As he observed,
I’m not ambitious. I feel like a father who helps his son [the League] to grow. If a father is a good 
one, after having brought up his son he goes to the sidelines and lets him walk by himself, with 
his own legs. I will do the same with the movement: when it will be in a position to walk by 
itself, I will retire. Power only interests me only if  it serves the cause.591
Bossi’s self-representation as a leader who is driven not by a thirst for power but by a 
grand ideal is a permanent feature of his rhetoric. He has always expressed his 
willingness to step down as leader as a “proof’ of his unselfishness. “Power does not 
interest me,” he said in an interview in 1993, “when I was elected I signed my resignation 
and put it in a safe. Whoever wants it can present himself to the League, and I’ll be ready 
to be an infantry soldier.”592 In 2003, while minister of reforms of the Italian government 
he expressed a similar sentiment: “I have never wanted and I don’t want to make a career. 
I have decided to be the minister not as and end but as a means: to make reforms, to 
change things.”593
At the same time, due to the fact that in his discourse the League is above all his 
creation, Bossi expresses a sense that he is entitled to decide its destiny. “I am the 
League,” he said in an interview, “the league is a gigantic machine that I operate, nobody 
else.”594 Bossi has remarked that he “created it [the League] from nothing, I had to 
provide for everything: recruitment, organization, and also the political platform.”595 As 
noted by Bossi, “I founded the movement, I have watched it grow, and I know all the 
officials.”596 Bossi repeatedly juxtaposes his biography with the biography of the
590 Bossi, Umberto, Tutta La Verita, op.cit, p.208.
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149
movement. They are one and the same. As he wrote in the preface for a compilation of 
his writings:
The League and its Secretary have not changed, they have just grown in the conscience of the 
people, and they have given birth, with hard work but also with joy, to the first true political class 
of the North. This book tells, without mediation, through original documents and therefore 
incontrovertibly, the story o f a long political march. If one day, many years from now, an 
historian wants to know how the idea o f Padania was bom, he will have in this book a useful 
tool.597
Bossi also portrays himself as someone who has the necessary qualities to lead the 
vanguard. To underscore his uniqueness as a politician who is driven not by mundane 
motives like personal wealth or prestige and is therefore free of self-interest, Bossi casts 
himself as a simple person, with everyman qualities. His discourse emphasizes the 
unpretentiousness of his life. In 1990 he said:
I did not become rich, I have not taken any advantage from my political life. I could have sold 
myself for a good price, that’s for sure. I have not done it and I will never will. I still live in the 
periphery o f Varese, with my wife and son, in a two-floor apartment. I drive an old Citroen. I’m 
usually dressed in the same old clothes. I earn almost ten million as a parliamentarian, but I give 
half to the League.598
At another occasion Bossi commented on the fact that “my house is very modest, [a 
typical] working class house.”599 “I am someone who comes from the people and to the 
people I will return,” he noted in an interview.600 In order to emphasize his popular image, 
and the gap between the League and the other political parties, Bossi has always prided 
himself in speaking in everyday plain language. Particularly at the beginning, the political 
discourse of the League was a direct rejection of politichese, the “political cant” of the 
other parties, which was full of grandiloquence, euphemisms, and abstractions that were 
totally unintelligible to the average citizen.601 Therefore, as a man of the people, Bossi 
swears and is not inhibited about casting himself as a macho man, especially through the
597 Bossi, Umberto, IIMio Progetto, op.cit, p.XI.
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use of sexual references. This sexist attitude became part of the identity of the party - 
usually referred to as celodurismo -  after Bossi’s intervention at the conclusion of the 
First Congress of the Northern League, when he yelled that “the political parties will not 
cheat us because la Lega Ce I ’ha durol [The League has a hard on!]” In an interview he 
jokingly said that his announcement “increased the popularity of the Lega among the 
female voters.”602 At another occasion, when a female socialist politician accused the 
League of getting ready for an armed secession Bossi, at a political rally, told the “cara 
honassa [dear hottie]” not to worry. The only weapons that the League had, said Bossi, 
while making the gesture of an erection, were “the manico [broomstick]”603 “In order to 
make revolutions,” he said at another meeting, “We need to have the balls and not to let 
ourselves be influenced by the opinionated.604 Such vulgar language has been a 
permanent feature of “tell-it-like-it-is” populist style of communication adopted by Bossi 
early on.
In his discourse the Northern League appears as a reflection of the populism of its 
leader. The party is unrelentingly characterized as being “of the people, and for the 
people.”605 Bossi has compared the League to the Greek mythical figure of Antaeus, “a 
giant who drew his immense force from the earth, because the earth was his mother. In 
the same way the explosive charge of the League comes from below, because [the 
League] takes its strength from popular sovereignty, of which it is the most direct and 
qualified interpreter.”606 The League is “an authentic popular and revolutionary force [that 
works for] the advent of a federalist democracy. We don’t fear the people because we are 
their tool!”607
Intimately linked with the popular nature of the party is the depiction of its 
discourse as an extension of common sense, of what is self-evident. In an interview Bossi 
assailed the elites for being purposefully aloof from the people. “Those beautiful types,” 
said Bossi, “say that we speak a language [that is spoken] in taverns. They don’t know 
the compliment they pay us for saying that! Because we say the things that the people
602 Bossi, Umberto and Daniele Vimercati, op.cit, p.70.
603 Iacopini, Roberto and Stefania Bianchi, La Lega ce I’ha crudo!, Mursia, Milano, 1994, p.54.
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think, we are on the side of the people.”608 Whether in opposition or in power, Bossi’s 
emphasis on the intrinsic “common sense” of the party remains unchanged. The way 
Umberto Bossi explains the League’s opposition to what he calls “immigration-invasion” 
exemplifies his populist approach. “We are in government to stimulate,” he said in an 
interview, “We are a popular party, and we go around holding rallies to listen to the 
people. And when the people see the arrival of thousands of immigrants, all at the same 
time, si incazza [they get mad].” The solution of this situation is not related “to money, it 
is about having the balls to do it, which is a different thing.”609 In another interview Bossi 
declared,
The people don’t want millions o f illegal immigrants -  you just have to walk around to know 
what the citizens think. It is a very simple thing, just listen... I am a leader and in general a leader 
must mediate; however, a leader cannot betray the people, therefore he must be able to make the 
voice o f the people heard inside the palace. That is why, once in a while, the voice [of the people], 
must be raised [by Bossi].610
Bossi presents himself as the medium through which the people speak. But they often do 
not know what to say since their native good judgment has been anesthetized and 
undermined for years by the unrelenting propaganda of the enemies of the people. That is 
why the vanguard led by Bossi has the role of reminding the people of its roots. As noted 
before, the vanguard plays the role of vigilantes protecting the natural identity of the 
people. The League, Bossi vowed, “must commit itself to reminding the people Padani of 
their history and how their slavery started, not by the work of the Romans, but by 
ourselves.”611
Among the necessary qualities that Bossi claims to have in order to lead the 
group, his power of prescience, which I discussed previously in relation to his inner 
circle, occupies a central role. In his own narrative different events are constantly 
interpreted as evidence of his clairvoyance. According to him, he understood the path of 
history long before others. “[And] this is a discovery that goes back many years ago,” 
said Bossi, “even before international events showed how right my intuition was, we can
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say that the pendulum of history, after having moved for more than a century in the 
direction of justice, has inverted its oscillation and now moves towards the pole of
19freedom.” As he stated in an interview,
When I told you [about a revolution in Italy] six months ago you [journalists] got all scared. 
Then, after foreign journalists came and said the same, it became trendy [to talk about a 
revolution]. We, instead, have understood for years now that it would be like this, that a moment 
would arrive in which the idealistic philosophies would replace the materialistic philosophies and 
would give birth to a cultural and political revolution.613
“In 1991, when many including in the League were convinced that the worst was behind 
us,” said Bossi, “I warned [our] officials: be ready, now [against us] the most insidious 
reaction of the regime will be unleashed... I was a good prophet.”614
At the same time, Bossi highlights his resilience, his suffering, and his capacity to 
endure hardships in order to fulfill the mission. The image of sacrifice is dominant in 
Bossi’s discourse. As he wrote, “The League has cost me so much, in all kind of 
ways.”615 He often tells the story of how one day his mother found him cooking for one 
of the political parties of the League: “[She said] ‘Look at you, from a doctor to a cook!’ 
This disturbed me,” Bossi said “but there was no other way if we wanted Lombardy and 
the north became free of roman tyranny one day.”616 As he declared at a political rally: “I 
know how to distinguish creation from property. I know that the League is yours, even if 
it has cost innumerable sacrifices to some people, especially me. And, let it be known,
f\ 17that in so many years the League has not given me not even one lira.” In the 
development of the narrative of himself as the savior, Bossi has played the character of 
the self-sacrificing son of Padania many times. “I think that the base of the League sees 
the right reference point only in me. They know I don’t betray” he said in an interview, “ 
However the Romans are also aware of this and that is why they massacre my image and
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hit me in all possible ways, because I represent the glue of the united North against Roma
/ C l  Qladrona [Rome the thief] and its parties.”
The image of victimhood has always been present in the Bossi’s imagination. He 
has repeatedly stressed his persecution by Rome. “Personally, in my life I have had 
hundreds of judicial warnings, many unjust and pre-ordained sentences, daughters of 
Roman nationalism. We have to resist smiling.”619 Furthermore, he claims that his 
unconditional defense of the group has put his own life in danger:” Yes, in order to stop
fO C iBossi there is a very quick way, but the ideal, that cannot be stopped by anyone.” “I 
could tell you about the threats, the so-called suggestions, the blackmails” he said at a
f%) 1press conference “I know very well that I’m surrounded, I know that they want me.” In 
a meeting with his militants Bossi declared, “I can even become a persecuted, a prisoner 
for life, a Mandela of Padania, but the North wants federalism, the reforms and [that] 
cannot be stopped.”622 Images of sacrifice and martyrdom in the narrative of Bossi are a 
dynamic part of the missionary dimension of his leadership. The savior goes through 
great hardships, and is ready to die, in order to redeem the entire community.
Bossi’s self-depiction, through his discourse, as a missionizing figure plays an 
important part in the development and consolidation of the Bossi industry. I will consider 
now how the hierarchical structure of the party reinforces and legitimates his primacy as 
the leader of the vanguard.
• The Personalized Party
The centralized structure of the Northern League plays a significant function in the 
identification of the party with its leader, Federal Secretary Umberto Bossi. There are 
five organizational sections: Federal, national, provincial, district and communal. At the 
top of the hierarchy is the Federal Secretary, who is elected by a federal congress, and the
618 “Roma ci vuol depotenziare,” in La Padania, July 11, 1999.
619 “Attenti alle due controleghe,” in La Padania, August 1, 1999.
620 Vimercati, Daniele, op.cit, p.l 17.
621 “E il leader lumbard: al congresso chiedero carta bianca per il federalismo,” in II Corriere della Sera, 
op.cit.
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Federal Council, which is composed by the secretaries of the national sections and a 
dozen other members elected by the congress. The Federal Council has the right to 
dissolve the national sections of the party if they “act in clear contrast with the political, 
moral and administrative line established by the Federal Congress of the Northern 
League”623 The Federal Secretary has a say in all federal organs. He coordinates the 
directives of the Federal Congress and chairs the Federal Council. Furthermore, the 
statutes of the party establish that the Federal Secretary represents, at a political and legal 
level, the unity of the movement. At the same time the organizational structure 
encourages militancy. Membership is conditioned by the time (sometimes years) that a 
member has spent working for the party and proving his loyalty to the movement. The 
Northern League makes a strong distinction between old and new members. Only older 
members have rights and duties within the organization. There are no institutionalized 
criteria for promotion or career, which could have the risk of transferring the loyalty from 
the leadership to the organization. Only Bossi’s word leads to promotion.
Umberto Bossi has always justified the primacy of the leader within the Northern 
League as a necessity. Because enemies loom everywhere and try to infiltrate the group, 
the survival of the movement demanded a strong leadership. As Bossi has argued, “It is 
better to suffer accusations of hierarchization, or even worse of dictatorial management 
of the movement, then to allow the diffusion of immoral behavior.”624 “The Lombard 
League -  and afterwards the Northern League -  has been protected in many ways, “Bossi 
said, “in order to prevent disloyal officials from ruining the structure.” The primacy of 
the leader is accepted naturally by other officials, as the following words of Giancarlo 
Giorgetti reveal: “He is not just the current leader of the party: he is the party. He has an
extremely charismatic influence over party members, and controls the party entirely by
£*)£.
himself. Anyone seen to challenge his authority is expelled.”
Bossi sees the Northern League as a true example of direct democracy. So far, he 
has always been reelected by acclamation, without a formal ballot. With a strong public
622 “Bossi: tempo scaduto per il govemo,” II Corriere della Sera, August 21,1995.
623 Roberto Biorcio, La Padania Promessa, op.cit, p.219.
624 Bossi, Umberto, La Rivoluzione, op.cit, p. 170.
625 Bossi, Umberto, Tutta La Verita, op.cit, p.l 15.
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mandate from the party congress, Bossi always sets the agenda of the organization. As he 
once said:
The delegates have become conscious of the need to put on the road a car with one driver at the 
wheel. When the car drives at 150 miles an hour, the driver must be left alone ... I am at the top 
of the League with a precise mandate: to prevent the horses from stopping at the manger o f the 
regime, so that they become fat and let themselves be ridden by our enemies. I cannot admit that 
the strategy o f the movement is put under discussion at every curve. I am the guarantor of this 
strategy. I intend to respect the mandate of congress.627
The Federal Council is, in essence, an instrument of Bossi’s power. A former member of 
the Federal Council, Senator Tabladini, describes the absolute dominance of Bossi in 
these meetings in the following way:
The term “Council” might give the wrong impression. Everyone went there to listen to the 
Secretary [Bossi] who was always mildly angry, who didn’t care about any agenda, who would 
distribute epithets to anyone. [The other members] do not even contradict him because that would 
be the guillotine, but would nod [like robots] ... It was in practice a long monologue only 
interrupted by the ring o f his cell phone.628
The creation in 1998 of a new section in the party -  the Segretaria Politica (Political 
Committee) -  testifies to the complete sway that Bossi holds over the structure of the 
party. Bossi appointed its members, and its goal was to provide “support and consultancy 
for Bossi.”629 The party paper explained the rationale for this new organ by saying that 
“the fight of the League relates to many sectors of society and, therefore, it must be 
conducted, within the intents of Bossi, in an effective way.”630 This section is typical of 
the hierarchical and personalized structure of the Northern League. All components of the 
party ultimately relate to Bossi and follow his personal guidelines. The uniting force is 
absolute loyalty to the leader.
In an organization that gives complete primacy to the leader and where personal 
allegiance to the leader and his mission play a crucial role, dissent is invariably perceived 
as an act of personal betrayal and lack of commitment to the cause. Therefore in the
626 Giancarlo Giorgetti, Segretario Nazionale Lega Lombarda, Interview with the author, May 19,2004.
627 Bossi, Umberto with Daniele Vimercati, op.cit, p.90.
628 Tabladini, Francesco, op.cit, p.69.
629 “Pronti alia battaglia,” in La Padania, December 23, 1998.
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vocabulary of the Northern League, dissension is synonymous with treason. According to 
Bossi,
I have had no regrets when I had to get rid o f the men who had not respected their commitment. 
The consensus of the base is the measure of all of my choices... They left no trace, neither among 
the people nor inside the party. They sold a great idea in the pursuit o f their personal ambitions. 
Without them the League is richer... It is not a coincidence that those gentlemen end up nowhere 
or survive in a pathetic way, like the former president of the Chamber of Deputies [Irene Pivetti]. 
The one who betrayals the people is condemned by the people to the most terrible punishment for 
ambition: oblivion.631
Time and again, Bossi warns against the enemy within. Those who leave the League are 
invariably characterized as agents infiltrated by the League’s enemies whose purpose was 
to divide and ultimately destroy the group. The need to expunge internal spies is a 
recurring theme for Bossi:
There is always someone who, every four years, ends up involved with Rome and clinging to the 
enemies o f the North and of the “Northern Question.” It’s like the Olympics o f those who side 
with the Romans: In 1991 it was Castellazzi, in 1994-5 those who followed Berlusconi; Now  
[1999] we have the same types, climbers that always side with the wealthy.632
Bossi has repeatedly referred to the expelling of dissidents as a necessary 
“cleansing,,633of the group. Dissension is described as if it were a disease that weakens 
and corrupts the body of the party. During one of these periods of “purification,” Bossi 
said that “it is necessary that the ‘fifth columns’ internal to our movement crumble; it is 
necessary to squeeze the pus out of the League.”634 In the discourse of the Northern 
League, betrayal is always possible, and this perception maintains the tension and 
mobilization within the group at high levels. Personal doubt could be the beginning of 
betrayal. Therefore, any member’s qualms regarding the ultimate cause of the group and 
the abilities of the leader must be put aside. As Bossi stated: “We have to be aware of the 
resistance that we will find in the decisive battle. To combat until the end we need to
631 Bossi, Umberto, Processo alia Lega, op.cit, p. 107.
632 “II Congresso a Bossi: hai carta bianca,” in La Padania, July 26, 1999.
633 “Lega, iniziate le ‘grandi pulizie’,” in La Padania, July 6 1999.
634 “II Congresso a Bossi: hai carta bianca,” in La Padania, July 26, 1999.
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know that the greatest enemy is inside us, between ourselves: it is division, doubt 
regarding the final goal.”635
So far, I have endeavored to demonstrate that both the personalized nature of the party 
and the promotion of a cohesive and compact organization are important ingredients in 
the consolidation of the leader’s missionary leadership. I’ve shown how these attributes 
coincide with a polarized view of reality, a sense of imminent catastrophe, and a near 
deification of the leader, who is regarded and who presents himself as a man of 
superhuman prescience and political ability. Furthermore I’ve shown how internal 
betrayal and purging of the disloyal is a constant theme in Bossi’s discourse. Now, I will 
look at the role of symbolism and ritual in binding of the close knit-community of the 
League. I will end with a discussion of Bossi’s missionary charisma.




Umberto Bossi has always defended the lay nature of his movement. To him, “the League 
is secular, it is perhaps the first Italian political force authentically secular.” As noted 
by Bossi in an interview, “The Church has always taken a position against us. I don’t 
know why. I’m a layperson, I don’t follow these things very closely, but I know that there 
are priests close to us, to our people who have understood that the process [freedom for. 
Padania] is unstoppable.”637 Although his party is not indeed a confessional party Bossi 
has used repeatedly Christian images to describe the threats to his community and has 
adopted a good-versus evil imagery in his denunciation, for example, of globalization. 
The final goal of his vanguard should be to vanquish evil.
In Bossi’s eschatology a gigantic final battle is going on in the world. Either a 
new era of freedom and prosperity will arise from this battle, or else it will spell the end 
of democracy and the end of cultural and ethnic diversity. As noted, for Bossi, we are 
living through an epochal confrontation between two different visions of the world that 
corresponds to a battle between good and evil: “The vision of ‘Lucifer,’ of the Jacobins 
and Masons that have worked on finance in order to impose their ‘business community,’ 
the power of elites over the citizens, and [the vision] of the League, according to which
/TOO
the economy, like power, must come from [the people] below.” At another occasion 
Bossi referred to the increasing danger that “materialism, that is, the evil, erases the 
spiritual dimension of Man. The confrontation that is taken place today concerns, closely, 
Christianity.” “The struggle pits local Identity against the evil empire that is
636 Bossi, Umberto, II Mio Progetto, op.cit, p. 196.
637 “Tra La Chiesa e il Dio Po,” in Famiglia Cristiana, n.24, June 11 1997.
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globalization. If we take action soon evil can be stopped immediately,” Bossi said in an 
interview.640
• Ritual
In order to legitimate the strategy of renunciation and redemption of the world that is the 
basis of the movement, the Northern League has provided its supporters with a vision of 
an alternative world. Specifically, it has provided them with a new collective identity that 
defines the peoples of the north of Italy as a specific historical group united by shared 
traditions and values. Ritual has at all times been an essential facet of the symbolic 
construction of this alternative world by the Northern League. These repetitive and 
standardized actions have had the purpose of reinforcing the solidarity within the group 
while at the same time augmenting the emotional investment in Umberto Bossi as the 
standard-bearer of the mission. Among the organized mass-events by the Northern 
League two of them occupy a central place in this process: the annual rally, inaugurated 
in 1990 at Pontida, where in April, 1167, the communes of the north vowed to resist the 
emperor Barbarossa; and the annual rally in Venice, where the Padani celebrate the 
independence of Padania, announced by Bossi in 1996.
These annual rallies invest the ultimate goal of the Northern League -  the freedom 
for Padania -  and the members’ allegiance and commitment to the mission with a sacred 
nature. The first great manifestation in Pontida was convened in 1990, where newly 
elected members of the party swore loyalty to the movement. From that moment on, as is 
written in one of the party biographies, “nothing must distract them from the task that it 
has been given to them: that is, to be the loyal tools of the Lombard League in the fight 
for Lombardy.”641 The text of the oath, which was aimed at establishing a parallel 
between the oath taken by the defenders of the region in the twelfth century and its 
contemporary defenders declared that:
640 “Bossi: made in Padania o muore la nostra storia,” in La Padania, November 14, 1999.
641 “La Vera Storia Della Lega Nord,”, op.cit, p.48.
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Today in Pontida our commitment is bound to the sacrifices o f our ancestors who chose this place 
to swear their commitment to the defense o f freedom. I, who have decided to join in the lists of 
Lega Lombarda-Lega Nord to become an active standard-bearer in the fight for the autonomy of 
the people from Lombardy, Veneto, Piemontese, Ligure, Emiliano, Romagnolo and Toscano, 
unite my oath with those o f our ancestors. I swear loyalty to the cause o f the autonomy and 
freedom of our peoples, which today, as it was a thousand years ago, is incarnated in the Lega 
Lombarda and its democratically elected officials.”642
The then party paper, Lombardia Autonomista, announced that “an oath, a big 
Lombard party, 8,000 militants of the Lombard League celebrating in Pontida. Sunday, 
May 20, 1990, will remain a historical day for our movement and for Lombardy.” It 
added, “After 800 years, History with a capital ‘H’ repeats itself, notwithstanding those 
who say that history has ended.”643 This claim for the sacred aura of Pontida has 
continued in the imagination of the Northern League. Within this narrative, Pontida 
stands for uncompromising loyalty and devotion to the all-consuming sacred mission of 
liberating Padania from oppressive forces. Referring to the 1990 oath, the party daily La 
Padania observed that “In this way was a long story of loyalty was initiated, that repeats 
itself for thirteen years ... the moving history of a movement that has unhinged the 
apparent immutable rules of old politics.”644
The high point of the annual rallies to Pontida is a solemn speech by Umberto 
Bossi. In these speeches, Bossi announces the steps that the movement must take in order 
to fulfill its mission. As ritual events, these speeches have a standard form. Bossi 
explains, in a pedagogic manner, the realities of Italy and the world and then unveils the 
path forward for the movement. He announces new decisions and asks for the approval of 
the people, which is invariably given. This rite of the legitimation of Bossi as the guide 
for the group happens every year in what La Padania calls the “Sacred Ground of 
Pontida,”645 where Bossi plays the role of the prophet who interprets the present and 
points the way toward the future. The group expects the leader to play this role. As 
written in La Padania,
642 “Giuramento di Fedelta”, Pontida, 20 Maggio 1990, ibid, p.48.
643 Lombardia Autonomista, May 1990.
644 “Ottomila Guerrieri di Liberta’ in Nome del Popolo,” in La Padania, April 30,2003.
645 “Tutti a Pontida il 6 Giugno,” in La Padania, May 15, 2004.
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Every time that Bossi calls for the gathering o f the men and women of the North in Pontida, a 
new page o f political history is opened. We go to Pontida to understand what will happen in 
Rome, to reason about politics, because change comes from the North. It was like that also in 
April 7, 1167 when men who wanted to be the masters of their houses again subscribed to a pact 
of loyalty against Barbarossa, in the same Pontida o f the historical abbey ... The present and the 
future o f this redemption from centralism continues to come from the meadow of Pontida with 
the words o f Bossi to accelerate the reforms.646
The following piece of Gigi Moncalvo, director of La Padania, epitomizes the trust in 
Bossi as the guide who, in Pontida, sheds light on the path to the future. According to 
Moncalvo,
We are ready one more time to follow the battles, the indications, the political line outlined by 
Bossi. And today in Pontida the people of the League will show [that] to everyone, one more time 
... We believe, [we] think, and know that Bossi has all the elements to know what to do and how 
to do it. And today, [Bossi] first on the stage and then in the middle o f the crowd, looking in the 
eyes the People [sic] o f Pontida, the flags, the faces, the smiles o f our militants, seeing that 
unique spectacle in the world and listening to the cry that comes from Pontida -  the ‘Freedom for 
Padania’ from thousands o f people -  our secretary will have one more element, important and 
emotional, democratic and binding, to establish what are the most just decisions, the path in 
which we’ll walk, the ways to get closer to the final goal. The road is still long, it’s not easy ... 
Bossi knows all o f this very well.647
Pontida symbolizes the periodic renewal of trust between the leader and his 
followers. It is also the place where the leader goes every time he wants to test the loyalty 
of the group towards him. After the disappointing results in the European election of 
1999 that risked undermining Bossi’s leadership, he announced that he would submit his 
resignation as Federal Secretary at a rally in Pontida. In Pontida the followers of the 
Northern League would have to vote for or against Bossi’s continuation as head of the 
movement. “I put myself at stake,” declared Bossi, “for a cultural revolution, to wake up 
the conscience of the people of the North from its sleepless state.”648 Bossi wanted to 
make sure that the militant followers were firmly behind him. What followed was a 
collective and public testament of loyalty from all sectors of the party from long time, 
officials to simple militants. The President of the Northern League Stefano Stefani made 
it clear that “although we can discuss many things, only one thing is not in discussion: the
646 “II cammino verso la devolution,” in La Padania, April 29,2003.
647 “Contro I nemici del cambiamento,” in La Padania, May 4,2003.
648 “Mi metto in gioco in cambio di una rivoluzione culturale,” in La Padania, June 17, 1999.
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irreplaceable nature of Umberto Bossi as the guide of the Northern League.”649 The 
“letters to the editor” section of La Padania was swamped with emotional comments of 
its readers about Bossi’s intention to resign. These letters, in which the leader was 
overwhelmingly referred to by first name, show personal devotion and a sense of intimate 
connection to the leader. Here are a few examples:
Dear Umberto... Non si Lasciare! [Do not leave us!]; Umberto, you have made us dream. You 
are always in our hearts as our unique guide, polar star o f the north!; Umberto, wake up from the 
nightmare ... if  you resign, ‘they’ have won.; Umberto, without you there is neither Padania, nor 
future ... Do not abandon us, otherwise we will all leave.; Umberto, please, don’t give in; Dear 
Umberto, we are disturbed by your declaration. You cannot abandon your people! Without you 
there is no future for us; Dear Umberto, you cannot leave us now, you cannot abandon your 
children ... I’ll be in Pontida ... to yell out loud how much all o f us love you; I’m telling you: 
without you never, you are the League and we are your extension.”650
In Pontida, the commitment of the followers to their leader was reinforced and the 
militants voted overwhelmingly for Bossi to stay on. Under the suggestive headline 77 
nostro Condottiero non si tocca (No one touches our Leader), La Padania asserted that 
“The battle of the League restarts. It will be one more time guided by Bossi.”651The 
loyalty of the followers to Bossi had been tested in the sacred place of Pontida, and they 
had passed the exam. The leader remained, with increased legitimacy, as the guide of the 
vanguard.
Another major symbolic event for the Northern League is the annual rally in 
Venice. In September 1996, in solemn ceremony, Bossi took water from the source of the 
Po River and initiated a pilgrimage that took him and his entourage to Venice, where the 
water from the Po River was poured by a nine-year old girl, dressed in pink and 
symbolizing the new republic, into the lagoon of the city. The pouring of water was 
described by the party organ as “an act of purification” indicating the “refusal of 
subordination to Rome” of the peoples of Padania. This ceremony was intended to 
symbolize the birth of Padania and constituted a crucial moment of three days of rallies 
of the militants and sympathizers of the Northern League, from the source of the river in
649 “II presidente federale: propongo di convocare Passemblea del Carroccio,” in La Padania, June 19,
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Monviso to Venice. In this period an oath was taken for the “Declaration of 
Independence and Sovereignty of Padania.” It read,
We, the people o f Padania, assembled in the great Po River.... From immemorial times we have 
lived, worked, protected and loved these lands, passed on to us by our ancestors.... Here we have 
developed an original way of life, of developing the arts and work. We belong to a historical area, 
the Padania, that under a socio-economic profile is strongly integrated internally... We constitute 
a national, cultural, and socio-economic community founded on a shared patrimony of values,' 
culture and history and on homogeneous social, moral, and economic conditions... The History 
of the Italian State, instead, is a history o f colonial oppression, o f economic exploitation and 
moral violence. Over time, through its bureaucracy the Italian State has systematically occupied 
the social and economic system of Padania... These are the reasons why: We firmly believe that 
the continuation o f Padania under the Italian State would mean any hope o f rebirth would die 
out... we firmly believe that a free and independent Padania will become a political and 
institutional reference for the construction of the Europe o f regions and Europe of peoples.... We, 
people o f Padania; because the courage and the faith o f those who fought for the freedom of 
peoples are our inspiration and must lead us to take our own destiny... In the name and with the 
authority that comes from the Natural Right for self-determination into our hands... We, peoples 
of Padania solemnly proclaim: The Padania is a federal republic, independent and sovereign.653
During this historical episode, described as a “sacred moment,”654 the Northern League 
publicly proclaimed a provisional constitution and a “Bill of Rights of the Citizens of 
Padania.”655 Every year this rite that is commonly known as the “Ceremony of the 
Water” is repeated; the mass-rally culminates, as in Pontida, with a solemn speech by 
Umberto Bossi. Like Pontida, this ritual serves as a symbolic representation of the sacred 
mission of the group; a representation of the freedom for Padania. The position of the 
League in the Italian political landscape has not affected the celebration of the ritual. 
“Yesterday a journalist asked me why is the League still pouring water of the Po River in 
the lagoon of Venice now that we are heading towards governing,” Bossi said at one of 
the rallies in Venice “‘isn’t that a symbol of secession?’[She asked] I told her that it is 
much bigger than that, it is the symbol of our identity.”656 In the party literature this event 
is characterized as “the birth of Padania.”
652 Lega Nord-Padania Indipendiente, “Padania, Padania,” September 16, 1996.
653 “Dichiarazione di Indipendenza e Sovranita’ della Padania”, 15 Settembre 1996, in La Vera Storia Della 
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The rituals of Pontida and Venice both serve to consolidate the alternative world 
promoted by the Northern League. Alongside these two major mass-rallies, the party 
regularly organizes rallies, conventions, conferences, and “Padania Days” in different
iTCO
parts of the north. The creation of specifically Padania groups and associations are part 
of this strategy of cementing the image of Padania in the rank-and-file’s collective 
imagination. It has created such organizations as a special security guard called Guardia 
Nazionale Padana (Padania National Guard), Sport Padano (Sport from Padania), 
Movimento Giovani Padani (Youth from Padania), Donne Padane (Women from 
Padania), Cattolici Padani (Catholics from Padania) and Scuola Padana (Padania 
School). Each gathering of the “people of Padania” either in Pontida or Venice spawns an 
atmosphere that resembles a festival with a playful dimension constituted by organized 
games and musical events. At the same time all the associations close to the movement 
make themselves visible at their own stands. In the words of one of the organizers:
Everything in Pontida emanates history and myth. Emanates autonomy from central powers, in 
the past from Germany, in the present from Rome. The meeting in Pontida is also a true festival,, 
like the one in Lorien. There are 300/400 hundred stands o f associations, movements, groups. 
They sell everything: stamps, bumper stickers, craftsmanship. There are the motorcyclists, truck 
drivers, fishermen, linguistic and cultural associations, [people] play the baghet (Lombard 
bagpipe). Every nation o f Padania has its stand, with their own typical products to drink and eat 
... the night before [the end of the rally], we, the youth of Padania, have our own meeting, we 
play Celtic or Irish music, and [we] have our own groups who speak in our local languages.659
At the same time the party has launched beauty contests such as “Miss Padania,” 
“Miss ‘Green Shirt’” and “Miss Sun of the Alps,” held every year. Bossi always attends 
these contests.660 The intense symbolic production of the Northern League can also be 
seen in the adoption of the Sole delle Alpi (Sun of the Alps), a green, six-rayed Celtic 
symbol, as the logo of the party, and in the chromatic adoption of green as the color of 
the movement. These are all part of the attempt to reinforce the alternative history of the 
Padani. In the choreography of the party’s congresses and rallies, the color green is 
dominant. An article in La Padania refers to the color green as “our totemic color,” 
adding that because of the Northern League “the Green Sun of recovery and awakening
658 See, for example, “Padania day, la forza viene dal basso,” in La Padania, January 16,2000.
659 Paolo Grimoldi, President of Padania Youth, Interview with the author, May 24,2004.
660 See, “La Lega elegge Miss Padania ma gli applausi sono per Bossi,” in La Repubblica, April 2,2004.
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shines in the North.”661 Bossi often dresses in green because “in order to succeed in 
persuading the others we have to give visible examples. We have, and I’ve already 
decided personally, to wear green shirts more often.”
The development of its own media network, including Telepadania (Padania 
Television), Radio Padania Libera (Radio Padania Free) and La Padania (The Padania - 
daily newspaper) and a Website serve as a way of strengthening the identity of the group
ftfiKby releasing information and programs free from the perceived bias of the regime. The 
following description by Stefania Piazzo of the role played by the party periodical testify 
of the importance that the party gives to their media: “Lega Nord [party weekly] is and 
remains our pride ... because it has carried the ideas that have raise from the earth a 
people who was dozed, almost resigned; it has sowed the conscience of an identity.”664 
Every rally of the Northern League culminates with the playing of the piece Va Pensiero, 
from the Giuseppe Verdi’s opera Nabucco, which was adopted as the “national anthem” 
of the Northern League.665
• A Moral Community
This on-going construction of a symbolic reality increases the perception of the Northern 
League’s exceptional nature in the minds of its followers, expanding their own self­
perception as a unique community integrated by an alternative set of historical roots and 
values. An official of the Northern League observed that “some commentators, showing 
all their ignorance and materialism, speak in a superficial way or ridicule our celebration, 
they despise what they don’t’ know, what they don’t feel to be as ‘their thing,’ because 
they are strangers to popular culture.” He added, “we instead are proud of this day in 
Monviso [the ceremony of the water], because behind those peaks we celebrate an
661 “Verde: il nostro colore totemico,” in La Padania, February 13,2000.
662 “Umberto Bossi, intervento al 3 Congresso Federale 1997,” op.cit.
663 “Comunicazione,” inwww.leganord.org
664 “Lega Nord e diventata grande,” Lega Nord-Padania Indipendiente, December 9, 1996.
665 “Costituzione Transitoria,” in La Vera Storia della Lega Nord, op.cit, p. 143.
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important appointment to recover the identity of the north.”666 “One who has never been 
in this meeting of the people [Pontida],” emphasized La Padania, “does not know what 
its meaning is.”667
In the alternative world created by the Northern League, gatherings of the party 
are interpreted not as mere political meetings but as a testimony of faith in the members’ 
collective mission. In the words of a movement official, “Pontida remains the party [as in 
festival] of the League, which a militant, a Padani, a supporter cannot in any way miss. 
Beyond anything else Pontida is a pilgrimage that must be accomplished at least once a 
year.”668 The Federal Coordinator of the Padania Youth expresses a similar sense of 
destiny about the community assembled in Pontida as follows:
It is amazing how a political movement manages to bring together thousands o f people in the 
name of our identity, and to take an oath about the freedom of our peoples. Sometimes we don’t 
think about it, we are used to it; but if  we reflect we become aware o f the importance o f the event. 
This is the sign that our movement is a movement destined to change the history of the country.669
The militants, those who have undergone the path of integration into the 
alternative world of the party, are a community of true believers united in their sense of 
collective mission and profoundly devoted to the leader. A former official of the Northern 
League, Francesco Tabladini, sees in the pool of voters for the Northern League two 
kinds of people. In his words,
In practice, the crowd that flocks to our meetings is always the same: it grows or diminishes 
according to the appeal o f the demonstration, but we are always talking about tens o f thousands. 
To make a practical example of the voters of the League it is necessary to imagine two containers 
of different proportions that have scarce connections between them, if  any. In the smaller one are 
the “movimentisti” [activists]; they are those who go to Pontida, to Venice, to [the river] Po and 
wherever Bossi calls them. This container augments and diminishes in negligible ways ... they 
seem many and in reality they are many, but they are always the same ones. Then there is the 
other container, with bigger capacity, that determines the electoral results without making noise. 
They don’t go to Pontida or Venice ... this is the container that it was filled in April 1996 and that 
now is emptying inexorably.670
666 “Bossi domain a Pian del Re prelevera l’acqua del grande Po,” in La Padania, September 11, 1998.
667 “II ‘pratone’ della verity,” in La Padania, June 15, 1999.
668 “In ‘pellegrinaggio’ a Pontida culla del popolo Padano,” in La Padania, June 20, 2002.
669 “La storia di Pontida lancia nel fiituro I giovani Padani,” in La Padania, June 19,2002.
670 Tabladini, Francesco, op.cit, p. 121.
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The attachment of the militants towards the leader is of a different nature that the 
attachment of the general voter. The leader puts forward an account that encourages the 
inner core to see itself as a community of belief. Bossi repeatedly stresses the emotional 
values that unite those who belong to this community. In the discourse of Bossi the' 
Northern League is a community bonded by love. In his own words,
I say often that the League is like a baby; it is the result of love. I am convinced that this 
movement is the result o f the generous work of thousands of men and women who feel strongly 
toward each other, who feel strong about the city they live in, about the nation that they belong to. 
The baby has grown, has started to walk with its legs. But there’s still work to do so that it 
becomes an adult and fulfils its ambitions.671
“Our patriotism is the love for our Padania,” declared Bossi in one of the League’s
congresses, “the love for our peoples, who have united their forces to fight the beautiful
battle of Freedom.”672 “To love something means to hug it, not to repel it,” said Bossi
regarding those who “sold” the ideals of the League for their own self-interest, “Padania
£.*1*1
is really the only thing that we have.” According to Bossi, “our love, dear Padania, 
brought you back to life. Not as an ordinary country but as our Fatherland.”674
In the narrative of the leader of the Northern League, there is a leap of faith at the 
very basis of the movement. This faith-based nature of the League’s politics is a recurrent 
theme. A messianic certitude about the success of the movement can be seen in the 
following words of Bossi,
Without faith it is not possible to make politics, and my faith is the certainty that the good right of 
the North to be free sooner or later will prevail over Roman colonialism. I have never doubted, 
since the League was formed by just a few militants, that in the end we will be free o f Rome. I 
have always thought that if  [the goal] wasn’t reached by my generation and me it would be 
reached by my children and, after them, the children of my children.675
Addressing the League’s parliamentarians, Bossi stated that “any one of you, perhaps 
without a total understanding but with the strength of faith, of that faith that moves
671 Bossi, Umberto with Daniele Vimercati, Vento dal Nord, op.cit, p.92.
672 “L’Intervento integrale del Segretario Federale, riconfermato ieri,” in La Padania, March 29, 1998.
673 “Congresso Federale Straordinario della Lega Nord,” October 24,25 1998 in www.leganord.org
674 “Dio assista la Padania,” January 27,2004.
675 Bossi, Umberto, La Lega:1979-1989, op.cit, p.95.
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mountains, has done your part in this grand design.676 “The master of the League is the 
people,” declared Bossi at a rally in Pontida, “the people who are looked after by the faith 
of Pontida: a civil and lay faith in the common good of freedom.”677 Time and again, in 
order to keep the levels of mobilization of the militancy high, Bossi warns against the 
dangers of the weakening of faith. At one of these moments he said,
We can say that it is a problem of conscience that sometimes can weaken, [a problem of] weak 
faith, we can say. And weak faith leads to a reduced willingness for sacrifice. And without faith, 
as we know it, the faith that moves mountains, without [faith] Padania cannot appear. This you all 
know, I’m certain; [without faith] we cannot do anything other than settle and go for careers, 
[materialistic] things, etc ... and God forbid that this kind of people would [belong to our 
movement].678
Faith sets the militants apart from ordinary people and gives them strength in moments of 
doubt regarding the project. “The lack of faith is unbearable,” declared Bossi at a 
congress, “Do not despair, because it is despair that destroys the world, because it is 
easier to dominate those who do not believe in anything.”
In Bossi’s discourse the political action of the Northern League is always framed 
in terms of ideal. For him, the rise of the League brought with it the return of the ideals to 
the political life.
[The other parties] didn’t understand that the League was winning because the materialistic 
philosophy that had won in the post-war was in crisis and that new idealist horizons were being 
opened ... they didn’t understand that the League was somewhere else. It was impossible to 
damage it because it belonged to another world, [the world] o f the great ideals.680
“Federalism, [and] freedom,” declared Bossi at a Pontida rally, “are like oxygen for us. 
They are a dream: either we’ll achieve it or we’ll die because of it. They are great ideals, 
great love.”681 As Bossi warned at a rally in Venice, the battle for federalism will be a 
“very tough battle. But we from the League are not soldiers of fortune. We are not
676 “Ora la Padania ha un cuore,” in La Padania, July 14, 1998.
677 “1994 Lega di Lotta e di Govemo,” in La Padania, May 1,2003.
678 “Intervento del Segretario Federale Umberto Bossi,” September 7,1998, op.cit.
679 “Congresso Federale Straordinario della Lega Nord,” October 24,25,1998.
680 Bossi, Umberto, II Mio Progetto, op.cit, p.56.
681 “L’intervento del segretario federale della Lega Nord Umberto Bossi pronunciato a Pontida,” op.cit.
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mercenaries. We are idealists ready for any clash.”682 In the narrative of Bossi the word 
dream is interchangeable with the ultimate ideal goal of the group. In his words:
The base [militants] is strongly characterized by the [power of] dream, and by dream we mean the 
tension towards the transformation of society, a dream that is worthwhile to fight for, which in 
our case is the freedom of the Padani peoples. There cannot be a lack of dream otherwise we 
would lose the base o f the party, and a party without a base cannot achieve any change.683
Bossi’s language is purposefully belligerent, and in the ongoing battle for the 
concretization of the project Bossi puts a high premium on courage. “The League is a 
force of courage,” he said to his militants “We can confront any adversity.”684 As he 
stated in a speech: “Courage is the first great gift that the League has brought to the 
Italians. The courage to confront the corrupt and to remember the roots of our own 
history.” 685 The sacrifice of the militancy is an imperative in order to fulfill the collective 
mission of the group. “The hope of the peoples is a shining aurora but the dawn is still 
faraway,” said Bossi “The battle will be long and difficult.”686
In the narrative of the leader there is an all-consuming sense of mission that binds 
the group together and transforms it into a pious community. “Until we reach our goal,” 
declared Bossi, “any man of the League must have only one concern: to work towards a 
politics aimed at the transformation of Italy in a federal State. One goal to be achieved no 
matter what the cost.”687 All suffering and sacrifices can be endured by the community 
because they are part of a wider story, a wider order that offers an ultimate goal that lies 
in the future. As long as there a final goal that offers salvation, suffering can and should 
be endured by hardcore believers in the Northern League. The militants see themselves as 
a righteous community of people bound by the same idealist fervor for, commitment to 
and belief in the justice and goodness of the mission. “The militant [from the Northern 
League] does not have only a political idea, but almost a faith,” notes Matteo Salvini, 
official of the Northern League and director of Radio Padania, “[the militant] does not
682 “Intervento del Segretario Federale,” Venice, September 15,2002.
683 “Padania, sogno che diventa realta,” in La Padania, August 5,1998.
684 “Intervento del Segretario Federale Umberto Bossi,” September 7,1998, op.cit.
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have an ideology but has absolute confidence in Bossi and in the idea of federalism and 
freedom of the north which makes him dedicate hours and days, voluntarily, to political 
activities and more.”688 Viviana, member of the Padania Youth, sees in the “belief in an 
ideal, the Padania” the reason why the militants of the Northern League are 
fundamentally diverse from all other militants. “The initiatives of the Northern League 
are carried out by the militants because they believe in them and not because they are
yTQQ
being paid as happens in other political parties,” she added.
The following words of the provincial secretary of Como testify to this deep- 
rooted self-perception of the uniqueness of the members of the community:
The first requisite o f a militant is the faith in the ideal that, supported by enthusiasm and courage, 
can surmount and overwhelm any obstacle and fear... From the iron discipline o f courage arises 
the free civic consciousness and the moral sense from which originate the balance, coherence and 
finally the strength to carry out a great mission ... like the soldier who faces the extreme sacrifice 
- and wins the ‘saintly b a ttle ’ -  after the captain reminds him o f  the suffering endured, the 
courage showed and the recompense o f  the supreme redemption: it is like that fo r  the true 
militant who gives everything and does not asks fo r  anything else than to serve the ju s t cause 
[Italics mine] ... The League has always known how awaken the courage, the enthusiasm, the 
brotherly union, and the faith in the ideal that have shaped the only real Militant: our Militant.690
The messianic character of the vanguard is visible in the way a parliamentarian, 
Simonetta Faverio, described the ultimate goodness of the Northern League. According 
to her,
We have believed and still believe that the citizens have the right and the duty o f making history 
by writing a new pact between themselves. We are those who think we have ideas to offer not 
only to Italy but also to all men. [italics mine] We are those who have renounced the small tricks 
and conveniences o f the usual habit of compromise, [in order to] to think big and, like poets, we 
have constructed our model o f the world, our model o f social cohabitation. We try to impose the 
idea that we love, as do honest and defenseless people: working hard to persuade others o f the 
goodness o f our project. We know that the one who claims its dignity and wants to change things 
will have a difficult life and many cruel enemies.691
Given this redemptionist message, it is not surprising that the community 
interprets dissension as a moral failure. The dissenter did not live up to the high standard
688 Matteo Salvini, Direttore Radio Padania Libera, Interview with the author, July 6,2004.
689 Viviana, Member of Padania Youth, Interview with the author, June 15,2004.
690 “I Leghisti: militanti, non mercenary,” in La Padania, January 10,2001.
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of the group. “The men of the League,” noted Bossi at a rally in Pontida, “have the moral, 
rather than political, duty to remain compact and deaf to the sirens of the regime.”692 As* 
declared by Bossi, “Betrayals - because they are betrayals -  sadden me, but they don’t
fL Q 'l
surprise me. I know very well that men easily give up to temptation.” Periods of 
difficulty are seen as tests of the loyalty of the individual to the community. The 
following words of one of the provincial secretaries of the Northern League reveal the 
elitist high-mindedness of the group. In his view,
The moment o f crisis such in profoundly idealistic movements as the Northern League for the 
independence o f Padania, also have positive aspects; in fact they test the loyalty and the ideal 
[sic] o f the men, causing a beneficial ‘natural selection’ that keeps away the rotten apples, the 
opportunists.”694
Evidently, recruitment into the community is not an ordinary process based on 
simple persuasion. It is a process based on the conversion of others to an all-consuming 
project. Ordinary political parties demand a minimum participation from their supporters; 
at best theirs is a partial involvement. The Northern League, however, demands 
maximum participation and the involvement required is total. A writer close to the party 
complained about the fact that “its activists are subject to an excess of activism: A day 
does not go by without being called to a manifestation, [whether] collecting signatures, 
joining an association, attending a course, show or conference.”695 The demanding 
nature of Northern League militancy can be seen in the following words of long time 
official, Gilberto Oneto:
In order to strengthen its tactical maneuvers (whatever they might be) the Federal Secretary needs 
to have obedient people, [needs] a disciplined troop, o f militants of a movement, not of a party... 
our militants must not distract themselves with sordid games o f power but [they] must convince, 
convert, and create consensus. Every militant must be a propagandist, a preacher, an enlister: Like 
a small seed [the militant] must concentrate in itself all the genes o f the big tree o f freedom ...
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when a commander o f an army brings his men to battle, he needs obedient soldiers who hate the 
enemy (and even some of the momentary allies).696
Referring to the recruitment of others to join the Northern League Bossi declared, “I trust 
my Padani brothers... all of us must commit ourselves in a truly work of 
evangelization.”697 This evangelical call is typical of a close-knit community that seeks 
expansion through conversion. In this process of evangelization, from early times, Bossi 
has given the example. He is the preacher who goes from town to town to spread the 
gospel of the League. Bossi has always encouraged regular rallies that he personally 
attends. “I like to be in the middle of the crowd,” he says
Those simple meetings with my people, with the children who ask for autographs and want to 
take a picture with me. I’m not divine, mind you. But in me the people see a hope, the dream of 
change. I’m happy if they love me because in reality they love the idea that I represent. As long 
as the people are with me, I will have the strength to fight the mafia o f Rome.698
In fact this regular presence of Bossi in the middle of “his people” is a crucial 
driving force in the development of dynamics of personal devotion between the leader 
and the followers. “Umberto Bossi is charismatic,” notes Filippo Pozzi, “because firstly 
he does not cut efforts in the work for the freedom of Padania.” “As a consequence,” 
Pozzi added, “he is the first to give the example to his militants and to the people of 
Padania.”699 In an interview, the Federal Coordinator of the Padania Youth, Paolo 
Grimoldi, referred to these ceaseless personal contacts between Bossi and the militants as 
a crucial feature of the leader’s charisma. According to Grimoldi,
The militants love him because after every rally he spends hours and hours giving autographs, 
taking photos, speaking with every single voter or any bystander who walks by him. Two hours 
after the rally, and after being two hours in the middle o f the people, he finally goes eating with 
the militants o f the place and entertains himself speaking about politics, the structure of the party 
and even frivolities with all the militants of the province. I have to tell you that he is very friendly 
and loves speaking about everything. Around four a.m. he goes back home sometimes with hours 
of trip in front o f him... Almost every night he is in a different angle o f Padania at rallies: he 
doesn’t go only to big cities but even the small and very small villages.00
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A similar view is expressed by Matteo Salvini:
Umberto Bossi does politics, in the middle of the people, for a long time, touring markets, cities, 
festivals, dining until the early hours o f the day side by side with the young and the elderly. I 
don’t know any other leader, men, not to mention ministers, who stay up until 3 am talking about 
what goes on in Rome with people who until that moment were perfect strangers ... Because of 
this I think that between Bossi and “his people” there is a unique relationship, formed during 
years after years o f personal relations and not invented by the television.701
Along with making a physical connection to his followers, Bossi’s regular presence in the 
midst of the people testifies to his personal commitment and sacrifice to the community. 
In the eyes of his followers he personifies the all-consuming mission that he demands of 
all members of the vanguard. This aspect of Bossi’s leadership is emphasized in the 
literature of the party. As written in La Padania,
Two-and-a-half million kilometers. This is [the number of kilometers] traveled by Bossi since he 
started in politics. And they keep increasing because even in these days the word ‘vacation’ does 
not belong to his vocabulary; the agenda o f the secretary o f the Northern League is full of 
appointments all over the four angles o f Padania. Conventions, meetings, but mostly rallies at the 
festivals o f the Carroccio [Northern League].702
• Charisma
As I have tried to show, within the narrative and imagination of the Northern League, 
Umberto Bossi is a Salvationist leader who has through the years developed a charismatic 
missionary aura. He presents himself and is perceived by the vanguard as the messianic 
leader of a mission of redemption. His level of charisma is rooted more deeply than the 
more common and superficial “popular level” of charisma. It is intimately linked with an
701 Matteo Salvini, Direttore Radio Padania Libera, Interview with the author, July 6,2004.
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enclave mentality that Bossi has been able to inculcate within his militants. Although the 
general electoral support for the Northern League has dwindled in recent years the 
devotional support of the core militancy has remained stable. No matter what the tactical 
changes are, they follow Bossi’s guidance. This chapter has focused exclusively on his 
charismatic missionary relationship with this core militancy. I have tried to show that in 
order to remain, this type of charisma demands constant work of maintenance and 
preservation. The work of what I have called the “Bossi industry” coupled with the 
constant ritualization of the movement, has played and continues to play a fundamental 
role in keeping the loyalty of the core of militants, who remain devoted to their leader 
despite any setbacks or changes in party policy.
3.3 The Succession of the Charismatic Leader
Succession, as Weber noted, is always the test of the strength of a charismatic 
organization which, by definition, relies on the personality of its leader for its cohesion. 
The Northern League is not exception. Although after being re-elected by acclamation as 
Federal Secretary in the 2002 Federal Congress of the Northern League Bossi expressed 
his desire to step down as a leader after the mandate, he has never anointed a successor. 
In March 2004, he suffered heart failure and remained in drug-induced coma for a 
considerable period. The reaction of the militancy and officials of the party to Bossi’s 
absence represents one more testimony of Bossi’s absolute centrality for the community 
of men and women that he has led for the last two decades. The Group Catholics of 
Padania organized a prayer session in the abbey of Pontida where the militants prayed for 
the recovery of the “Capo.”704
All of the officials of the party professed their allegiance to the absent leader. 
Giampaolo Gobbo, a Northern League member of the European parliament declared at a 
rally that Bossi was an all-but-impossible leader to follow, saying, “we must only follow 
his teaching. There are no triumvirates or quadriumvirates, after Bossi there is only
703 “Malore per Umberto Bossi, Trasportato in ospedale,” in La Repubblica, March 11,2004.
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Bossi.”705 In an open letter to La Padania wrote that “Significantly, Bossi’s health 
problems were interpreted as the direct consequence of his total and unconditional 
commitment to the Northern League. As written by Gigi Moncalvo Bossi uses “his own 
energy and power not for himself but for the idealistic battle in which he believes” 
because “he only looks at the good of the League never his own good, even putting at risk 
his own health as recent events showed.”706 In an open letter to Bossi, Stefano Stefani, 
long time Northern League official Stefano Stefani said,
Not even the strongest of men is able to make tenth of rallies in a month, which last hour after 
hour, and which only end after you spend even more hours in the middle o f the militants until late 
night. You put up with kilometers after kilometers crossing Italy in order to be always in contact 
with the people, with your people ... I’ll tell you another thing, one more time: you cannot, after 
tiring hours o f work in the parliament, stay up at night working and writing ... even the strongest 
of men is not, unfortunately, indestructible. Come back soon to us because, as everybody knows, 
you are the League.”707
The reaction of the rank-and-file to the problems of the leader offers a powerful example 
of the emotional attachment to the leader. Here are a few examples taken from the party 
daily.
Good Easter condottiere, who lays in the bed of an hospital, there is no one like you in the 
confines o f Italy, like Christ who resuscitated from the sepulcher, you, reinvigorated, will guide 
us in the fight against all the troubles spread among us by Islam; You will manage to win this 
tough battle and you will come back stronger to guide us towards the Freedom of Yours [sic] and 
Ours [sic] Padania; Get well soon our great condottiere to guide us towards Padania, free at 
last.708
One of the readers of La Padania compared Bossi to “Gandhi who for years has 
enlightened our common path.”709 “At the same time, and as a strong indication of the 
authority of the Messianic figure of Bossi, the Northern League officials promised to 
follow scrupulously the guidelines of the movement that Bossi traced before he fell ill. 
Roberto Castelli, Northern League Minister of Justice, observed that Bossi “as usual, had
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established the course for the movement among very precise coordinates [and that] all we 
have to do is to follow coherently those coordinates in the expectation of his return.”710 
Senator Calderoli even noted that Bossi would be proud of the performance of the 
officials in his absence: “[Bossi] has always warned us about some of the surprises and 
traps that might come from some allies, he has prepared us... he has delineated different 
scenarios. I have to say that when he returns he will be satisfied with the degree of 
maturity of the executive class of the League.”711 Although doubts about his full recovery 
remain, Bossi was placed at the top of the Northern League slate for the European 
Parliamentary elections of June 2004.712 After these elections, due to his ailing condition, 
Bossi resigned as minister of reforms and assumed the seat he won in the European 
Parliament; he was replaced by another League official, Roberto Calderoli. It is 
noteworthy that during his health-related absence, Bossi maintained contacts with his 
followers: Although physically impaired, he has addressed meetings of leghisti through
71phone calls which have invariably met an emotional response from the audience; at the 
same time, the party gave the followers the leader’s address in order to promote an 
epistolary relationship between Bossi and his militants. 714
Giancarlo Giorgetti declared that the Northern League could survive without Bossi’s 
leadership but “it would lose its current importance in the political arena. There is no 
leader charismatic enough who could substitute Bossi in the party.”715 This episode 
serves to show yet again how strong the dependence of the movement is upon the 
charismatic leadership of Umberto Bossi. His succession and its consequences remain an 
open question for the future of the Northern League.
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4. The Missionary Model -  Politics as Salvation
In his political life Umberto Bossi has emphasized his rejection of generalized or state- 
sponsored Salvationist projects for humankind. He has always referred to them as Jacobin 
utopias. At their basis is what he sees as immoderate optimism. “It is rooted in 
ideological or religious utopias,” he observed. “The Marxists saw in communism a lay 
miracle, the creation of a new man. An obvious excess of optimism as history as 
demonstrated ... [The project of] Federalism does not believe in the new man, utopian 
idea that often assigns the State the task of imposing a new morality with Stalinist
71 ( \methods.” For him, those who push globalization suffer from the same utopian 
“symptom,” the imposition of an artificial project that seeks to redefine man’s behavior 
and the structure of societies. Globalists are many times derided as children of the 
Enlightenment.
However, the fact of the matter is that in the discourse of the Northern League, 
both verbal and symbolic, politics plays a Salvationist role. A large conception of politics 
has fuelled the action and behavior of the vanguard led by Bossi from the beginning. 
Politics is the sacred tool through which a new era will be opened in History. As Bossi 
said at a rally in Pontida, “After having creating the Northern League, a political 
movement that merges in itself the autonomous will of the peoples of the North, the 
epoch of great politics can now be initiated, the epoch in which our federalist ideal can 
spread its wings and project itself from our consciences to those of the citizens.”717 This 
redemptive function of politics is present throughout the discourse of Bossi. “The League 
has the honesty and the courage,” wrote Bossi in a letter to his militants, “to transform the 
ideas of the people in projects, through the League politics is indeed the only tool that 
people have in order to make themselves matter.”718
The vanguard is fuelled by a visionary project of transforming society. As stated 
by Bossi, “the decisive element of the revolution is not violence but it is the project. That
716 Bossi, Umberto, La Rivoluzione, op.cit, pp.162,163.
717 “Discorso di Pontida,” Lombardia Autonomista, June 1991.
718 “Lega, il motore del cambiamento,” in La Padania, May 5,2002.
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is, the vision of a new order that substitutes the previous one. This distinguishes the 
revolution from revolt, which lacks any objective.”719 Through its radical politics the 
League will inaugurate a new chapter in History. As stressed by Bossi in his book La 
Rivoluzione (The Revolution),
It is a great revolutionary design that is proposed by the League... It is only necessary to make an 
inventory o f the revolutions in the last three centuries to understand that the federalist revolution 
it is part o f it. Rather, in the history o f unified Italy it is perhaps the most radical and decisive, 
because it deals with all aspects of the social, cultural and economic life. It is not a jest.720
Bossi has repeatedly emphasized the life-changing nature of the political project of the 
Northern League. For him,
It must be clear to everyone that the League is not a product o f power or, even worse, of low 
politics. The League, on the contrary, is not only a formidable phenomenon o f historical nature 
but is above all a catalyst that has demonstrated itself able to accelerate time. The League can be 
defined, without emphasis or arrogance as a force o f nature. And it has confirmed this, first by 
disrupting the basis o f partitocracy, but also by opening a new chapter in history. And this chapter 
has one name only, the name of the greatest democratic revolution: Its name is federalism.721
Ultimately, the model of society for which the Northern League fights for extends beyond 
the borders of Padania and even Italy. It has a universalistic dimension. As declared by 
Bossi in a speech in Pontida,
We know that the federalist battle is not a battle for the bell tower, is not a battle for the 
Lombardy, is not even a battle for the north, which has to do only with the north, is not even a 
battle solely for our country, it is a bigger battle ... Federalism is the road, the fundamental 
choice, the prioritary [road] so that the world have a future. The one who fights for freedom and 
justice fights not for a certain type of man but for all men. Pontida represents the fight o f all men 
for freedom and justice in the world.722
At the very basis of this conception of politics as a redemptive instrument is a 
voluntaristic vision of History. The power of Bossi’s vision and the efforts of the loyal 
vanguard can reverse trends and introduce change. Reflecting on the trend towards 
multiracial societies in the West, Bossi said, “I’m not convinced that this is inevitable ...
719 Bossi, Umberto, La Rivoluzione, op.cit, p.12,13.
120 Ibid, p.ll.
721 “Intervento del Segretario Federale,” Venice September 15,2002.
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I think we should rebel against this ‘ineluctability’.”723 As he declared at a rally in 
Venice,
Some say that it is too late to save our home: Individualism, profitability, the failure of 
Risorgimento have put to death our Padania. Someone told me a few months ago at a rally “you 
are right. Unfortunately today we can only lower our hats in front o f the death o f our land.” I told 
him that we should not resign ourselves, that he had uttered the same sentence with which Nelson 
Mandela had pushed and lifted South Africa to the conquest o f its own dignity and freedom ... 
after death, life. This is my interpretation.724
Bossi has put forward a framework in which his vanguard is on a path toward 
salvation. He repeatedly defines the political activity of his movement as a “long 
march.”725 In the literature of the Northern League, the various interventions of Bossi 
over the years in Pontida, the sanctuary of the movement, are described as gradual levels 
on the long journey towards the “freedom of Padania.” In this march, routine political 
fights are viewed as if they were Armageddon. The community is involved in a never- 
ending twilight battle with powerful enemies, hell-bent in their destruction, be they the 
corrupt centralist forces of Rome, the tyrannical European Union or the materialistic 
forces of globalization. In the narrative of Bossi this apocalyptical battle is viewed 
through a good-evil spectrum. The moral goodness of his community is repeatedly 
emphasized. The vanguard is good, just, and moral. They have taken upon their shoulders 
a collective mission of salvation. They are the natural defenders of the roots, history and 
tradition of the north of Italy and, in principle, of the future of humanity. In the 
description of their enemies, images of corruption, perversion, obscurity and subversion 
of what is natural are common.
In Bossi’s discourse this confrontation leads inevitably to an either-or final 
scenario. This has been a recurrent image in Bossi’s discourse over the years: “If the 
League is defeated in Italy, it is the end of its European culture and the victory of the 
culture of mafia. Federalism is the last stand”727; “The League recovers the roots [of the
722 “Discorso di Umberto Bossi a Pontida,” Lombardia Autonomista, June 1993,
723 Bossi, Umberto with Daniele Vimercati, Vento dalNord, op.cit, p.148.
724 “Intervento del Segretario Federale,” Venice, September 21,2003.
725 See, for example, “Discorso di Bossi a Pontida, 1991,” op.cit.
726 See, for example, the issue of La Padania, April 30,2003.
727 Bossi, Umberto with Daniele Vimercati, La Rivoluzione, op.cit, p.216.
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north of Italy] and is committed to the final battle at the end of which there will be no 
prisoners: the Padania or the Roman State, one of the two will succumb.” “We know 
that either we succeed and win our grandiose battle, or the lights of federalism will be 
spent for a long time.”729 Therefore, the political fight is incessantly framed in terms of 
absolutes. The battle of the Northern League against the forces of globalization is 
described in the same absolute way. For Bossi,
The Northern League is the sun of the peoples who do not accept to endure the criminal design of 
the occult powers, those few ‘illuminati’ who want to impose one state, one race, one 
government, through aberrant tools such as cloning, the rights o f adoption to homosexual couples, 
the destruction of the natural family and the invasion of immigrants. We stand for what is natural. 
The Left, the caretakers o f the occult powers and of the great international economy, is sided with 
the artificial.730
As I have tried to demonstrate, along this path towards salvation Bossi plays the 
role of the missionary leader of a monolithic community united around their leader. No 
matter what the instructions of the leader are, no matter what sacrifices he demands for 
the concretization of the collective mission, the vanguard follows him because they 
recognize in him the missionary charismatic leader with the necessary qualities to save 
the community.
728 Bossi, Umberto, llM io Progetto, op.cit, p. 125.
729 “Intervento del Segretario Federale,Venice,” September 15,2002, op.cit.




A Framework of Analysis
So far I have tried to show the multiple factors that are at work in the internal dynamics 
of the missionizing politics of my case studies. In this chapter, drawing on my empirical 
research and findings of these movements, I establish a comparison between the two and 
identify the most salient aspects of their missionary politics. I will integrate my findings 
in order to construct a theory, and develop an ideal type of missionary politics in 
contemporary times.
Therefore, in this chapter, I want to show the persistence of political religions in 
contemporary European democracies and demonstrate that Le Pen’s and Bossi’s 
movements are a newer manifestation of sacralized politics. I identify the different 
elements of sacredness in both Le Pen and Bossi’s movements, and reveal how this 
sacralization of politics provides a transcendent framework of meaning for individuals 
within the movements. This sacred framework, based on a narrative of salvation, myths, 
and rites, generates and galvanizes group solidarity and institutes a moral community in 
the Durkheimian sense. These cultural frames structure the group and sustain the 
charismatic relationship between the leader and the followers. I will conclude with a 
discussion of the implications of current global and societal trends to the future of the 
Missionary route in Western European politics and with an overview of my thesis.
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Elements of Sacredness
In this section I will show how the two movements in question manifest a religious 
character by breaking down my case material into categories and establishing 
comparisons.
1. A Sacred Nation
A force propelling the respective political religions of the National Front and the 
Northern League is the deeply felt premise of the sacrality of the “nation.”
Very little of the literature on nationalism focuses specifically on political religion. 
Among the first historians who have analyzed nationalism’s sacred dimension, Carlton J. 
Hayes described nationalism in 1926 as “essentially a religion of modem secularism” that 
appealed to man’s “religious sense” and offered a “substitute for, or supplement to, 
historic supernatural religion.”731 Since its advent in Western Europe, nationalism has 
had the nature of a cult with a dimension of worship including rites processions, 
pilgrimages, temples and a mythology of sacrifice “performed in the name and for the 
salvation of a whole community,”732 According to Hayes,
Human beings do not normally and willingly give their lives for economic gain. The supreme 
sacrifice is ofitenest paid for an ideal and in response to a religious sense; and the best and final 
proof o f the religious character o f modern nationalism is the unquestioning willingness with 
which all manner o f its devotees have laid down their lives on the battlefields o f the last hundred 
and seventy years ... Modem nationalism has indeed been a peculiarly bloody religion.733
Historian George L. Mosse further developed these sacred foundations of 
nationalism identified by Hayes, and integrated them into his study of the “new
731 “Reflections on the Religion of Nationalism,” in Hayes, Carlton J. H., Nationalism: A Religion, New 
York, The Macmillan Company, 1960, p. 176 (Taken from Essays on Nationalism, first published in 1926).
732 Ibid, p.165.
733 Ibid, p. 171.
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politics”734 that emerged after the French revolution. At the very basis of it was the 
concept of popular sovereignty that evolved into a true secular religion in which “the 
people worshiped] themselves.” Mosse noted that earlier studies had neglected 
nationalism’s mythic and cultic character: The masses were primarily attached to the 
nation not as simple rational and disembodied actors but as members of a secular 
religion. In an important passage of his The Nationalization o f the Masses (1975) Mosse 
wrote,
The unity o f the people was not merely cemented by the idea o f common citizenship; rather, a 
newly awakened national consciousness performed this function ... The nation in the eighteenth 
century was now said to be based upon the people themselves, on their general will, and was no 
longer symbolized solely by allegiance to established royal dynasties. The worship o f the people 
thus became the worship of the nation, and the new politics sought to express this unity through 
the creation of a political style which became, in reality, a secularized religion.735
Mosse explored such crucial features of this secularized religion as the use of national 
myths and symbols, and the “development of a liturgy which would enable the people 
themselves to participate in such worship.” Rites, festivals, myths and symbols 
objectified the general will and, therefore, cemented the identity of the national 
community.
In a more recent study that follows Mosse’s work, Anthony D. Smith, finds in the 
“sacred foundations” of the nation both the primary sources of national attachments and a 
crucial reason for the durability and strength of national identities. Nationalism is “a form 
of culture and a type of belief-system whose object is the nation conceived as a sacred 
communion.”737 This sacred communion is “devoted to the cult of authenticity and the 
ideals of national autonomy, unity, and identity in a historic homeland.”738 To Smith the 
belief-system of nationalisms have drawn on earlier religious belief systems, from four 
particular kinds of cultural resource: “A myth of ethnic election; a long-standing 
attachment to terrains regarded as sacred; a yearning to recover and realize the spirit of
734 Mosse, George L., The Nationalization of the Masses: Political Symbolism and Mass Movements in 
Germany from the Napoleonic Wars Through the Third Reich, Howard Fertig, New York, 1975, p.l
735 Ibid. p.2
736 Ibid.
737 Smith, Anthony D., Chosen Peoples, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003, p. 18.
738 Ibid, p.254.
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one or more golden ages; a belief in the regenerative power of mass and individual 
sacrifice to ensure a glorious destiny, and the importance of commemorating and 
celebrating the community and its heroes.”739 These sacred sources are at the very basis 
of the devotion and loyalties evoked by the nation:
Where a given community manifests a clear sense o f itself as “chosen” for a task or covenant, 
where its members are firmly attached to homeland and soil, where they seek to emulate the 
virtues of past golden ages, and where their members are prepared to make personal sacrifices, if 
not life, then o f time and effort for the future o f community and the yet unborn, there we may 
expect to find a lively sense o f national identity, one able to withstand the dangers and 
temptations o f rapid change in a more interdependent world.740
Both the National Front and the Northern League foster a deep attachment to a 
holy nation that is perceived as an original and authentic entity, with peculiar and unique 
characteristics and features. The nation is not only conceived as an abstract or imagined 
community but it is worshiped as the objectification and concrete realization of the 
collective will of the people. There is a dimension of “feeling” in this attachment to the 
nation that should not be overlooked: In the dynamic of these movements, the nation is 
elevated as the authentic repository of the common destiny, territory and unique virtues 
of the people, and venerated as sacred. It is this dimension of the “true nature” of the 
nation -  forged during the centuries in a specific territory -  that expresses the collective 
will and sets it apart from all other nations. The centrality of the concept of national 
“authenticity” -  and the collective emotional force and devotion it spawns - for these 
movements cannot be stressed enough. From this core concept follows the investment of 
sacredness to the people -  also comprising the dead and the yet unborn - to national 
heroes, objects, emblems, rites and places. One should not be surprised at the emotional 
dimension pervading these movements. At the very heart of the attachment that the 
sacred communities of France and Padania demand from their respective inhabitants both 
Le Pen and Bossi put forth the idea of filiation, of a personal relationship grounded in and 





For Le Pen and the National Front the French people - defined as “an 
incomparable alchemy of Celts, Germans and Latins”741 - is invested with original 
features, from a deep-rooted sense of the sacred to a spiritual and personal attachment to 
the land. Bossi and his movement early on emphasized the Celtic roots of the Padani and 
described the typical Padano as fiercely independent with such autochthonous 
enterprising virtues as vigor, drive and competition. Both peoples are therefore rooted 
and original islands of authenticity amidst a sea of diversity.
Thus each movement formulate a geography of the sacred, that is, lands and 
places that objectify the collective Memory and testify to the authenticity and holiness of 
the nations. Le Pen, as we have seen, refers to the city of Reims, the coronation place of 
later French Kings, as the “sacred altar of the homeland.” The same sacredness is 
invested in the statue of Joan of Arc in Paris and the burial places of the saints and 
martyrs of the nation — including the war dead — the fallen-patriots to which the 
“community of the true patriots” pays regular homage. These sacred sites invoke the 
memory of its self-sacrificial sons and daughters, and serve as testaments to the true 
nature of France as a Western and Christian nation.
The sacred geography of the Northern League emphasizes what it sees as sites 
that demonstrate the holiness of the nation. Less dependent on Christian imagery than the 
National Front, it sanctifies the place of Pontida as the place where the autonomy and 
independence of the Padani is proclaimed for the ages; the city of Legnano and the statue 
of the warrior Alberto da Giussano, where the autonomist troops defeated imperialism; 
and the Po River as the sacred geographical delimitation of the homeland. These are the 
sacred foundations of the homeland, testaments to the common destiny of independence 
and freedom of the Padania nation.
I will now look at the mythification of history and the self-portrayal of both 
communities as chosen peoples.
741 Militer au Front, Editions Nationales, op.cit, p.21.
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2. A Sacred History
My data has shown that in the narrative of both National Front and Northern League the 
past is elevated to a condition of myth, and historical figures to the status of legends. This 
call to a mythical history to legitimate the identity of both groups is present throughout 
the narratives put forward by their leaders. The pre-modem roots of the “History of 
France” have a prominent place in the mythology of the National Front. The Gallic roots 
of France together with the fight of the Gallic leader Vercingetorix against the troops of 
the Roman Empire are an important reference for the myth of the origins of the French 
nation. But the main reference in the construction of this myth of origins is the historical 
figure of Clovis, king of Franks who in the sixth century converted to Christianity. This 
moment is heralded as marking the birth of the French people and its Christian roots. In 
fact, the city of Reims, where the baptism of Clovis occurred is a sacred place in the 
imagination of the National Front. As mentioned in a previous chapter, standing before 
the cathedral of Reims, Le Pen gave his “sermon” indicting the treaty of Maastricht of 
threatening the survival of France. The life of French martyr Joan of Arc lent itself to a 
process of mythification by the National Front. The narrative of the National Front 
permanently shifts the life of Joan of Arc from the level of history onto that of myth. She 
is above all a symbol of the independence and sovereignty of France. By serving as 
sacred reference points of the glorious Christian and independent nature of the French 
nation, both Clovis and Joan of Arc together serve as a visible image of holiness: They 
are above questioning and, hence, serve as objectifications of established truths. They are 
not mere images, they are France. And they are identified in party literature with the 
National Front, which therefore is identified with the mythical narrative of France.
A similar process of mythification of history can be seen in the narrative put 
forward by the Northern League. As in the case of the National Front, the League places 
emphasis on the pre-modem roots of the collective. The Padania’s Celtic origins are 
emphasized in order to distinguish the nature and character of the northern populations 
from the rest of Italy. This Celtic heritage of the Padani becomes a resource of symbols 
for the Northern League. The emphasis on the color green by the movement together with
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its adoption of the “Sun of the Alps” a green, six-rayed Celtic symbol as the logo of the 
party are part of this process of mythification of the past in order to legitimize the' 
present. At the same time the example and achievements of the original Lega Lombarda 
constitute a powerful myth of origins for the contemporary Northern League led by 
Umberto Bossi. Alberto da Giussano, the leader of the communes of the Northern League 
who defeated the invading troops of the emperor Barbarossa has a central place in the 
mythology of the group. The image of a sword-wielding Giussano became a prominent 
symbol of the Northern League. Further, Pontida, the place where the communes swore 
resistance to the invaders became a sacred place for the Northern League. This is the 
place where the group gathers periodically in order to emphasize the historical continuity 
between them and their ancestors of the twelfth century. Pontida is also the place where 
the leader gives the most prominent examples of missionizing rhetoric. The Northern 
League has been particularly prolific in cementing the mythology of the group through 
the incessant production of new symbols of identity such as the Po River, where since 
1996 the Padania nation has gathered in celebration.
Both groups have, therefore, holy historical/national figures with which they 
associate ideas of freedom, independence, and continuity. They embody in themselves 
the virtue of total and unconditional commitment to the nation. In the words of Smith,
The key to that inspiration [for the people] has been the readiness o f heroes and prophets 
alike to sacrifice themselves for the community -  not in a spirit o f disinterested love, but with a 
passionate and all-embracing commitment. Theirs is not an act o f noble renunciation; it is, on the 
contrary, a fervent affirmation o f life and love for the community to which they belong and 
cherish. This is what gives their actions, and especially their self sacrifice, such profound 
meaning and consequence for the surviving members and their children.742
As we have seen, they also have sacred places where they can demonstrate and 
experience their attachment both to these symbols and to the ideas associated with them. 
In order to emphasize the sacredness of this attachment, both groups have created 
ceremonies where its members solemnly swore loyalty to the identity of the France and- 
Padania nation. Le Pen and his followers have made such an oath in the sacred place of 
Reims. Bossi and his followers have periodically repeated an oath of loyalty to the group
742 Smith, Anthony D., op.cit, pp.42-43.
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and to Padania in the sacred place of Pontida. Through these ceremonies ideas become 
sacred, which adds to their power of persuasion. These ceremonies legitimate the passage 
of ideas from the condition of arguments to the condition of established and sacred truths. 
It is an important distinction.
Finally, both groups promote a rival sacralized and polarized interpretation of the 
history of the nation to the dominant mainstream interpretation. This rejection of the 
hegemonic and secular historical paradigm serves to de-legitimize the order that emerged 
from it. There are a consistent reinterpretation of historical events and a rehabilitation of 
historical figures to legitimize the alternative paradigm of history of both groups. From 
the perspective of the National Front and the Northern League, there is a negative 
historical tradition against which the identity of each group is defined.
This negative history has also, in both cases, a myth of origins. In the case of the 
National Front, all the evils that currently afflict France hark back to the Enlightenment. 
According to their version of history it marked the beginning of the erosion of the 
“natural” order of France and the onslaught of the “artificial” and the “abstract.” It is the 
beginning of la decadence: the uprooting of the “millenarian” roots of France and the 
French people. In the imagination of the National Front the Enlightenment constitutes the 
“original sin” from which all problems and dangers to France, in one way or another, 
originate. The tradition of French Republicanism is anchored in the historical paradigm 
that came out of the Enlightenment and therefore, in the eyes of Le Pen, is artificial and 
separated from the true roots, desires, and needs of the French people. The National Front 
proposes to bridge the gap and return France to its primal source.
For the Northern League the evils suffered by the group have its origins, 
ironically, because they are its heirs, in the nineteenth century ideology of nationalism 
that created “artificial” Nation-States and transformed different ethnic, cultural and 
economic regions into colonies within a centralized and oppressive entity. The micro­
nationalist imagination of the Northern League favors an interpretation of history that 
stresses the tradition of autonomy of the peoples of the north, from the fight of the 
communes to invaders to the federalist movement of the nineteenth century.
The negative history against which the Northern League defines itself is 
symbolized by the idea of “Rome” which became a symbol of evil, that is, of the
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“oppression” suffered by the peoples of the north. It is important to stress that for both 
movements the dominant historical paradigm became a negative symbolism in itself and 
furthers the self-image of the group as a deviant, revolutionary, and morally righteous 
force separated from the mainstream that has been corrupted. By setting itself apart, 
bounded by a “forbidden” belief system, the outsider status of the group acquires a sacred 
nature in itself. The group becomes a symbol and carrier of the “sacred history” it swore 
to represent and defend. This outsider dynamic is of a crucial importance. We’ll come 
back to this point later in this chapter.
3. The Chosen Peoples
Intimately linked with the concept of alternative history is the concept of the chosen 
people. The members of both the National Front and the Northern League are identified 
as the heirs to the historical continuity that harkens back to the beginning of France and 
the Padania. They portray themselves as the true representatives of the good and natural 
roots and traditions of their nations. They are not tainted by the artificial, hegemonic 
historical paradigm. In the case of the National Front they are portrayed as a “community 
of the elect”, they constitute the remnant few, the last of the patriots. Le Pen repeatedly 
calls them the most “courageous and lucid” of the French people. The mission of saving 
France has been thrust upon them. Le Pen uses an active-passive dialectic to distinguish 
his “community of the elect” from the rest of the French population. What distinguishes 
the “active France” is its awareness of the roots and traditions of France and, because the 
active French are aware of their heritage, they are conscious that France is in danger and 
surrounded by evil forces bent on its destruction. The “passive France” on the contrary is 
unaware of or indifferent to the heritage of France because their identities as patriots have 
been weakened by the evil work of the hegemonic historical paradigm. Unlike the 
“remnant few” of the National Front these passive French have lost their sense of 
authentic being, they have been brainwashed. They are like directionless zombies who 
wander in a world without meaning. In this context, it is up to the “community of the
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elect” to carry out the mission of national recovery and rescuing France from its 
decadence.
In the imagination of the Northern League its members constitute a “true 
vanguard” of men and women who are aware of their roots and character as an 
autonomous people. In explaining the distinctiveness of its group Bossi employs a 
consciousness-unconsciousness metaphor. The vanguard is self-conscious of its history 
and ethnic traditions and, because of this, is immune to brainwashing by outside forces. 
Those who have not joined the Northern League are usually described as passive, 
alienated, immature, and lacking the self-consciousness to understand fully that the 
Northern League is the only force that stands for truth and goodness. In this context it is 
up to the vanguard to burden themselves with the mission of reminding their compatriots 
of their roots, to increase their self-consciousness, to achieve a freer future for the 
Padania nation.
In this way, both the members of the National Front and the Northern League 
have invested themselves with a messianic function of guiding their respective peoples 
into a better future. This is their sacred mission. They are committed to something bigger 
than the sum of the individuals who constitute these groups: a collective and transcendent 
mission giving meaning to their political commitment and reinforcing group solidarity, as 
well as enjoining self-sacrifice for the sake of the ultimate goal. This concept of the 
“chosen people” exerts a powerful dynamic in these groups. By raising the bars of what is 
at stake -  the recovery and redemption of the community -  the mission increases the 
focus and sense of potency of their members making them much more effective than the 
members of any other mainstream group. This sacredness of the mission of the “chosen 
people” maximizes their effectiveness. I will look now at the development of a narrative 
of salvation in both the National Front and the Northern League.
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4. Apocalypticism and the Dynamics of Salvation
From my empirical research I draw the conclusion that the discourse of both the National 
Front and the Northern League is anchored in an epistemological framework of salvation 
and redemption. In order to emphasize the need for salvation each movement, albeit in 
different forms, advocates an apocalyptic vision of the present. I will start by analyzing 
the motion of apocalypticism inherent to these movements and then move to an analysis 
of its millenarian consequences.
• Apocalypticism
It is worth pointing out that these movements are characterized by secularized 
expressions of apocalypticism, although in the case of the National Front and Le Pen the 
boundaries between the religious and the secular are blurred. In the discourse of both 
movements four logical strands intertwine and fuel apocalyptic expectations.
The first one is a logic o f conspiracy. Several studies of social psychology have 
emphasized the “uncertainty reduction” mechanism of conspiracy for maintaining group 
psychology.743 In fact, social psychologists have particularly focused on a widespread 
deep-rooted sense of anxiety as the driving force of conspiracy theories. For Franz 
Neumann in the same way that crises pave the way for the identification between the 
masses and a savior they create the conditions for conspiracy theories. “Just as the masses 
hope for their deliverance from distress through absolute oneness with a person,” he 
wrote, “so they ascribe their distress to certain persons, who have brought this distress 
into the world through a conspiracy.” He added, “Nothing would be more incorrect than
743 See, for example, Hogg, Michael A. and Barbara -A. Mullin, “Joining Groups to reduce uncertainty: 
Subjective uncertainty reduction and group identification,” in Abrams and Hogg (eds), Social Identity and 
social cognition, Malden, Ma, Blackwell, 1999, pp 266-7.
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to characterize the enemies as scapegoats (as often happens in the literature) for they 
appear as genuine enemies whom one must extirpate.”744
Carl F. Graumann shares a similar perspective when he notes that “a state of 
anxiety is more easily coped with if anxiety becomes fear, that is fear o f someone whom 
we can hold responsible for the bad shape in which we are finding ourselves.”745
Perhaps a deeper current that can be found in the development of conspiracy 
theories is a need for what Mosse called “permanent and timeless longings,” namely the 
desire for “permanence and fixed reference points” in a changing world.746 The
fear of atomization and fragmentation felt by the individual, a general sense of loss of 
relationship with an organic whole, with a totality, being the community or the nation, 
spawn theories of subversive and disruptive conspiracies. Historian Raoul Girardet, in his 
study of political mythologies has alluded to this longing for community at the center of 
the myth of Conspiracy. According to him,
[Developed from] and obscure sentiment o f threat, testimony o f incertitude or panic, the 
mythology of conspiracy appears at the same time as the negative projection of tacit aspirations, 
[as the] inverted expression of wishes, more or less conscious but always insatiable. The order 
that the “Other” is accused of wanting to establish maybe can be seen as the antithetical 
equivalent o f what we ourselves want to put in place? ... That organic unity ... that supreme will 
where all the particularistic wills lose themselves, that absolute authority, provident, protective ... 
aren’t they the answer to a certain type o f communitarian ideal tenaciously kept alive in the 
deepest spot of our consciences?747
To these psychological and communitarian approaches that attempt to explain the 
formation and development of conspiracy theories another one should be added, namely, 
a teleological approach. I see this approach particularly relevant to the development of 
Salvationist dynamics in both the National Front and the Northern League. I focus here 
on conspiracy as a powerful unifying mechanism that exacerbates the dramatic moral 
contest between the forces of good and evil. Because both the National Front and the 
Northern League envision themselves as the “last guardians” of their respective nations 
they believe that they face a powerful and demonic alliance of enemies who work and
744 Neumann, Franz. The Democratic and The Authoritarian State: Essays in Political and Legal Theory,
The Free Press of Glencoe, New York, p.279 (First paperback edition 1964).
745 Graumann, Carl F. “Conspiracy: History and Social Psychology -  A Synopsis,” in Carl. F. Graumann 
and Moscovici (Eds), Changing Conceptions of Conspiracy, New York, Springer-Verlag, p.248, 1987.
746 Mosse, George L. op.cit, pp.211,212
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conspire together in order to put an end to the community. There is a natural link between 
the discourses of conspiracy and apocalypse.
In the words of Stephen O’Leary,
They are linked by a common function: each develops symbolic resources that enable societies to 
define and address the problem o f evil: While conspiracy strives to provide a spatial self­
definition o f the true community as set apart from the evils that surround us, apocalypse locates 
the problem o f evil in time and looks forward to its imminent resolution ... The story o f the 
apocalyptic tradition is one o f community building, in which human individuals and collectivities 
constitute their identities through shared mythic narratives that confront the problem of evil in 
time and history.748
The logic of conspiracy gives the group a key to understand the world and every 
evil that afflicts the community. It gives them a model of coherence and clarity. Events 
are neither random nor arbitrary but are like the pieces of a giant puzzle decipherable by 
those who know the “hidden truth.” According to Graumann, “Only those who ‘know’, 
namely the experts, are able to unmask, to disclose, that is, to ‘see’ the conspiracy and to 
identify the conspirator(s).” He adds, “he who ‘knows’ has the burden of fighting the 
invisible enemy, and he has a mission, namely to convince or persuade the majority that 
they all must learn to recognize and fight the enemy in all his or her disguises.”749
The “true communities” are beset by forces typically described as demonic. Many 
times diabolical vocabulary is reserved for these “forces of darkness,” contrasting them 
with the essentially goodness of the community. These forces can be reduced to two main 
groups. In one group are the enemies within the nation. They can be either an alliance of 
the mainstream political parties, the media, and powerful civic society groups and secret 
societies, or they can be the “enemy within,” those who have infiltrated the community to 
destroy its solidarity. It should be noted that there is an element of anti-Judaic rhetoric in 
Le Pen, mostly in the form of innuendo about the subversive activities of Jewish groups, 
that is non-existent in the rhetoric of Bossi. At the same time Bossi has many times 
demonized the institutional Church, as a force that is part of the conspiracy against the 
community. This anti-Church rhetoric is flimsy-to-non-existent in the case of Le Pen. Le
747 Girardet, Raoul, Mythes et Mythologies Politiques, Editions du Seuil, Paris, 1986, pp. 61-2.
748 O’Leary, Stephen, D., Arguing the Apocalypse: A theory of Millenial Rhetoric, New York and Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 1994, p.6.
749 Graumann, Carl, F. op.cit, p.248.
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Pen can eventually criticize what he sees as the hostility of some Bishops toward the 
National Front but he has always refrained from attaching the Church as a whole or the 
Vatican.
In the second group are the enemies outside the nation. These are hell-bent on 
pushing for a tyrannical New World Order. Because rooted ethnicities and nationalisms 
stand on the way of this “monstrous and gargantuan” project, they are being destroyed by 
policies of de-population and massive immigration. Globalization obeys a script written 
by powerful and rootless cosmopolitan elites and groups, and has as its function to create 
a fluid worldwide market, driven by America, with no distinctions between peoples, 
cultures or ethnicities. Those like the National Front and the Northern League who dare 
to challenge this project are marked for destruction. These external enemies are therefore 
allied with the internal enemies of these groups, many times described as nothing more 
than “sycophants” of this World Wide Conspiracy against the “true community.”
The development of New World Order conspiracy theories -  increased with the 
deepening of globalization -  elevates the struggle of these groups to a cosmic level. It 
gives them the perception of an apocalyptic, ongoing cosmic drama between the forces of 
evil and good, the forces of light and darkness. Therefore, the greater the scope of the 
conspiracy and evil, the greater will be apocalyptic expectations.
In order to further the perception of “apocalyptic times,” the logic o f catastrophe 
is dominant in the narrative of both the National Front and the Northern League. In his 
taxonomy of apocalyptic beliefs, Medieval historian Richard Landes distinguishes 
between cataclysmic and transformational apocalyptic scenarios. Cataclysmic scenarios 
are characterized by rapid and vast devastation that precedes the advent of a new reality.' 
Transformational Scenarios are equally vast but generally slower. Adapting this 
classification to the world of contemporary politics, we can see an “apocalyptical” 
distinction between the discourse of Le Pen and Bossi. As I have noted in the previous 
chapter, Le Pen has many times included in his discourse “signs” announcing sudden and 
devastating events for France. He has often given a timetable for the “survival” of France. 
His apocalypticism can be considered “cataclysmic.” Bossi, on the other hand, sticks with
750 Landes, Richard, “Millennialism,” in James R. Lewis (ed), The Oxford Handbook of New Religious 
Movements, Oxford University Press, 2004, p.347.
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the denunciation of the apocalyptic consequences of policies and therefore promotes an 
apocalypticism that should be termed “transformational.”
Landes also distinguishes between “active” and “passive” apocalyptic scenarios. 
In some apocalyptic scenarios, humans have a passive role: for example, they await, for 
example God’s time. Other scenarios depend on human agency. In Landes words, 
“[active apocalyptic scenarios] places the operative deeds in the hands of a redeemed 
community of faithful who, either as God’s agents or in ‘his’ absence, build the
7^  tmillennium. Secular apocalyptic movements are almost always active.” Both Le Pen’s 
and Bossi’s movements should be positioned in the active side of the apocalyptical 
spectrum: they stress both the role of agency in changing history and the power of will in 
fighting decadence. However, in the case of Le Pen there is some ambiguity between the 
role of man and the role of God. The possibility of God’s intervention is not totally 
excluded in his discourse. His positioning in the active side of the apocalyptical spectrum 
is not as solidified as Bossi’s.
The logic of catastrophe is complemented in both cases by the constant use of 
images of disaster. The consequences of immigration, of the European Union, or of 
globalization are described using verbs that convey a sense of tragedy and doom. To 
further this logic, both Le Pen and Bossi use biological imagery to describe the threats to 
their communities. Images of putrefaction, diseases and impurity abound in the discourse 
of both leaders. It helps to contrast the defiling nature of these dangers to the essential 
purity of the community. The discourse is constructed to instill fear and to shock which 
maximizes the power of the messages of doom.
The third logic that increases apocalyptical expectations is a logic o f ultimacy. 
The discourse of both parties is aimed towards ultimate ends and “final battles.” It is a 
discourse of finality. By giving issues the greatest possible size and significance an air of 
finality magnifies the solutions. Because politics is interpreted in terms of “the world to 
come,” the logic of ultimacy is intimately linked with millennial expectations. Political 
scientist Michael Barkun describes how “politics becomes ‘millennialized’” and “ceases 
to be seen as an instrument for the incremental adjustment of conflicting interests and
751 Ibid, p.348.
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becomes instead a ‘politics of ultimacy,’ where ultimate issues are at stake in a once-and- 
for-all confrontation.”752
A dynamic of polarization feeds and is fed by this logic of ultimacy. They are 
mutually enforcing. A binary rhetoric pervades the discourse of the movements. The 
political landscape is clearly divided between two conflicting and contrasting poles. The 
“true patriots,” all of those who are courageous, lucid, and incorruptible constitute the 
pole on which stands the National Front. This is the side of the France Frangaise, (The 
French France). Against them it stands the pole of the “anti-France.” This pole is 
malleable and it can include any party, group, or force that is perceived to be in 
opposition to the interests, principles, and values of the National Front.
The “Padani” are those who are self-conscious about their roots and traditions. 
They are also free of corruption and immorality. The pole of their enemies is also, 
malleable and it includes any force that is perceived to be in opposition to the group. All 
issues are interpreted and explained in this binary manner. At the same time, the constant 
use of a belligerent language adds drama to this confrontation. These movements define 
what for some are routine political fights as world historical “battles,” and military 
metaphors and warrior-like images can be found throughout. Naturally this discourse of 
finality ends many times in an all-or-nothing scenario. Either the community engaged in 
these “mortal battles” will achieve its final goal or its enemies will prevail. In the 
discourse of these movements, if not always in practice, the middle ground is neither 
viewed nor desired as an acceptable outcome. These movements, by their nature, flirt 
with perfection. O’Leary expresses a similar idea when he notes that “a world seen as 
inherently imperfect invites discourse that makes sense of imperfection by reasserting the 
principle of perfection.”753
Finally, a logic o f urgency is the natural corollary of the discourse of these 
movements. Because the community is under siege by a powerful alliance of enemies and 
represents the last stand against catastrophic events in the making, there is a pervading 
sense of urgency to act in order to stop these diabolical trends and to fight towards the
752 Barkun, Michael, “Politics and apocalypticism,” in Stephen J. Stein (ed)., The Encyclopedia of 
Apocalypticism, vol. Ill: Apocalypticism in the modern period and the contemporary age, New York, 
London, Continuum, 2000, p.458.
753 O’Leary, Stephen, op.cit, p.33.
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edification of a new reality. Intimately linked with a discourse of fear, however, is a 
discourse of hope. In these movements fear and hope are closely linked and fuel 
millennial expectations.
• Millennialism
The medieval historian Norman Cohn writes that millenarian sects or movements he has 
studied always picture salvation as,
(a) Collective, in the sense that it is to be enjoyed by the faithful as a collectivity;
(b) Terrestrial, in the sense that it is to be realized on this earth and not in some other­
worldly heaven;
(c) Imminent, in the sense that it is to come both soon and suddenly;
(d) Total, in the sense that it is utterly to transform life on earth, so that the new dispensation 
will be no mere improvement on the present but perfection itself;
(e) Miraculous, in the sense that it is to be accomplished by, or with the help of, supernatural 
agencies.
But “even within these limits,” Cohn adds, “there is of course room for infinite variety: 
There are countless possible ways of imagining the Millennium and the route to it.”754 
There has been some dispute among scholars of nationalism on whether or not nationalist 
and millennial movements share goals and composition.755 I hold the view that in the 
discourses of Le Pen and Bossi, the millennial imagination counterbalances and 
completes the apocalyptic vision. The apocalyptic dynamics of an imminent “turning 
point” in time trigger millennial dimensions that can be seen in both of these movements. 
I employ the term millennium not in the Christian sense of a Second Coming of Christ 
but in the sense of a belief in a future golden age, typically positioned as an end to the
754 Cohn, Norman The Pursuit of the Millennium: Revolutionary Millenarians and Mystical anarchists of 
the Middle Ages, Oxford University Press, New York, 1970. (Revised and expanded edition).
7550n this point see, Smith, Anthony D, Nationalism in the Twentieth Century, New York, New York 
University Press, 1979, pp. 14-42.
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existing world order, which in these cases is synonymous with the triumph of the 
movements’ nationalist agenda.
Therefore, I share Thomas Flanagan definition of political millenarianism as 
“political ideologies or movements that propose, not just to take power, but to transform 
the human condition, ushering in an era of peace, freedom, equality and abundance.”756. 
Where I part ways with Flanagan is when he states that, in today’s world, because there is 
nothing “left to rebel against” political millenarianism is essentially a dead issue. As he 
has written,
It seems that we may be at the end o f a two-century-long cycle pf rebellion against the human 
condition. As we get ready for a new century and a new millennium, it is time to return 
millenarianism to the religious realm, where it belongs. Let us admit that our society, our 
economy, our politics do and must reflect the basic facts o f human nature. Nothing is fixed; there 
is an indefinite prospect for piecemeal change.757
This sense of resignation is conspicuously absent from the movements under study: their 
dynamics and rhetoric are obviously not geared towards piecemeal change but toward 
widespread holistic transformation. For these movements there is indeed still something 
to “rebel against.” However, unlike Cohn’s Medieval cases, for these contemporary 
movements, salvation will not pictured as “miraculous” and will not be accomplished “by 
or with the help of supernatural agencies.” Nevertheless, in the case of Le Pen, as I have 
noted in a previous chapter, the absence of supernatural intervention is not a clear-cut 
case. Many times Le Pen gives the impression that his group basks in God’s favor. The 
miraculous element, even if tepid compared to Medieval religious millennial movements, 
is still present.
Landes distinguishes between restorative and progressive millennialism. While a 
vision of restorative millennialism tries to achieve a return to a golden age of original 
purity, progressive millennialism aims at constructing a new and unprecedented 
society.758 Based on this distinction I include the National Front in the category of 
restorative millennialism and the Northern League on the category of progressive
756 Flanagan, Thomas “Modernity and the Millennium: From Robespierre to Radical Feminism,” in Martha 
F. Lee (ed), Essays on Twentieth-Century Millenarianism, Praeger, Westport, 2000, p. 4.
757 Ibid, p. 14.
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millennialism. However, I should be careful to point out that this taxonomy should not be- 
seen as based on all-or-none categories but as a continuum. The Northern League, while 
aiming at something unprecedented in history -  the creation of an autonomous Padania -  
bases the “society to come” on an original purity, located in the past. At the same time 
the National Front, while aiming at the restoration of the “natural and pure” society of the 
past, has strong “modem” dynamics, in the sense of trying to adapt the modem society of 
masses to a “true form” of democracy, where the sovereign people rules. It is not a simple 
return to or knee-jerk imitation of the hierarchy of the past.
We can discern similarities in both movements’ notions of the “world to come.” 
In their millennial visions change in public policies is not a sufficient condition for 
salvation. In fact, for them, salvation is total, in a metaphysical sense. In their world evil, 
because is magnified, is everywhere, and within the realm of evil lie the root causes of 
their oppression and all the injustice that they suffer. Therefore, salvation implies the 
expunging of evil. Apocalypticism explains and locates evil. Millennialism eliminates it. 
As stated by the anthropologist Mary Douglas, “a strong millennial tendency is implicit 
in the way of thinking of any people whose metaphysics push evil out of the world of 
reality.”759 It implies therefore a work of purification and renewal. The “true 
community,” constituted by those who are good and just, will be rewarded while “the 
enemies,” those who are powerful and corrupt, will be punished. This millennial 
tendency has been left out of many studies of Le Pen and Bossi. In the discourse of Le 
Pen, we clearly see this call for spiritual renewal, for a “moral renaissance” of France to 
fight the evil of decadence and degeneration.
Similarly, Bossi indicts globalization for “de-valuating” man and denounces the 
drift towards materialism, to the point of soulnessness, of human kind. He has many 
times described globalization as the “work of Lucifer.” Members of both movements 
primarily portray themselves as the defenders of their own groups. However, because of 
the metaphysical nature of their claims, it is not surprising that they also proclaim to offer 
a model of salvation for Europe and, ultimately the entire world.
758 Landes, Richard, “Millennialism” op.cit, p.347.
759 Douglas, Mary, Purity and Danger: An analysis of concept ofpollution and taboo, Routledge Classics, 
2002, p.211. (1st edition 1966).
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Both movements, because they ultimately aim to vanquish both evil and all of the 
oppression and suffering caused by evil, demonstrate a dimension of demotic 
millennialism. In this redemptive worldview there will be no evil and despotic elites, and 
the faithful will live in an egalitarian manner within their own authentic communities, 
based on blood and belonging. This millennial vision is at the basis of the profound anti­
elitism of these two movements and motivates their calls for a direct democracy that 
bridges the gap between the “people” and power structures and institutions. A radical 
egalitarianism runs through the visions of the new millennium of the National Front and 
the Northern League. It is not surprising that the “true communities” described by Le Pen 
and Bossi are models of brotherhood and fellowship where the “faithful” are bounded by. 
love for each other, for their homeland and for their leaders. They are unified, as a 
collectivity with a common will, common values, and shared affection. They are not mere 
individuals but members of a moral community of the faithful and saved.
This vision eliminates the gap between democracy as practice and democracy as 
an ideology. This gap has been noted by prominent Political Philosophers. Giovanni 
Sartori started his study on democratic theory by stating emphatically that “the 
democratic ideal does not define the democratic reality and, vice versa, a real democracy 
is not, and cannot be, the same as an ideal one.”760 The pure ideal “Power to all the 
people” is an unachievable in practice. Sartori takes his point further:
In a system of representative government the people actually exercise power (political power) by 
being able to control and change the people in power. With all of this, it is still the case that the 
original principle is far from being fulfilled: The people still do not exercise pow er in any fu ll or 
literal sense o f  the expression [emphasis mine]. What to do next? The temptation, and indeed the 
easy path, is to repropose the principle in its purity  [emphasis mine]. If so, the intermediary 
structures (the representative state) are no longer seen as means o f implementation and 
appreciated for what they have achieved; they are perceived, rather, as obstacles and thereby 
dismissed as impediments along the path of the realization of the ideal.761
In the same vein, Norberto Bobbio has written about what he sees as the “broken 
promises” of democracy that reflect “the gap between democratic ideals and ‘actually




existing democracy.’762 For Bobbio, “the model of the democratic state, based on popular 
sovereignty, was conceived in the image of, and as analogous to, the sovereignty of the 
prince, and hence was a monist model of society.” He added, “The real society 
underlying democratic government is pluralist.” Another major broken promise was 
the unfulfilled elimination of invisible power in democratic societies. The question of 
“Who controls the controllers?” remains as pervasive as ever. For Bobbio,
If no adequate answer can be found to this question, democracy in the sense o f visible 
government is lost. In this case we are dealing not so much with a broken promise but with a 
trend which actually contradicts the basic premises of democracy, a trend not towards the greatest 
possible control o f those in power by the citizens, but towards the greatest control o f the subjects 
by those in power.764
Democratic politics works in a complex manner; it is full of intricacies and 
procedures and creates institutions that, while formed to mediate between the people and 
power, end up alienating “the people” unable to, in the words of Margaret Canovan, 
“form a picture of the location of power or to trace a clear path through the maze.”765 Le 
Pen and Bossi offer a positive vision of a “true democracy” that eliminates distant, venal 
and self-serving elites and, through the identification of the leader with the community, 
provides a clear mental picture of what democracy “really is.” By doing so these 
movements combine transparency and popular empowerment. That is why both the 
National Front and the Northern League have always defended mechanisms of direct 
democracy, such as the regular use of referendums. The National Front has defended the 
establishment of a “Republic of referendums” and the Northern League launches regular 
referendums within his own group many times in order to legitimize the direction 
announced by Bossi. The existence of a majority electoral system in both countries, 
instead of a proportional one, only adds to the perception of a “nominal” democracy and 
not a “real” one.
762 Bobbio, Norberto, The Future o f Democracy: A Defense o f the Rules of the Game, University of 
Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1987, p. 18 (First Italian Edition 1984)
763 Ibid, p.28.
764 Ibid, pp.34-5
765 Canovan, Margaret, “Taking politics to the People: Populism as the ideology of Democracy,” in Yves 
Meny and Yves Surel, Democracies and the Populist Challenge, New York, Palgrave, 2002, p.26.
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This element of demotic millennialism is a crucial component of the Salvationist 
narrative that drives both movements. We will now look at the “sacred authority” of the 
messianic leader in guiding the “chosen people” towards the millennium.
5. The Messianic Leader
My findings show that from the early beginnings of each movement there has been a 
process of mythification of their respective leaders. I have referred to this process as an 
“industry” because it develops and maintains narratives that sustain the messianic status 
of the leader and invests him with a sacred authority. The work of collaborators, the 
discourse of the leader himself and the personalization of the parties play a fundamental 
role in the construction of the image of the leader as a savior, a missionizing figure of 
historical proportions. I have detected six key images “produced” by these industries and 
I will discuss their implications.
• The Leader as the Moral Archetype
In the narrative of these movements the leader is an exemplary figure. The power of 
example emanates both from the personal qualities of the leader and from his life- 
achievements. Le Pen is regularly portrayed as a man with a number of rare qualities 
worthy of admiration. He is a natural, driven leader and a gifted, magnetic orator. His 
perseverance in the pursuit of his ideals is worthy of admiration. Above all, he is the 
quintessential Frenchman and a true patriot. His life-achievements constitute the proof of 
his rare qualities. Although he founded the party with other people, he is heralded as the 
only true founder of the party and the man who, through his commitment, self-sacrifice
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and unwavering loyalty to his ideals was able to bring the National Front to the higher 
level of the political landscape. He belongs to the category of the “great men” of History.
In the narrative of the Northern League, Umberto Bossi is a leader of unique 
courage, intuition and clairvoyance. He is also a powerful speaker with a spellbinding 
personality. His life-achievements show that, although he had to confront powerful 
forces, he was able to create a revolutionary party. Both leaders are the first militants of 
their respective parties. The story of how they created the parties from scratch and the 
activism that they have continually showed in the defense of their cause makes them the 
standard of militancy to which all the other militants must conform. Le Pen’s and Bossi’s 
lives, together with the personal qualities that they manifested throughout their lives, 
legitimate them as role models and archetypes of the entire collectivity. In his study on 
the charisma of George Washington, Seymour Martin Lipset gave a primordial 
importance to the power of example emanated by the first President of the US. 
“Washington greatest contribution was to keep it [the army] viable, to command respect, 
and to maintain morale,” wrote Lipset, “he showed no personal weakness and never gave 
his soldiers any reason to lose faith in him. He lived with his troops, drew no pay, and 
rejected opportunities to take even the briefest leave to visit Mount Vernon.”766 For 
Lipset, during his public life,
Washington knew what he was doing. He never used the phrase “charismatic legitimacy” -  a 
modem coinage -  but he understood that a stable and free polity required a set o f values, a 
national character that subsumed the rule o f law, respect for authority, and a willingness to 
subordinate private interest and factional conflict for the sake o f the larger good. His task was to 
set an example, to be a model o f ‘public virtue’, to awe the politicians and the public into doing 
right.767
In fact, for the militancy both Le Pen and Bossi epitomize virtue and, as a consequence, 
they are heroic examples to admire and emulate.
766 Lipset, Seymour Martin, “George Washington and the Foundation of Democracy,” in Journal of 
Democracy, Volume 9, No.4, October 1998, p.29.
767 Ibid, p.31.
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• The Leader as the Prophet
By the faithful, Le Pen and Bossi are thought to be men ahead of their times. They can 
read the “signs” of the present and announce events that lie in the future. These leaders 
shed light unto the group; they see what others cannot. In the story told by these 
movements, different events are relentlessly interpreted as evidence of the leader’s 
clairvoyance. In the literature of the parties and in the discourses of the leaders it is 
common to find expressions such as “Le Pen was right,” or “Bossi was right.” Le Pen is 
heralded as someone who had the ability to “see” what was “unseen” at the time: from 
the evils of communism to the emergence of a “dictatorial” European Union, from the 
disruptive consequences of unhinged immigration to the issue of the Islamization of 
Europe. The same prophetic legitimation of the leader can be seen in the way Bossi is 
praised as someone who understood the path of history before others: the crisis of nation­
states, the emergence of micro-nationalisms, the “chaotic” consequences of Third World 
immigration, the “evil” of globalization.
This prophetic dimension bestows upon both Le Pen and Bossi an aura of 
manifest destiny while simultaneously transforming their opinions into dogmas that are 
difficult for believers to question. The fact that the leader was always right in the past 
legitimates his status as a sacred truth-teller in the present. If there is recurring theme in 
the image of the leader as a prophet is the constant praise for the courage to tell the truths 
and a tireless commitment to, by the use of the “word,” to break the lies of the dominant 
official paradigm. Writing about the prophets of the Old Testament, Elie Wiesel noted 
that “the true power of the prophet derives from his moral conviction and from his 
courage and persistence in expressing it.” To Wiesel,
Anyone at any time may strike at him or humiliate him, and some have done just that. 
Nevertheless, nothing -  neither seduction nor threat -  can sway him. He never flatters, never aims 
to please; he is an enemy to all complacency: he is the bearer of truth and ethical concerns; and 
nothing and no one can make him say what he doesn’t want to say, or silence him. Should he fall 
silent, his silence itself bears witness.768
768 Wiesel, Elie, Wise Men and Their Tales: Portraits of Biblical, Talmudic, and Hasidic Masters, New 
York, Schocken Books, 2003, p.178.
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Obviously the context of Wiesel’s prophets is different from today’s context. But it does 
buttress the ethical aspect of prophecy that can also be discerned in the way militants 
perceive the leader’s resolution and steadfastness amid inhospitable conditions in the 
pursuit and exposition of the “truth.” This claim is central to the leader-follower dynamic 
of these movements.
• The Leader as the Martyr
The scripts for these movements share a dominant theme of the leader’s self-sacrifice for 
his beliefs and his cause. The respective biographies of Le Pen and Bossi constitute 
evidence of their self-sacrificing nature. They gave up their own personal interests, well­
being, and even their health for the sake of their mission. In the case of Le Pen several 
biographical episodes are brought up to the fore as evidence. The fact that Le Pen left the 
French parliament to go fight in Indochina showed how willing he was to put his life in 
danger in the defense of the nation. Both the bomb attack that destroyed Le Pen’s Paris 
house and the fact that, according to the literature of the National Front, Le Pen “lost an 
eye” fighting political enemies demonstrate how easier and tempting, in the face of such 
risks, would be for him to give up. Le Pen, however, persevered. He has many times 
mentioned the possibility of losing his life in the pursuit of his cause. Even more personal 
episodes such as Le Pen’s losing his wife for another man are interpreted through the 
prism of sacrifice. A zealot for his cause, so committed to the party, he ended up 
neglecting his wife. Coupled with personal sacrifice is the theme of public sacrifice. The 
political parties, the mainstream media, the judiciary, and other forces of civil society, 
aware that Le Pen represents their only “true” opposition, ostracize and persecute his 
movement. Le Pen could have opted for compromise with the system and, therefore, been 
personally rewarded by the system. Although easier, he refused to be an “insider.” In the 
narrative of the National Front this persecution constitutes a “badge of honor” and 
testifies to the self-sacrificing character of their leader.
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One of the most prominent themes of the script of the Northern League is Bossi 
as the self-sacrificing Son of Padania. Again we find a use of biography similar to that of 
the National Front to legitimate this image of sacrifice. Bossi is constantly portrayed as 
someone who gave up a comfortable life, possibly as a doctor, to fight for the 
communities of Northern Italy. Bossi is described as someone who, from the very 
beginning, committed himself in a total manner to his cause. Given particular emphasis 
are the early days of the League when Bossi, despite widespread challenges, financial, 
logistic and from other political forces, managed to establish his own movement in the 
political landscape.
As in the case of Le Pen, Bossi is portrayed as someone who could have given in 
to the offers and temptations from the political establishment. However, he surrendered 
his selfish interests for the attainment of something higher: the creation of an independent 
Padania. Because of this “higher ideal” and his refusal to sell-out his movement, Bossi is 
the “victim” of persecution - he has talked about the possibility of being jailed or even 
assassinated - from the judiciary, media and political parties. This theme of unselfishness 
has remained unchanged even during the times where Bossi is a government official: 
Bossi entered the government not to fulfill personal interests but to fight for the cause of 
Padania. In the pursuit of his mission Bossi sacrificed his own health. In fact, his heart 
problems are usually described as the consequence of sleepless nights, tireless 
campaigning, and nonstop meetings, everywhere, with his militants. Bossi’s suffering is 
viewed as the result of his missionary zeal. In both cases, images of personal suffering 
and martyrdom abound. It increases the “missionizing” image of the leader as a heroic 
and stoic figure who endures great pain and sacrifice in order to fulfill his mission and ho 
serves as an example of sacrifice for the followers.
• The Leader as the People
The powerful dynamic of radical egalitarianism that crosses both movements is manifest 
in the way their narratives portray the leaders as personifications of common men with
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everyday qualities, attitudes, and lifestyles. They embody the radical anti-elitism of the 
movements they lead. They are hailed as the antithesis of the self-serving and self- 
centered elites that the rank-and-file disdains and despises. Again, the use of biography 
serves to legitimize this demotic dimension of the leaders. Both had humble beginnings: 
Le Pen as the offspring of a family of fisherman and peasants; Bossi grew up in the 
“simplicity and commonality” of the countryside. In the storyline of the movements both 
Le Pen and Bossi have an unassuming and unpretentious life style. This simplicity of life 
is persistently stressed. Not only they stay away from a luxurious way of living but also 
they regularly state that they do not need luxury, they do not need material possessions. 
Le Pen, for example, although he inhabits a mansion and has a considerable fortune, 
repeatedly stresses his ultimate frugal and austere nature. Intimately linked with the 
image of a “common man” is the image of the “family man”. Whether in party, 
congresses, meetings with militants and other public gatherings both leaders surround 
themselves with their families. Le Pen is seen many times with his wife and daughters, 
and Bossi with his wife and sons.
Their discourses emerge as the natural corollary of their dimension as simple 
people. Their language is direct and many times crude. In meetings with militants they 
adopt a conversational style, sometimes telling jokes, singing and, particularly in the case 
of Bossi, swearing. It is worthwhile to note that their discourse even though is 
conversational in nature it has also a strong dimension of erudition, particularly in the 
rallies with militants, utilizing regular references to history and cultural phenomena. This 
mix of informality and erudition provides the basis for a discourse of identity. At the 
same time their discourse is presented as an extension of common sense. The leaders, 
because they are from the people, have a direct link to what the people really think our 
really should think, no matter how much brainwashing and propaganda comes from the, 
“powerful.” In this way it comes as no surprise that both parties are identified as the 
people’s parties because they are the only ones who truly represent “the people.” The 
demotic dimension of Le Pen and of Bossi is crucial for their strategy of self-legitimation 
as saviors of the community. It gives them the right qualities and credentials to “guide” 
the people.
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• The Leader as the Party
Both the National Front and the Northern League represent political parties geared 
toward preserving and maintaining the primacy of the leader and the personal attachment 
between the leader and the militants. Lately, political scientists have commented on the 
trend in European mainstream political parties towards a top-down model of party 
organization and increasingly leadership driven parties. According to Peter Mair et al, 
“The parties become their leaders. What this also implies, of course, is that the party
i
appears more undifferentiated and standardized, speaking with just one voice and 
imparting just one message to the broader public.” However, this trend by the 
mainstream parties is understood as a response to changing electoral markets, and 
therefore essentially as an electoral tool for the masses.
What distinguishes the personalization of the National Front and the Northern 
League is that it is part of the nature of these parties and has been a crucial component 
since the origins. The fact that each leader was present at the creation of the parties is 
crucial to understand the highly personalized nature of each organization. Both parties are 
viewed as products of the leader’s commitment and vision. This image of the leader as 
someone who almost single-handedly created and developed the party functions as a 
“myth of origins” for both parties investing the leader with a natural sense of entitlement 
to decide about its structure and decision-making process.
From the very beginning both organizations were characterized by a hierarchical 
structure controlled by a leader with a discriminate power to appoint people to different 
offices. This leads to a personalized structure that creates and encourages personal loyalty 
to the leader. The mandate of many in both parties, particularly for those in executive 
positions, depends on the good will of the leader. Both executive committees of the party 
testify to this personal hierarchy. Le Pen and Bossi appoint the members of their 
executive committees, and the criteria for appointment is loyalty to the leader, which 
encourages the development of a monolithic dynamic under a single guidance. Both
769 Mair, Peter, W. Muller and F. Plasser (eds), Political Parties and Electoral Change: Party Responses to 
Electoral Markets, London, Sage Publications, 2004, p.265.
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leaders are triumphantly reelected in the party congresses by an acclamation that 
symbolizes the dynamics of the “true and direct democracy” pervading the ideology 
system of the collectivity. Strong from overwhelming mandates from “the people” both 
leaders set the party agenda and decide in which direction they want to take the party 
confident that the militants are in agreement.
This centralized structure of the party is deemed “necessary” due to the power 
and “mischievousness” of the group’s supposed enemies. Hell-bent in destroying them, 
these forces many times infiltrate agents in the group to create doubt and weaken its 
solidarity. Therefore, doubt must be quelled. Every schism that happens is justified 
within this framework of the “enemy within.” The possibility of internal betrayal is 
always present within the group and contributes to solidify the primacy of the leader even 
more, with officials eager to demonstrate their agreement and personal loyalty to the 
leader and periodically jockeying for position around him. Angelo Panebianco describes 
a pure charismatic party as one being “formed by one leader who imposes himself as 
undisputed leader, conceiver and interpreter of a set of political symbols (the party’s 
original ideological goals), which become inseparable from his person.”770 Both the 
National Front and the Northern League do seem to fit the category of “pure charismatic 
party.” Even if there is an element of routinization of charisma and bureaucratization, the 
dynamics of “true democracy” within the party and the discriminatory power and 
legitimacy that gives to the leader keep the personal and charismatic allegiances flowing 
within those bureaucratic structures.
770 Panebianco, Angelo, Political Parties: Organization and Power, Cambridge University Press, 1988, 
p.52.
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• The Leader as the Missionary
The central storyline produced by the Le Pen and Bossi industries, which sacralize the 
leader, is the portrayal of both Le Pen and Bossi as prophetic figures driven by a sense of 
mission to save their respective communities. This is the overriding theme in the script of 
both the National Front and the Northern League. This missionizing dynamic, however, 
is not merely connected with the promotion or enunciation of a sense of mission. It gains 
its strength from how persuasively the leaders embody this sense of mission. It deals, at a 
deeper level, with the issue of authenticity. The biographical dimensions of the leaders 
and their early and continuous commitment and devotion to the cause lend credibility to 
leader’s claims (or the inner core’s) that they have a mission indeed. The leaders are 
authentic and worthy of being invested with trust and belief not only because they put 
forward a storyline but also because they embody the story that they tell. It is a crucial 
distinction. This is also an important insight from studies that have focused on the 
process of leadership as a “narrative.” Howard Gardner’s conclusion that the most 
important weapon in the leader’s arsenal is stories of identity is confirmed by my case 
studies of Le Pen and Bossi. That is, “stories about themselves and their groups, about 
where they were coming from and where they were headed, about what to be feared, 
struggled against, and dreamed about.”771
But the way those leaders embody those stories -  the extent to which they 
personify the narrative - is crucial; otherwise they risk being downplayed as hypocrites 
and manipulators which, using the words of Gardner, “mutes the effectiveness of their 
stories.”772 From the beginning both leaders have showed commitment and devotion to 
the cause, many times at the expense of their own self-interest and well being, and have 
demonstrated that they possess the right and unique qualities to guide the group. In 
essence, they incarnate the figure of the missionary. This aspect adds a moral dimension 
to their leaderships. Their devotion, rectitude and loyalty to the group and the mission set 
an ethical example of sacrifice and commitment to all the followers. It also boosts their
771 Gardner, Howard, Leading Minds: An Anatomy of Leadership, New York, BasicBooks, 1995, p.14.
772 Ibid, p. 10.
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capital of trustworthiness within the community, for followers are more likely to accept 
shifts in strategy or policy only because they trust the leader, who knows what is best for 
the community and, above all, would never do anything to harm the community. This 
aspect can be seen, for example, in the way the core militancy of the Northern League 
followed the changes of direction of Umberto Bossi. The followers trust the leader’s 
strategy because it is the leader’s strategy. This dynamic is closely connected to the break 
with the rational order characteristic of the Weberian definition of charisma. It is 
important to remember the words of Weber:
Charismatic domination means a rejection of all ties to any external order in favor o f the 
exclusive glorification of the genuine mentality o f the prophet and hero. Hence, its attitude is 
revolutionary and transvalues everything; it makes a sovereign break with all traditional or 
rational forms: “It is written, But I say unto you.”773
In the same vein followers are also more likely to interpret electoral setbacks or 
internal crisis as tests to their faith in the leader and tests to their devotion to the 
community. The follower’s perception of Le Pen and Bossi as a leader who is authentic 
and genuinely committed to the collective cause is fundamental to an understanding of 
the leader’s “missionary dimension” and of the leadership capital that he gains from it. 
Their authority becomes sacred in the sense that calls not only for a strong belief but also 
a necessary leap of faith in the wisdom and rightness of the missionary leader.
The Sacred Collective
The actual construction and implementation of missionary politics is based on a paradigm 
of a redemptive outsiderhood. The group perceives and organizes itself as a separate and 
sacred entity existing on the periphery of the dominant profane rational-bureaucratic 
sphere that is ruled by “evil” forces and reliant for survival on the “passivity” and 
“ignorance” of the populace. This dynamic develops the group’s self perception as a
773 Max Weber, “The Sociology of Charismatic Authority,” in H. H. Gerth and C.W. Mills, From Max 
Weber: Essays in Sociology, New York, Oxford University Press, 1958, p.250.
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transcendent, sacralized entity set apart from the ordinary world. Though these 
movements collaborate with the dominant, hegemonic paradigm (participating in 
elections or even joining governmental coalitions, as in the case of the Northern League), 
internally they always see themselves as constituting a people apart. This outsiderhood 
dynamic is never lost within these movements.
1. Narrative and Outsiderhood
The narratives employed by these movements stress the group’s inherent uniqueness. As 
noted above, the members of the collective are hailed as the heirs to a specific historical 
tradition, a “chosen people” who, guided by their messianic leader, carry out the mission 
of saving their communities. This reinforces self-perceptions of “exceptionality” that set 
them apart from the mundane and ordinary world of politics. The narrative gives the 
group’s members an alternative understanding of reality, providing them with a different 
belief-system than the one promoted by the dominant paradigm. Therefore, their values, 
principles, and beliefs acquire a deviant nature. They differ from the normative system 
and the accepted standards of society, which is promoted by the “all powerful.” The fact 
that they see the world through the lens of deviancy creates what Michael Barkun has 
named a “stigmatized knowledge.” This type of knowledge runs counter to generally 
accepted beliefs. According to Barkun, “ by stigmatized knowledge [sic] I mean claims to 
truth that the claimants regard as verified despite the marginalization of those claims by 
the institutions that conventionally distinguish between knowledge and error -  
universities, communities of scientific researchers and the like.”774 This stigmatized 
knowledge can have different varieties but as my findings on Le Pen and Bossi indicate 
the overriding variety within both movements is clearly the one of suppressed knowledge. 
Here’s how Barkun describes suppressed knowledge:
774 Barkun, Michael, A Culture o f Conspiracy: apocalyptic Visions in Contemporary America, University 
of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 2003, p.26.
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[Suppressed knowledge is] claims that are allegedly known to be valid by authoritative 
institutions but are suppressed because the institutions fear the consequences o f public knowledge 
or have some evil or selfish motive for hiding the truth ... believers assume that when their own 
ideas about knowledge conflict with some orthodoxy, the forces o f orthodoxy will necessarily try 
to perpetuate error out o f self-interest or some other evil motive. The consequence is to attribute 
all forms of knowledge stigmatization to the machinations of a conspiracy.775
In fact, in the discourse of the National Front and the Northern League there is a 
constant embracing of what are perceived as the “taboos” of the hegemonic paradigm 
promoted by the elites. From the time of their creation they have made their own these 
themes that they have perceived to be excluded from use, approach or mention by the 
authorities. As noted previously, the dominant paradigm in France stresses a specific  
historical tradition. The French Republic is founded on the values of the Enlightenment 
and the idea of diversity and peaceful coexistence of ethnicities and cultures has become 
the widespread acceptable standard for public policy. From this dogma has emerged the 
idea of a multi-cultural society, a place where immigrants of different cultures or races 
form an integrated society. The National Front stresses a different historical tradition 
founded on a primordial ethnic vision of the Nation, which is constituted by members of 
the same ethnic group. Society is not an “abstract” group of citizens but a “natural” 
community of people who are bound by blood ties and a common culture. The National 
Front breaks the French Republic’ orthodoxy of “multiculturalism” with their heterodox 
vision of “monoculturalism”. Further, in a break with the dogma of the laicization of the 
Republic the National Front, as we have seen, puts the Christian heritage of the country at 
the forefront of its political discourse. At the same time the National Front embraces 
related issues perceived to be suppressed because they contradict this main paradigm of 
“diversity,” such as the heritage of the Vichy regime and colonialism.
The Northern League has always held close what it has perceived as the 
suppressed knowledge of the dominant Italian paradigm. To the faithful, this taboo 
originated in the nineteenth century with the historical unification of the Italian State 
known as Risorgimento. The centralized structure of Italy around its capital, Rome, and 
the related suppressing of local economies, cultures, and ethnicities became a dogma for 
the powerful elites. The continuing struggle of the Northern League has been against the 
powerful forces hell-bent on preserving the orthodoxy. In this vein the Northern League
775 Ibid, p.27.
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has emphasized a heterodox vision of history that stresses the continuous tradition of 
freedom of the communities of northern Italy. As in the case of the France, the 
hegemonic paradigm operating in Italy is also guilty of imposing an “artificial” model of 
multicultural society on the “natural” roots and traditions of the peoples. The Northern 
League breaks this taboo and offers its own model of a mono-cultural society.
The emphasis that both movements give to the creation of their own media and 
communications networks serves as good evidence of the crucial dynamics of suppressed 
knowledge that run through these movements. The mainstream media is invariably 
perceived as the gatekeeper of the dominant paradigm and nothing more but a tool of the 
orthodoxy. That is the reason why these “heterodox” movements are ostracized, 
censored, ridiculed, and mischaracterized by the mainstream media, which, therefore, 
cannot be trusted. These movements feel compelled to create their own media where their 
suppressed knowledge may be channeled, free of distortion and censorship, to the 
members of the community. The National Front has created a Publishing House that 
publishes both party programs, and books by major party figures and Le Pen. It has 
always had newspapers, magazines, and it was the first political party to use the Internet 
as a tool of political propaganda. The Northern League has also created its own 
Publishing House and had always had different party newspapers. It has also acquired a 
radio and a television channel. The League has used the Internet from the beginnings. 
Both parties see the Internet as a powerful medium to circle around what they perceive to 
be the bias of the media. Their websites are many times described as domains of freedom, 
from censorship and the guardians of the dominant paradigm. We will now look at how 
the permanent use of rites serves to solidify and make transcendent the outsiderhood 
dimension of both movements.
2. Ritualism and Outsiderhood
From the very beginning, both the National Front and the Northern League, in order to 
cement their alternative world experientially, have engaged in ritualism. These repetitive
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and standardized actions and events have served both as demonstrations and inculcations 
of collective allegiance to the beliefs of the group and to the missionary leader, and have 
had the consequence of reinforcing its internal solidarity. Both movements have provided 
their militants with a comprehensive system of rites. As we have seen, they regularly 
organize parades and processions to historical places. The National Front, for example, 
holds an annual homage to its patron saint, Joan of Arc, that includes a procession to the 
streets of downtown Paris, Le Pen laying a bouquet of flowers at a gilded statue of Joan 
of Arc riding a horse and waving the national flag, and a “solemn speech” of the leader to 
his militants in the Place d’Opera. The party also holds an annual Festival of the Blue- 
White-Red (the colors of the French flag), where the militants of the party gather in 
celebration. Again, the crucial moment of the gathering is a speech by Le Pen.
The Northern League regularly organizes majestic parade-rallies to Pontida, the 
place where their ancestors have sworn to defend the freedom of the communities of the 
north. The central point of each rally in Pontida is the speech of Bossi. The Party also 
annually holds three days of rallies in the area surrounding the Po River that delimitates 
the territory of Padania. These rallies end with a speech by Bossi in Venice.
These rites assume a form of pilgrimages, where the militants go to a sacred place 
where they spend considerable periods of time together in anticipation of the words of the 
founder and leader of the group. The fact that the speeches of both Le Pen and Bossi are 
an integral part of the ritualistic procedures is an essential aspect. In his study of the “new 
political style” that emerged in the early nineteenth-century from modem nationalism, 
Mosse explained the power of ritualistic speeches. By making the speech part of a ritual, 
in a sacred environment, the speech becomes a mere symbol among other symbols. In 
fact, both Le Pen and Bossi give their most militant, dramatic and missionizing speeches 
in these rituals. Their words, as stated by Mosse referring to ritualistic speeches of the 
past, “were thus actions, an integral part of the dramatization of the rite of national self­
representation.”776 In this manner “[the leader] was himself a living symbol who could 
commune with other symbols.”777 The liturgy of both the National Front and the Northern 
League, made of processions, rallies in sacred places (truly sanctuaries), flags, posters
776 Mosse, George L. op.cit, pp.201-2
777 Ibid, p. 202.
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and slogans, help to invest the leader, as a symbol among other symbols in these “hours 
of worship,” with an undisputable and sacred authority.
3. The Collective and Liminalitv
The sacralization of politics by both the National Front and the Northern League leads to 
a mythification of the party narrative. As we have seen, the militants are seen as a 
“chosen people,” heirs to a “sacred history,” who are engaged in a Salvationist mission 
and guided by a messianic leader. While the narrative becomes a “myth” in itself, the 
permanent use of rites, as we have seen, objectifies this mythic narrative and renders it a 
matter of personal and collective experience. In fact, through the use of myth, symbols, 
and rites, the community undergoes passage to what the anthropologist Victor Turner has 
called a “liminal situation.” This process that Turner first applied to tribal societies but 
then expanded to post-industrial contexts (calling it specifically “liminoid”) is 
characterized by a transcendent overcoming of the limits of everyday life and a 
suspension of the ordinary world. In these “threshold” moments, the ideal “world to 
come” is envisioned, which produces a sense of intense solidarity, which he characterized 
as communitas. Therefore, liminality is “a time and place of withdrawal from normal 
modes of social action,”778 and it is “any condition outside or on the peripheries of 
everyday life. It is often a sacred condition or can readily become one.”779 Turner has 
defined the route from liminality to communitas in the following manner:
People who are similar in one important characteristic ... withdraw symbolically, even actually, 
from the total system, from which they may in various degrees feel themselves “alienated” to 
seek the glow o f communitas among those with whom they share some cultural or biological 
feature they take to be their most signal mark of identity. Through the route o f ‘social category’
778 Turner, Victor, The Ritual Process: Structure and Anti-Structure, Cornell University Press, New York, 
1977, p.167. (First Edition 1969)
779 Turner, Victor Dramas, Fields and Metaphors: Symbolic Action in Human Society, Cornell University 
Press, 1979, p.47.
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they escape the alienating structure o f a “social system” into “communitas” or social 
antistructure.780
Liminality phases and communitas can develop on the fringes of the main 
structure, constitute the components of anti-structure or meta-structure, and are the 
“conditions for the production of [rival] root metaphors, conceptual archetypes, 
paradigms, models for, and the rest.”781 Turner’s theory of collective rituals is too large 
and complex for a detailed exposition here. But the dynamic dialectic between structure, 
liminality, and communitas is useful for achieving a fuller understanding of the sacred 
dimension of the National Front and Northern League collectivities. Both communities, 
through a mythologized narrative and ritualism undergo passage away from daily reality 
and into a liminal experience in which participants experience themselves immersed in a 
collective, unified body separated from the main hierarchical and divisive structure of 
society. As a consequence of this “threshold” situation, both the National Front and the 
Northern League constitute manifestations of communitas that is heightened during 
collective ritual performances.
We find here the same longing for wholeness that impels these movements, as we 
have noted before, to demotic millennialism and forms of direct democracy in an attempt 
to make reality more fulfilling. The main structure referred by Turner is a 
compartmentalized and rationalized society, where “the units are statuses and roles, not 
concrete human individuals. The individual is segmentalized into roles, which he 
plays.”782 These liminal movements break from this structure and form a different model 
of society, communitas, that in the words of Turner,
Often appears culturally in the guise o f an Edenic, paradisiacal, utopian or millennial state of  
affairs, to the attainment o f which religious or political action, personal or collective, should be 
directed. Society is pictured as a communitas of free and equal comrades -  o f total persons.783
780 Turner, Victor, “Variations on a theme of liminality,” in Sally F. Moore and Barbara G. Myerhoff, (eds), 
Secular Ritual, Van Gorcum, Netherlands, 1977, pp.47,48.
781 Turner, Victor, Dramas, Fields and Metaphors: Symbolic Action in Human Society, op.cit, and p.50.
782 Ibid. p.237.
783 Ibid, pp. 237-8
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4. Communitas and Militancy
Against a segmented model of society, both the National Front and the Northern League 
offer to adherents a model of society that is an undifferentiated, homogenous whole 
where individuals are united by feelings of brotherhood, a shared belief-system and a 
common will. The internal dynamics of these missionary communities bespeak of the 
centrality of kinship and affinity for its members. My findings, through analysis of party 
literature and interviews, attest to this aspect of the parties as a “community of equals” 
under the guidance of the missionary leader. The communities are relentlessly portrayed 
as “communities of love” where affectivity between the members is a driving force. They 
constantly say that they are bounded by love toward each other and toward the homeland 
that, in their view, has been betrayed and corrupted. They are moral communities that, in 
these times of tribulation, share a common idealism, faith, courage, sacrifice, and hope in 
the coming of their version of the Millennium. All the members of communitas have a 
sense of righteousness about themselves and of the absolute goodness of their mission. 
Those who defect are invariably characterized as “moral failures” and miscreants to the 
community.
Because of the fervor and solidarity generated by missionary politics, the 
commitment of the militants is total, which increases the effectiveness of their militancy. 
In the past few years several studies have shown that, in comparison to the heyday of 
mass parties, party membership in Europe, particularly in France and Italy, is on the 
wane. One of the reasons, as stated by Mair and Biezen, is that “as party identities have 
waned, and as partisan politics itself has become eroded, individuals citizens are 
themselves probably less likely to be willing to devote the time and energy that is often 
required by active party membership.”784 To Mair et al, “today, however, the most 
pressing challenge to which the mainstream parties have to respond is that posed by 
popular disengagement and disaffection.”785 The activism of the militants of both the
784 Mair, Peter and Ingrid van Biezen, “Party Membership in Twenty European Democracies, 1980-2000, 
Party Politics, Vol.7, No.l, 2001, p. 14.
785 Mair, Peter, W. Muller and F. Plasser, op.cit, p.273.
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National Front and the Northern League runs against this trend in European politics 
where political activism, at least through the traditional institutions, is not seen as 
rewarding anymore.
• Group Dynamics. Commitment and Conversion
The work of sociologists of religion Stark and Finke regarding the formation and 
development of religious groups provides insights that might help us to have a rounded 
view of the high levels of commitment dynamics within the Missionary Community.. 
These missionary communities play an analogous role to religious sects, that is, religious 
groups who are in a high tension with their surroundings. They have norms and values 
different from those of the surrounding society and many times they are met either by 
ridicule or open hostility. As we have seen, in the case of both the National Front and the 
National Front they set themselves apart from the rest of society becoming subcultural 
deviances. Herein lies a fundamental reason to understand the high level of commitment 
of both groups. For Stark and Finke, “the higher its level of tension with its surroundings, 
the more extensive the commitment to a religious organization.” As explained by them,
The higher the tension of their religious group, the less distinction people draw between religious 
and secular matters: religious doctrines and practices impinge on everything else, defining with 
whom they associate, how they spend their leisure time, sometimes even how they dress and 
speak.786
At the same time, “the higher its level of tension with its surroundings, the more 
expensive it is to belong to a religious group”, that is, the higher the material, social and 
psychic costs of belonging to a religious group. Thus, the group demands and requires 
more of its members. Finally, “the higher a group’s level of tension with its surroundings,
786 Stark, Rodney and Finke,Roger, Acts o f Faith: Explaining the Human Side of Religion, University of 
California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 2000, p. 144.
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the higher its average level of member commitment.”787 For Stark and Finke there is a 
reciprocal relationship between expense and the value of the rewards of membership. In 
the case of the sects the greater value they offer in return for commitment is a close, 
personal and responsive God.
In fact, for the militants of both the National Front and the Northern League both 
movements offer indeed a greater value that justifies all the costs for the true believers. It 
is an important insight to understand that the activism does not necessarily represent an 
irrational or “demential” attachment to the cause. The issue of “brainwashing” becomes a 
false issue. Most militants express the notion that, although the costs of belonging to 
these movements are extremely high in terms of emotional-physical commitment and 
sacrifice, the rewards of belonging to a “true community” that gives sense and a 
transcendental meaning to their lives alleviates all the trials they have to go through. The 
fact of belonging to the sacred communities of the righteous and experiencing the power 
of the collective and its devotion, committed to a mission of salvation as pronounced by a
# 7 0 0
charismatic leader justifies all the costs. Although a cost-benefit analysis is manifestly 
insufficient to understand all the dynamics and shades of these missionary communities it 
does not mean that such analysis should be all together discarded if it takes into account 
benefits that are essentially spiritual and psychological in nature, even though these are 
hard to quantify. Nonetheless, the testaments and deeds of the participants demonstrate 
that these benefits can be intensely motivating.
A related issue has to do with the dynamics of growth and the possibility or not of 
these missionary communities extend themselves from a core of supporters to the rest of 
society. This is connected to the question of if the charisma of the coterie can be 
expanded and transformed into mass charisma. The high levels of commitment of the 
members of these missionary communities lead them to proselytize and seek conversion 
of others. In reality, this need for conversion appears as a natural compensator for a 
movement that although it feels itself world-historical has a problem of validating its own 
marginality. The dynamics of close-knit group formation demonstrate that any new 
member will feel compelled to adapt their behavior and commitment to the average of the
787 Ibid, p. 145.
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group. It is the power of example. As stated by Stark, “people take their cues from the 
example set for them by typical others. To the extent that most people around them 
display high levels of commitment and express their confidence that their religion is true 
and effective people will conform.”789 At the same time because the religious group 
requires high costs of everyone it eliminates the problem of free-riders.790
Van Dooren in his study of charismatic communities acknowledges a similar 
dynamic in the newcomers of “spellbound communities.” For him, the convergence of 
outsiders to the community -  who he calls joiners - stems from the core militants, who he 
calls seekers (those charismatically committed) enthusiasm who set an “infectious spread 
of mood in a group motion”, that is, their behavior “attracts the attention of others in the 
environment who may then either be carried away by the contagious, display of 
enthusiasm or may interpret leader-adoration as the proper conduct in the given 
circumstances.” 791 In the final section I will discuss some of the contemporary trends that 
can, on one hand, deepen the enthusiasm, commitment and zeal within the missionary 
communities and, on the other hand, facilitate the proselytizing of new converts by the 
militants outside of the missionary borders of their community. Whether such 
proselytizing will set off a “contagious mood” for the rest of society is outside of the 
scope of my thesis.
What is relevant to note is that throughout their respective existence both the 
National Front and the Northern League have consolidated an outsiderhood dynamic -  
composed, as noted above, of various elements - that has developed each group’s self- 
perception as an “exceptional” entity, set apart from the mundane and ordinary. This 
liminal quality of these movements begets perceptions of a “true community” or 
communitas characterized by a different belief system, common values, and a different 
model of society than the dominant rationalized socio-political paradigm and bureaucratic 
structure. In the process the group acquired a transcendent dimension and the whole 
collectivity a sacred nature.
788 On this point, regarding a more instrumentalist dynamic within of religious groups see Stark, Rodney 
and Finke, op.cit, pp. 144-145.
789 Ibid, p. 147.
790 Ibid, p. 147-8
791 Van Dooren, Ron, Messengers from the Promised Land: An interactive theory o f political charisma, 
DSWO Press, Leiden University, 1994, p.253.
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Leadership and the Missionary Model
In sum, my data has shown that there is a sacralized framework -  comprised of a 
mythologized narrative and the use of symbols and rites - in both the National Front and 
the Northern League that sustain the relationship between the charismatic leader, 
perceived as a “living symbol” of the movement, and his “chosen people.” This structure, 
therefore, serves to support and maintain the charismatic dynamics and the missionary 
community. However, the focus on structure and on its function as a force of integration 
and group solidarity should not keep us away from the fact that agency has played and 
continues to play a fundamental role in creating and maintaining the missionary 
community. This hinges on the question of whether the missionary leaders are essentially 
strategists who use sacral and symbolic resources in a rational manner for political gain 
and manipulation of followers or they are indeed genuine true believers.
Evidently, in the process of constructing a compelling view of reality these 
leaders have at their disposal a full range of cultural resources that help to cement 
allegiances and mobilize people for collective action. Willner, for example, has noticed 
how one of the driving forces of charismatic legitimacy is the capacity of the leader to 
“inadvertently or deliberately tap the reservoir of relevant myths in his culture,” knowing 
how to “draw upon those myths that are linked to its sacred figures, to its historical and 
legendary heroes, and to its historical and legendary ordeals and triumphs.” The vast 
literature on social movements, drawing from the work of sociologist Erving Goffinan,793 
has showed how these social movements have always been involved in the shaping, 
structuring, and construction of social life. By assigning meaning to events and 
conditions, these “framing processes” mobilize participants and “function to organize
792 Willner, Ann Ruth, The Spellbinders, Charismatic Political Leadership, op.cit, p.62.
793 Goffinan, Erving, Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of Experience, Harper Colophon 
Books, New York, 1974. To him, “When the individual in our Western Society recognizes a particular 
event, he tends, whatever else he does, to imply in this response (and in effect employ) one or more 
frameworks or schemata of interpretation of a kind that can be called primary,” p.21.
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experience and guide action, whether individual or collective.”794 An important 
dimension of this framing of reality is, in the words of David Snow and Robert Benford, 
“narrative fidelity” or the way framing resonates with cultural narrations, that is, “with 
the stories, myths and folk tales that are part and parcel of one’s cultural heritage and that 
thus function to inform events and experiences in the immediate present.”795
As noted previously, the extent to which the National Front and the Northern 
League both portray themselves as the true defenders of the threatened cultural milieu of 
their nations and, therefore, have this dimension of cultural resonance with its symbols 
and myths, plays a crucial part in these movements’ mobilizing potency. As seen both in 
their writings and speeches, and through the activities of their respective parties, both Le 
Pen and Bossi are aware that symbolism and culture constitute powerful vehicles for 
resource mobilization. Thus, their efforts are in part calculated. At the same time they 
have seemed throughout their careers to display a spontaneous and genuine attachment 
both to their cause and to the missionary communities that they represent Not only do 
they declare themselves to be true believers; they act as true believers and continue to 
commit themselves to their movements in a total manner, as “true” militants should. 
Herein lies, as noted, a major reason that these leaders continue to appeal to their 
followers. Both leaders frame reality and mobilize resources to maximize their appeal. 
But ultimately what matters most for missionary politics is they way the leaders are 
perceived as genuine true believers by the other members of the community.
Roy Wallis emphasizes the need to focus on the social construction of charisma. I 
agree with Wallis when he writes that,
Becoming charismatic is not a once and for always thing. It is a crucial feature o f charisma that it 
exists only in its recognition by others. It must be constantly reinforced and reaffirmed or it no 
longer exists. The charismatic leader, and those around him, must find means constantly to secure 
the reaffirmation required.796
794 Snow, David A. and Robert D. Benford, “Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and 
Movement Participation,” American Sociological Review, Vol.51, 1986, p.464.
795 Snow, David and Robert Benford, “Ideology, Frame Resonance, and Participant Mobilization,” in B. 
Klandermans, H. Kriesi and S. Tarrow, From Structure to Action: Comparing Social Movement Research 
Across Cultures, Vol.l, JAI Press Inc, Greenwich, Connecticut, 1988, p.210.
796 Wallis, Roy, “The Social Construction of Charisma,” in Social Compass, XXIX/1, 1982, p.35.
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My focus on the implementation and actual operationalization of missionary politics in 
my case studies has demonstrated how crucial agency is in the process of construction of 
a reality, an organic whole, that integrates individuals and their leaders. However, 
although Missionary Politics is a construction, an element of authenticity lies at the very 
heart of the attachment to the community. Followers, therefore, should not be seen as 
“trapped” or “manipulated” by the missionary community. They are willing members of 
the community, in the sense that they are willing of being carried away by the emotional 
benefits offered by the community. It is not the missionary structure that imposes on the 
individual his or her allegiance to the community. This structure facilitates and sustains 
the allegiance. However, it is the member’s ideology, the power of belief, the emotional 
reality of experience, and the deeply felt perception of the “moral value” of the mission 
that is at the very root and underpins the allegiance to the community.
The Future of Missionary Politics
My findings from the study of the National Front and the Northern League attest to the 
continuing centrality of secularized and nationalistic religious beliefs in contemporary 
Western Europe. The sacralization of politics, which provides a transcendent framework 
of meaning for individuals, is alive and well and does not confine itself to totalitarian 
movements of the past. Future studies should focus on the persistence of the sacred in 
these contemporary neo-populist movements, which might in turn explain the continuous 
role of charisma as a force in modern politics. There are current trends that have the 
potential to increase the appeal of missionary politics, particularly in Europe. These 
trends, by increasing apocalyptic dynamics, might increase the call for a politics anchored 
in millenarian expectations and a telos of salvation. If the case studies of the National 
Front and the Northern League serve as an indication, the future promises more 




Anti-globalization rhetoric has become a primal force in the development of missionary 
politics. In the paradigm of missionary politics I have outlined, it is inevitably perceived 
to be a malign project promoted by powerful elites recklessly determined to achieve 
world domination. In this vision, it is a utopian project, rooted on an economicist vision, 
and has the final goal of the uniformization of peoples, cultures and practices, all united 
in the worship of the market. Policies of de-population and open borders are an essential 
part of this calculated project to disintegrate ethnicities and uproot cultures, which are 
pictured as the last bastions of authentic human experience.
This apocalyptic portrait of globalization -  linked with the pervasive 
conspiratorial theme of a New World Order - offers a grand narrative to missionary 
movements, involved in a struggle of historical proportions against the forces of evil. It 
also increases millenarian expectations. Ultimately, for these movements, globalization is 
forcefully rejected because it is thought to lead to a “devaluation” of Man. That is the 
reason why the criticism of globalization within these movements is indistinguishable 
from the criticism of the materialism and vacuity of modem society. Anti-globalization is 
therefore intimately linked with calls for a purification and renewal of the materialistic 
West. This rhetoric for cleansing implies a holistic, not pragmatic, vision of politics. 
Missionary politics, therefore, has found a fertile ground in its resistance against 
globalization, which appeals to a larger population afraid of a loss of identity in the 
anonymous global marketplace.
2. Islamization
The National Front and the Northern League manifest a deep sense of foreboding about 
the increasing number of Muslim immigrants and see their influx as a grave threat to
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Europe’s traditional Christian culture. The fear of an Islamization of the continent has 
increasingly gained ground in the narrative of both parties and has fueled apocalyptic 
dynamics where the end of millenarian Europe is presented as a real possibility. This 
theme of the “rise and fall” of Christian Europe replaced by a Muslim Europe has the 
potential to override, in the narrative of missionary movements, all other themes. Both 
the National Front and the Northern League have taken the lead in fighting against the 
construction of mosques and Muslim schools in their countries. The Northern League felt 
the need to readjust its discourse in a more Christian-oriented direction. One of the most 
recent electoral posters of the National Front reveals the growing importance of this 
theme. “Did you like immigration?” it states, “Well, you’re going to love 
islamization!”797
One of the dominant themes of these parties in the European Elections of 2004 
was the urge to resist the entry of Turkey into the European Union, which is interpreted 
as a potential cataclysmic event for the rooted Christian culture of Europe. The 
demographic decline of Europe and the filling of this demographic void with Muslim 
immigrants have increased the drama and the sense of urgency in the discourse of these 
movements. The coupling of these two factors, from the perspective of both the National 
Front and the Northern League, will create in the not so distant future a doomsday 
scenario for Europe. This sense of foreboding is likely to deepen, producing a greater 
distance between the “masses” and the “elites,” who seem at best as indifferent and at 
worst conniving with this trend, and will increase calls for political salvation.
3. Europeanization
The emergence and widening of a European Union policy paradigm is likely to increases 
narratives of identity that see in Europeanization a direct threat against the diversity of 
continental cultures. The push by the elites to build a postmodern bureaucratic paradise is
797 “Le 13 Juin dites non a la Turquie dans l’Europe,” May-June 2004, in www.frontnational.com
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seen as an attack against the “people.” Both the National Front and the Northern League 
have positioned themselves against the “Brussels mentality” characterized by the urge to 
meddle and to regulate every simple aspect of the European Union citizens. Both parties 
attack what they perceive to be a dangerous and artificial process of “social engineering,” 
hell-bent on destroying the “natural” roots and allegiances of traditional European 
societies.
Therefore, the European Union is increasingly derided as a “Superstate” of a 
tyrannical and totalitarian nature ruled by a class of bureaucrats. In the light of this, 
European Union-wide policies are nothing more but an attempt to coerce the citizens, 
legally and morally, to accept their version of society. This perception of a Europe-wide 
“rule of bureaucrats” has the potential of increasing the gap between the citizens and 
institutions of power and strengthening internal dynamics of outsiderhood and localism 
within the European countries.
An Overview
As I stated in the introduction to my thesis my method of investigation and explanation of 
the phenomena of contemporary sacralized politics was based on the construction of a 
heuristic device, an ideal type of the kind of politics that I named Missionary. Using the 
empirical reality of the movements as a starting point and taking seriously what the 
leaders and followers say and do, I then highlighted the salient dimensions of their 
sacralization of the political and used that to put forward a model of the characteristic 
pattern and structure of their collective action. In the process, and using contributions 
from different disciplines, I define Missionary politics as a cluster concept that gathers 
similar ideals, goals, and worldviews together. My research within both the National 
Front and the Northern League, deduced from their internal materials, indicates the 
following constellation: Missionary Politics should be understood as a form of political 
religion carried out by a chosen people who, in a time of self-perceived deep-rooted 
crisis, sees itself as a moral community led by a missionary charismatic leader
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undertaking a collective mission of salvation. Driven by apocalyptic and millenarian 
dynamics, the community manifests its solidarity and belief in the mission by constant 
ritualization. In the process, the members of the community celebrate themselves as a 
sacred collective, as representatives of a sacred nation and heirs to a sacred history 
involved in an apocalyptic showdown with the evil and conspiratorial forces of a new 
world order.
As an ideal type, Missionary Politics does not replicate exactly the reality of the 
case studies but highlight the features of patterned actions of the sacralization of the 
political and systematizes them into a coherent means-end chain. Therefore, both the 
National Front and the Northern League, although close to ideal typical cases for 
missionary leadership, do not replicate the pure type of Missionary Politics that, as an 
ideal type, will always remain a “constructed utopia.” This leads to the issue of whether 
other political leaders and movements, from the right or the left, can be positioned as 
cases of contemporary Missionary Politics. That depends on further investigation of other 
cases that will determinate or not if they fit the ideal type as well as the National Front 
and the Northern League and, if not, which specific factors are responsible for the various 
trajectories. This leads to what I hope to be the major contribution of my ideal type of 
Missionary Politics, that of providing an heuristic device to guide further examination 
into the phenomena of contemporary political religions and assist in discovering 
sacralized actions and patterns that otherwise would be neglected or left undiscovered. In 
this manner, the ideal type of Missionary Politics should be utilized not only as a 
“yardstick” against which reality can be compared and measured but also as a theoretical 
framework, a model that offers hypothesis that can be tested against specific case studies, 
assist in their conceptual framing and give an explanation of reality. This theoretical 
model of Missionary Politics might then be extended to other cases and contribute to the 
field of comparative politics.
My adoption of a cluster analysis approach to Missionary Politics has led me to 
formulate a conceptual framework that reveals associations and structures between major 
concepts that interact dynamically and in a synergetic manner. This approach might lead 
researchers in social sciences to avoid mono-causal approaches that many times capture 
reality in a reductionist manner. Therefore to have a full picture of the political religion of
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Missionary Politics the researcher might look not only at the sacred sources of 
nationalism but also at the establishment of “true communities” in a quest for salvation, 
issues of purity and pollution, ritualization, the development of charismatic leadership 
dynamics, the pervading sense of a conspiracy, among others. All of these concepts, 
behaviors, and values constitute the “building” of Missionary Politics and all of them 
play a constitutive role in its formation and development.
Ultimately, my thesis is in agreement with those who reject the secularization 
theory, particularly its micro-version of the gradual disappearance of individual piety and 
belief. The examples of the National Front and the Northern League offer proof that 
faith-based “secular” movements remain strong and may become even stronger in 
reaction to felt threats to localized identity. Within these movements, the sacralization of 
both the group and its collective mission is made in such a comprehensive manner that it 
gives members a way of “re-enchanting” the world with myths, rituals, and promise of a 
promised land. In this manner politics, no longer a judiciary activity, transforms itself 
into a sacred worldview that injects a sense of meaning and a revitalized identity in all of 
those touched by the sacred mission. In conclusion, it seems that a sacralized form of 
politics, far from absent in the modem or postmodern era, is destined to remain salient, 
and perhaps even to increase in importance. The primacy given by missionary leaders and 
groups to the aforementioned global and societal tendencies and to a secular-nationalist 
form of religious experience, bespeaks the potential appeal of missionary politics or 
“politics not as usual,” at least in contemporary Western Europe. Whether we like it or 
not, missionizing politics is here to stay for the foreseeable future.
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APPENDIX
In this section is an array of visual materials from the National Front and the Northern 
League. These images are reproductions of photographic, visual, and literary materials 
pertaining to either party: Along with photos of Jean-Marie Le Pen and Umberto Bossi, 




National Front (Fig. 1-17)
Figure 1 - The “burning flame,” the National Front Logo.
Figure 2 — Le Pen talking to reporters after the bomb attack on his house, in 1976. 
Figure 3 — Propaganda poster of the National Front, showing Le Pen gagged 
under the headline, “They want to gag France.”
Figure 4 — Le Pen at a meeting with his militants, in Marseille, France.
Figure 5 — Propaganda posters of the National Front, showing a ship, symbolizing 
France, sinking, and another one showing Le Pen as “The Captain,” who can save 
her.
Figure 6 —Le Pen and the “sacred” figure of Joan of Arc.
Figure 7 — Poster promoting the annual National Front Rally o f May First in 
honor of Joan of Arc.
Figure 8 — Le Pen leading the 2004 May First parade of the National Front in 
Paris.
Figure 9 — Poster of Le Pen under the headline “The Future is today.”
Figure 10 — Cover of the Roger Mauge Biography of Le Pen, titled “The Truth 
about Le Pen”
Figure 11 — The site of the “great speech” of Le Pen to his militants, in Place 
d’Opera in Paris, during the May first 2004 rally of the National Front 
Figure 12 — The apotheosis during Le Pen’s speech.
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Figure 13 — The cover of the National Front’s cartoon book dedicated to the life of 
Jean-Marie Le Pen.
Figure 14 — Cover o f the National Front’s Magazine Frattcais d ’Abord, October 
2004.
Figure 15 — Photo of Le Pen under the headline “Proud o f being French”, 
advertised as a background for computer in the National Front’s website.
Figure 16 — Poster of the National Front’s electoral campaign for the June 2004 
European Parliament Elections “For France, Make Yourself Respect.”
Figure 17 — Poster of the National Front alerting against the Muslim threat to the 
European Identity, headlined “No to the Entry of Turkey [into the European 
Union]”
Northern League (Fig. 18-34)
Figure 18 — Poster of the Northern League.
Figure 19 — Cartoon strip showing Bossi, dresses as the medieval warrior Alberto 
da Giussano, fighting its enemies. Published in Lega Nord, May 6,1996.
Figure 20 — Poster advertising a rally in the « sacred place » of Pontida.
Figure 21— The Celtic logo of the Northern League.
Figure 22— Poster advertising the annual September rally in Venice “Come, give 
your support to the freedom of Padania.”
Figure 23 — Photo of Bossi’s “great speech” during the annual rally in Venice, 
September 2001.
Figure 24 — Parade of militants, Venice September 2001.
Figure 25 - idem
Figure 26 — Rally of the Northern League, in front of M ilan’s Duomo cathedral, 
during the 2001 national elections.
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Figure 27— Speech of Bossi during a rally at Pontida.
Figure 28 — The swearing of loyalty to Padania from the officials of the Northern 
League, during the Venice rally of 2001.
Figure 29 -  2001 Northern League poster advertising the beginning of the annual 
three day rallies along the Po River, starting in its source in Monviso: “Devolution, 
Freedom, Speech of Bossi.”
Figure 30 — Photo of Bossi during a speech to the militants.
Figure 31 — Campaign poster of the Northern League for the 2004 European 
Parliament elections.
Figure 32 — Cover of the Northern League’s daily newspaper La Padania during 
the health-related absence of the leader: “Bossi, Pontida is waiting for you.”
Figure 33 — Another image of Bossi posted on the Web Site of the Lega Lombarda 
during his absence: “Go Umberto, Come back soon Warrior.”
Figure 34 — Cartoon created by militants of the Northern League, against the 
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